M.A.R., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile appellate court reversed a restitution condition imposed as part of community control probation because the trial judge improperly delegated the determination of restitution amount and payment terms to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (H.R.S.) rather than adjudicating those matters himself after giving the defendant notice and opportunity to be heard.
The trial judge cannot delegate the determination of restitution amount and payment terms to an agency; the judge must adjudicate these matters after giving the defendant notice and opportunity to be heard. However, restitution may be ordered even for crimes of which the defendant was not convicted if the defendant's conduct directly or indirectly proximately caused or substantially contributed to the damages.
[1] A trial court may not delegate the determination of the amount and method of restitution to a third party.
[2] Before ordering restitution as a condition of probation or community control, the trial court must provide the defendant with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before restitution is ordered as a condition of probation (or community control) the trial judge should give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard both as to the appropriate amount of restitution to be made and as to the exact method and terms of payment. These matters must be adjudicated by the judge and cannot be delegated.”
Establishes that restitution conditions require judicial adjudication after notice and opportunity to be heard; delegation to an agency is improper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.A.R., a minor, committed battery on Gerald Foland at a beach party. While appellant chased Foland, other persons in the group damaged Foland's vehic…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellant, a minor, committed a battery on one Gerald Foland at a party on a beach. Foland, attempting to leave the area, got his vehicle stuck in the sand. While appellant chased Foland other persons in the group smashed the windshield, dented the doors and slashed the tires on Foland’s stuck vehicle. Charged with juvenile delinquency by virtue of battery and criminal mischief on the vehicle, appellant was convicted of the battery but not of the criminal mischief charge. As a condition of community control (probation) appellant was ordered to make restitution for the damages to the vehicle “under terms and conditions specified by H.R.S.” Appellant argues that the trial court erred as to the matter of restitution. We agree.
It was error for the juvenile judge to order that the amount and manner of restitution be determined and specified by H.R.S. Before restitution is ordered as a condition of probation (or community control) the trial judge should give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard both as to the appropriate amount of restitution to be made and as to the exact method and terms of payment. These matters must be adjudicated by the judge and cannot be delegated. See Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1977); T.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); E.Y. v. State, 390 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Kroenke v. State, 366 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
We do not agree that the trial judge may not order restitution in this case merely because he did not find appellant guilty of criminal mischief with respect to the damage to the vehicle. Appellant’s conduct in committing the battery and in chasing the victim may have directly or indirectly proximately caused or substantially contributed to the damage done to the vehicle. This was a matter for the trial judge to determine. We have held that conditions of probation are not limited to those having some relationship to the exact crime which resulted in the probation but are proper to achieve any of the lawful purposes of probation. Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), review denied 419 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.1982). The principles of Bentley also apply to conditions of community control in juvenile cases.
Since the form of the condition of restitution in this case was improper, we reverse the sentence (disposition) and remand for resentencing (redisposition) anew in accordance with Bentley and this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DISPOSITION.
ORFINGER, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur.
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Rose v. State, 434 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…ve purpose. This court has held that conditions of probation are not limited to those having a relationship to the exact crime which resulted in the probation, but are proper if they achieve any of the lawful purposes of probation. M.A.R. v. State, 433 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.1982). The objective of the court in sentencing is to act on the offender in such a manner that, in the future, the offender will…
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Bowling v. State, 479 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…amage or loss having a direct relationship to the offense which results in probation. See Roberts v. State, 467 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Rose v. State, 434 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. den. 444 So. 2d 418 (Fla.1984); M.A.R. v. State, 433 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. den. 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1983). In this case, there was no question that the probationer caused the accident and injuries as a result of his reckless driving. Cf. Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1977) (where the rec…
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Huffman v. State, 472 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…tion upon the appellant. Section 948.03(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), requires that the trial court determine the amount of restitution to be made by the probationer or offender in community control. This duty cannot be delegated. M.A.R. v. State, 433 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed, and the sentence is set aside and remanded for resentencing. SHIVERS, J., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. . Compare, Rule 3.220(a)(l)(i), which provides: (a) Prosec…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977)
- Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- E. Y. v. State, 390 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- DeWITT v. Rollin W. Zimmerman, 366 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- T.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Claudette Canley v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)