CLIFFORD JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Clifford Jenkins was convicted of first-degree murder, armed burglary, and kidnapping with intent to facilitate robbery. The Florida appellate court affirmed the murder and burglary convictions but reversed the kidnapping conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the confinement was not merely incidental to the other felonies, as required by controlling precedent.
The kidnapping conviction must be reversed because the record does not establish that the confinement was not merely incidental to another felony. Under Mobley v. State, the kidnapping statute does not apply to unlawful confinements that are merely incidental to other felonies, and the evidence here was entirely consistent with the victim being murdered immediately, making any confinement inconsequential to further criminal acts.
[1] A conviction for kidnapping with intent to facilitate a felony will be reversed if the confinement or movement is merely incidental to the commission of another felony.
[2] Evidence of a victim's confinement must establish that the confinement was not merely incidental to another felony to support a kidnapping conviction.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Court held that the section does not apply to unlawful confinements or move-ments that are merely incidental to other felonies”
Establishes the governing legal standard from Mobley v. State that the kidnapping statute must be narrowly construed to avoid unconstitutionality
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins was charged with and tried for first-degree murder, armed burglary, and kidnapping with intent to facilitate robbery. The victim was found bou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Armed Burglary cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Jenkins was charged by a three count indictment with (I) first degree murder,1 (II) armed burglary,2 and (III) kidnapping with intent to facilitate the commission of a robbery.3 He was tried and convicted on all three counts. By this appeal, Jenkins challenges only the kidnapping conviction on the single ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge and conviction of a kidnapping allegedly committed “with the intent to ... facilitate the commission of a ... robbery.” We agree and reverse the kidnapping conviction. In Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1982), the Court held that a literal construction of subsection 787.01(l)(a)2 would render the statute unconstitutional because it “would apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person such as robbery or sexual battery.” Id. at 1034. Therefore, the Court held that the section does not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that are merely incidental to other felonies.4
In the present case, there were no witnesses to the crime and the defendant did not testify.5 The evidence upon which appellant was convicted consisted almost entirely of expert testimony that fibers, hair and blood samples found at the scene of the crime matched fibers, hair and blood samples found on appellant’s clothes and in his room. Appellant’s roommates also testified about his comings and goings on the night in question and about what he was wearing. There was no evidence of the sequence of events as they occurred on that night. The victim’s son testified that he found her body bound and gagged on the floor of her ransacked house the following morning. However, there is no evidence of when the victim was tied up or for how long, or how long she lived after being bound. It is therefore impossible to determine whether or not the confinement was accomplished with an intent to facilitate the commission of a robbery. The record evidence is, instead, entirely consistent with a supposition that the victim was murdered immediately, so that, in this case, her confinement before death was inconsequential in the commission of further criminal acts. See Faison, supra. Because the record does not establish that the confinement was not merely incidental to another felony, _we reverse the kidnapping conviction. The murder and burglary convictions are affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and WENTWORTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . § 782.04(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981).
. § 810.02(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1981).
.§ 787.01(l)(a)2, Fla.Stat. (1981).
. See also Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983), adopting the standard to be applied in determining whether a particular movement or detention constitutes kidnapping.
. Appellant apparently had an accomplice, but he did not testify.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
MacKerley v. State, 754 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…e bedroom); Berry v. State, 668 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla.1996)(“[T]here can be no kidnap! ]ing where the only confinement involved is the sort that, though not necessary to the underlying felony, is likely to naturally accompany it.”); Jenkins v. State, 433 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)(reversing the kidnaping charge because the record was consistent with a supposition that the victim was murdered immediately, so that, in this case, her confinement before death was inconsequential in the commission of further ac…
Authorities Cited
- Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)
- Autley Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1982)