JACK C. COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-06-22
No. 82-2613
GRIMES and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
433 So. 2d 627 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Negative Treatment
Cited by 17 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jack Coleman appeals his conviction and four-year sentence for burglary after the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea when a material fact about his probation status was discovered post-plea. The appellate court reversed, holding that Florida law requires a defendant be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea when the trial court determines it cannot honor the terms of a plea bargain.


Holding

When a trial court determines it cannot honor the terms of a plea bargain, the defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial court erred in denying Coleman's motion to withdraw.


Headnotes

[1] When a trial court determines it cannot honor the terms of an earlier plea bargain, the defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

[2] A trial court must grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the court determines it will not honor the terms of a prior plea agreement.

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Key Quotes

“It is the rule in Florida that when the trial court determines that it cannot honor the terms of an earlier plea bargain, the defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.”

Establishes the controlling legal rule that mandates the appellate court's decision to reverse

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Facts & Procedural History

Coleman pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain with Judge Parker capping his sentence at one year and one day. At the plea hearing, Coleman's counsel …

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Opinion of the Court
BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

Jack G. Coleman appeals his judgment and four-year sentence for burglary, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse.

Appellant pled guilty before Judge Parker pursuant to a plea bargain with the court that he would not receive more than a year and a day in prison. Prior to formal entry of the plea and the trial court’s offer of the sentencing cap, appellant’s counsel represented to the court in appellant’s presence that his client had never been given an opportunity for probation. Sentencing was deferred in order to obtain a presentence investigation report (PSI).

The PSI revealed that appellant was currently on probation for a burglary in Tampa. Appellant’s counsel stated at the sentencing hearing that he had not been aware of this fact at the plea hearing. When the sentencing judge, Judge Federico, stated that he did not feel bound by the terms of the original agreement due to the misrepresentation, defense counsel requested permission to withdraw appellant’s guilty plea. The court denied the motion and sentenced appellant to four years in prison.

It is the rule in Florida that when the trial court determines that it cannot honor the terms of an earlier plea bargain, the defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. E.g., Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1971). Thus, when the trial court determined that it would not honor the terms of the prior plea agreement, it was incumbent upon the court to grant appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

However, we empathize with Judge Federico’s outrage at the fraud perpetrated upon Judge Parker which induced him to offer a lenient sentencing cap to appellant. We, too, are concerned that the rule we follow here may reward defendants who may feel that they can make false representations through counsel with impunity. We suggest that one way to avoid this is for the trial court to state before the plea is formally tendered and accepted that sentencing concessions will not be honored at sentencing if material misrepresentations are later found to have been made to induce those concessions. See Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Another option would be to require the defendant himself to testify under oath to the mitigating facts the court is relying on to justify its offer of leniency. If that testimony subsequently proves false, then perjury and/or other appropriate criminal charges can be brought against the defendant.

Accordingly, appellant’s judgment and sentence are REVERSED and the cause REMANDED with directions to permit appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.

GRIMES and DANAHY, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Lepper v. State, 451 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …plea agreement, he must nevertheless grant the defendant a clear opportunity to withdraw his plea if the judge determines he cannot later accept the recommended disposition. This rule has been repeated in numerous cases. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 433 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Dunkel v. State, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gumbiner v. State, 429 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Nichols v. State, 403 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Freeman v. State, 376 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979); Coy v. State,…
  • Pumphrey v. State, 502 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …s on the sentence. It is well settled that when the trial court determines it is unable to comply with the terms of a plea bargain, it must afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Moore, supra; LaBaissiere, supra; Coleman v. State, 433 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Dunkel v. State, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gumbiner v. State, 429 So. 2d 828 (Fla.2d DCA 1983). See also Stanley v. State, 501 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial…
  • BEN v. State, 440 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
    …plea. The court denied the motion on the basis that Ben had attempted to perpetrate a fraud upon the court. The court then sentenced Ben to ten years imprisonment as an habitual offender. This case is controlled by our decision in Coleman v. State, 433 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), which requires the court to permit even a fraudulent defendant to withdraw his plea if it determines not to follow the plea bargain. In Coleman we did suggest two alternatives for dealing with the problem of material misrepresent…

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