JOHN E. PARKS, JR., AND ROBERT M. FOOTE AND ALBERT MCHUGH AND PAUL ZIEGLER AND SILVIO STAMERRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBERS OF LOCAL 28, I.B.E.W., IN A CLASS ACTION, AND LOCAL UNION 28, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. LOCAL UNION NO. 24 (IBEW), INTERVENOR

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

A dispute between an international union and one of its component local unions which led to the revocation of the local’s charter and the establishment of a new local embracing its jurisdiction, occasioned two suits against the international. One was brought by the local union and the other by five of its members in behalf of the membership, both suits seeking declaratory judgments and injunctive relief to restore the local to good standing in the international and to obtain incidental relief. The two suits have been consolidated. The revocation action complained of was taken by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) after its Local Union No. 28-IBEW (Local 28) went out on strike without obtaining the approval of the IBEW International President (IP) in contravention of the IBEW Constitution and failed to return to work in defiance of his repeated directions to do so. The strike was undertaken by the Local to enforce demands made by it in the course of contract negotiations with the Maryland Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association.

The plaintiffs contended below that the IP had no constitutional authority to refuse permission for the strike or to-revoke Local 28’s charter for disregard of his order. They further contended that even if constitutionally authorized, the action was invalid because: (1) it was in breach of a duty owed to the Local and its members, and was taken in bad faith for improper reasons; (2) the-Local was not afforded a fair hearing-before a properly constituted tribunal; and (3) the revocation was unjust and an unreasonably severe sanction in the circumstances.

More particularly, the plaintiffs maintained that the IP improperly collaborated with the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) during Local 28’s collective bargaining negotiations with the Maryland Chapter of NECA; illegally sought to impose a perpetual collective bargaining agreement on the Lo now challenge the revocation order. Plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the Convention did not bar disposition of the cases by the District Court. Although there is a common law doctrine that parties are not entitled to judicial relief until they have exhausted intra-union remedies, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions “which have substantially qualified if not nullified the rule.” 80 Exceptions are recognized when resort to the internal appeal would be unreasonably burdensome because of delay likely to result in irreparable injury.81

In addition to the common law doctrine, as qualified by its exceptions, there is now § 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (4).82 The Second Circuit has squarely held that the proviso in section 101(a) (4) is applicable as a limitation on jurisdiction in suits brought in the federal courts under section 102 for violations of Title I of the LMRDA. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961). Not only does section 101(a) (4) govern the exhaustion question in the Parks action, but since it provides an authoritative expression of congressional labor policy, it is, insofar as it may modify the common law exhaustion doctrine, a prime source upon which the court should draw in formulating the federal law in deciding the Local’s case. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957).

The four-month limitation in the proviso has been subjected to various interpretations.83 We agree, however, with the District Court’s conclusion that “whatever construction is placed” on this proviso (203 F.Supp. at 296), these suits are barred neither by the statutory limitation nor by common law exhaustion doctrine. When these suits were brought, all internal remedies, available within four months of revocation, had been exhausted. To insist upon full exhaustion of remedies would be to impose an unreasonable delay in the adjudication of plaintiffs’ rights and would result in irreparable harm to plaintiffs.84

CONCLUSION

Parent unions have played a useful role in bringing a measure of order and stability to the labor market. Perhaps their best contribution has been in restraining their component bodies from reckless resort to work-stoppages and strikes. If in some quarters abuses have arisen that require correction, there should be legislation. But courts should not step in and, in order to achieve immediate objectives thought to be desirable, establish a rule that locals may with impunity defy their parent unions and strike at will. By the judicial application of ad hoc standards, in the pursuit of what is called democracy in union government, we will have succeeded only in introducing, not democracy, but chaos. This would not only tend to disintegrate the labor movement, but the irresponsibility thus generated could have serious implications for employers and others as well.

We conclude that while the consolidated cases are within the court’s jurisdiction, there was no sufficient basis for holding that the IBEW or its IP breached a fiduciary obligation to Local 28 or its members, or that the hearing was lacking in fairness, or that revocation was an unduly severe sanction. The Local’s claim baséd on breach of con tract under the Taft-Hartley Act therefore fails and the charter revocation did not violate the members’ rights under, §§ 101(a) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411(a) and 529.

We are not unmindful that the interests of the members of Local 28 in the various local and international pension and benefit funds have been made uncertain by the revocation. Whether the International or the Local has title to the Local’s funds and other assets was not litigated in these cases and we do not pass upon this.85 We note, however, that the revocation order anticipated the International’s taking steps to assure that the members of Local 28 will not suffer unnecessary loss of financial benefits. Moreover, there is no indication that the rank and file members of the outcast local will be unable to preserve their memberships in the IBEW by accepting the invitation extended them to join Local 24 or by transferring to some other local.

The District Court’s decision must for the reasons stated be reversed, and the case is remanded for further orders consistent with this opinion.86

Reversed and remanded.

. The two cases rest on separate legal bases, although the same events are relied on as grounds for relief. The individual members’ action, Parks, et al. v. IBEW, was brought under §§ 101, 102, 302, 304, 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411, 412, 462, 464, 529) for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that revocation of the charter constituted unreasonably severe discipline of the members without a fair hearing, and also amounted to institution of a trusteeship over the Local. The District Judge ruled for the plaintiffs on the first ground, but found no evidence that tbe revocation was used as a means of circumventing tbe Act’s trusteeship limitations. The Local’s action, Union No. 28-IBEW v. IBEW, was instituted under § 301(a) of tbe Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29 TJ.S.C.A. § 185(a)) on.the grounds that tbe IBEW Constitution was a “contract * * * between * * * labor organizations” within the meaning of that section, and that the IP’s actions amounted to a breach of that contract entitling the Local to injunctive relief and damages. The District Judge granted injunctive relief but denied damages and counsel fees.

. In. addition to the District Court’s decision now under review, reported as Parks v. IBEW, 203 F.Supp. 288 (D.Md. 1962), there have been several earlier District Court opinions that bear upon the present case. See Executive Board, Local Union No. 28, IBEW v. IBEW, 184 F.Supp. 649 (D.Md.1960); Local Union No. 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 194 F.Supp. 491; 194 F.Supp. 494 (D.Md. 1961); Local Union No. 28, IBEW v. IBEW, 197 F.Supp. 99 (D.Md.1961).

. NECA is a national association of employers in the construction industry; it is comprised of local chapters representing electrical contractors in particular geographic areas for purposes of collective bargaining. Some contractors who are not members also designate NECA or an area chapter as their collective bargaining agent.

The Maryland Chapter represents 26 electrical contractors doing approximately 80% of the major construction in and around Baltimore; over the years the Maryland Chapter has negotiated successive collective bargaining agreements with Local 28.

NECA offers advice and assistance to-its chapters in collective bargaining matters. For years NECA and IBEW have-conferred on a national level to further their common interest in stabilizing labor relations in the electrical construction industry. The principal vehicle for-advancing this common purpose is the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Contracting Industry of the United States and Canada. (CIR or-Council).

. Its leadership includes former supervisors and contractors to whom these restrictions do not apply. The inclusion of' such active members in a union is not illegal, and is traditional in this industry..

. Many of the material provisions of the-Constitution are set forth in 197 F.Supp. at 102 n. 2.

. Questions of conflict are necessarily decided by the IP who is empowered to decide all questions of law. (Art. IV, § 3 (2)).

. Provision is also made for automatic expulsion of a member or a local for resorting to a court of law without having fully exhausted internal remedies. (Art. XXVII, § 1 and Art. XVII, § 1). Even advising such resort is penalized. (Art. XXVII, § 2(1)). The legality of some of these provisions, in the face of §§ 609 and 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 529 and 411(a) (4), might be difficult to defend. See § 101(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(b).

. On October 14, 1959, in accordance with tbe requirements of § 301 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 461, the International filed an initial trusteeship report with the United States Department of Labor stating that the trusteeship had been imposed because “tbe factionalism in the Local Union has prevented the officers thereof from properly organizing the electrical industry within the jurisdiction of the said Local Union.”

. On May 11, 1960, Judge R. Dorsey Watkins denied a motion to dismiss this complaint. Executive Board, Local Union No. 28, IBEW v. IBEW, 184 F.Supp. 649 (D.Md.1960).

. On September 16, 1960, the IEO unanimously recommended that no action be taken on the charges filed by Goidel. The reason stated was that there was confusion as to the meaning of the recently enacted LMRDA in regard to its effect on the doctrine of exhaustion of internal remedies and the accused men had acted on information received from a Labor Department oflicial.

In addition, elections were held within Local 28 in July, 1960; Eveson was reelected President and Beckhardt was elected Business Manager in the place of King. On August 5, 1960, the IP unconditionally terminated the trusteeship pursuant to his earlier order dated June 80.

. Provisions of this contract are more fully set forth in Local Union No. 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, National Electrical Contractors, Ass’n, 194 F. Supp. 494, 495-496 (D.Md.1961).

. Consistent with this stand, and in fulfillment of its statutory obligation, § 8 (d) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d), on February 24, Local 28 also sent a “Notice to Mediation Agencies” to the federal and state agencies, notifying them that a dispute existed concerning the collective bargaining agreement, and of the proposed termination of the agreement.

. Other than to note its surprise, the Local makes no effort to contest this finding, except to point out that the finding was not that the strike was caused by the Local’s leadership.

. These agreements providing for a 35$ wage increase were subject, however, to the condition that the Local would refund the difference between that figure and any lesser amount ultimately agreed upon with the Chapter. . Local 28 filed charges on June 19 before the NLRB accusing the Maryland Chapter of bargaining in bad faith in insisting on a perpetual contract. This charge was dismissed without prejudice on July 6, after the Chapter took the position before an NLRB examiner that it wanted such a contract but was not insisting on it. The same day, the Chapter, at the suggestion of its attorney and of the NECA Eastern Regional Director, broke off collective bargaining negotiations, charging Local 28 with failure to bargain in good faith. On July 27, Local 28 filed charges against the Chapter and two of its member contractors alleging coercion of members, and on October 3, 1961, charged the Chapter before the NLRB with a failure to bargain in good faith from April 4, 1961. The plaintiffs’ counsel have attested in their brief that the Labor Board has suspended its proceedings on these charges pending the disposition of the current litigation.

. Copies of this order were sent to each member of Local 28 on July 7 together with copies of the correspondence between the IP and O’Doherty. On July 14, Freeman wrote another letter to each member. He included a copy of the Constitution and explained the effect revocation would have on them. He further explained their obligations to the International and assured them that the Local could not validly discipline them for returning to work.

. The text of this order is set forth in 197 F.Supp. at 104 n. 4.

. The District Judge found that Local 24 had been from its inception and continued to be dominated by the International. On appeal Local 24 argued that encouragement and aid in its establishment was an appropriate exercise of the International’s function.

The District Court found that two leading contractors of the Maryland Chapter had cooperated with Terry in the formation of Local 24. On appeal Local 24 argues that this finding and any legal consequences are matters within the exclusive purview of the NLRB. .

. “Upon the theory that improper expulsion violates tlie member’s interest in the organization’s property or a contract between him and other members made up of the constitution and by-laws or, in recent years, upon the ground that there is a tortious interference with an advantageous relationship, the state will set an expulsion aside upon any of five grounds:

“(1) The procedure violated the union’s constitution or by-laws.

“(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorize expulsion for the alleged offense.

“(3) The procedure, although it conformed to the union’s constitution and bylaws, did not afford the member a fair bearing.

“ (4) The expulsion, although it was authorized by the union’s constitution and by-laws, was unreasonable, contrary to ‘public policy,’ or contrary to ‘natural justice.’

“(5) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported ground was only a pretense for getting rid of a troublesome member.”

Cox, “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1939,” 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 835-836 (1960). Accord, Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv.L.Rev. 609, 615 (1959); see Sherman, “The Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 54 Nw.L.Rev. 803, 820-821 (1960); Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25 Modern L.Rev. 273, 279-283 (1962); see generally, Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175 (1960); Summers, “Degal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.D.Rev. 1049 (1951); Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952).

. See Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 120 P. 2d 79 (1941); Hatch v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Ill.App. 495 (1924); Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind.App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920); Mixed Local of Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union Local No. 458 v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International, 212 Minn. 587, 593, 4 N.W. 2d 771, 775 (1942); Naylor v. Harkins, 11 N.J. 435, 94 A. 2d 825 (1953) (affirming issuance of a preliminary injunction), 32 N.J.Super. 559, 571, 109 A. 2d 19, 26 (App.Div.1954), ordering a permanent injunction and reversing, 27 N.J. Super. 594, 99 A. 2d 849 (Chancery Div. 1953); Mayer v. Hutcheson, 18 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup.Ct.), reversed on other grounds, 260 App.Div. 150, 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1940) , aff’d 285 N.Y. 832, 35 N.E. 2d 501 (1941) ; Moore v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff’d without opinion, 205 App.Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff’d with modifications as to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E. 2d 552, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943); Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948); 192 Misc. 603, 81 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1948) ; 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1949) ; International Union of Operating Engineers v. Pierce, 321 S.W. 2d 914, 918, 919 (Tex.Civ.App.1959); Washington Local Lodge No. 104, etc. v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d 1, 68-71, 203 P. 2d 1019, 1058-1059 (1949); see also, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1403 (1952); 87 O.J.S. Trade Unions § 45.

. Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 176-177 (1960); see Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75, 78-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961); cf., Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F.Supp. 608, 617 (E.D.Pa.), aff’d per curiam on other grounds, 284 F. 2d 162 (3d Cir., 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833, 81 S.Ct. 747, 5 L.Ed.2d 744 (1961).

. Barbash, Labor’s Grass Roots (1961) pp. 150-151; Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy (1959) p. 321; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1462 (1962).

. The District Judge found that in refusing consent to the strike “the IP was * * * primarily moved by a desire to acquire and retain as much control as he could over the negotiations with the Maryland Chapter, because he distrusted Eveson, Beckhardt and O’Doherty and other leaders of the group that controlled Local 28, as the result of previous difficulties * * 203 F.Supp. at 302.

Under the International Constitution it cannot be said that the IP could not legitimately desire to intervene in the negotiations. In addition, the District Judge specifically held that this -was a strike requiring the IP’s consent and that the IP’s refusal was not appealed to the IEC, 203 E.Supp. at 306, in which case the plaintiffs have waived judicial review of this action of the IP. Thus-, while the refusal to sanction the strike must be taken as valid and cannot be impeached directly, the result of the- court’s decision is to impeach it indirectly. The revocation was the lawful means chosen by the IP to terminate the forbidden strike as well as to discipline the recalcitrants. In the circumstances it would seem to have been the only effective means to restore industrial peace.

. The District Court in fact observed that a 35$ increase “would have brought Local 28’s scale about in line with neighboring cities, 'although it may have been unrealistic in view of the strong non-union situation in Baltimore.” 203 F.Supp. at 302 n. 24.

. See the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.; see also, e. g., Cox, “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 829-831 (1960) ; Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25 Modern L.Rev. 273, 273-279 (1962).

. See, e. g., Cohn, “The International and the Local Union,” 11 N.Y.U.Ann.Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Union Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected Answers,” 45 Va.L.Rev. 261 (1959).

. The District Court correctly recognized that:

“The evidence in the instant cases, however, makes it clear that those [worthy] results [of the Council’s service] have been achieved through a tight control over the agreements of most local unions by the international officers of the IBEW, particularly the IP, at the' cost of a large measure of the autonomy of the local unions. The IBEW constitution gives at least lip service to the principle that the local unions shall do the collective bargaining for their members but it also contains provisions which appear to authorize the control over the affairs of the local unions exercised by the IP. “The provisions which shall be included in the constitution and the policies which shall be followed by the officers are matters for the union as a whole to decide, subject to the restraints imposed by law. Federal courts may impose such restraints only within the jurisdictional limits provided by Congressional enactments, and must follow the policies established by the statutes, as interpreted by authoritative decisions.” 203 F.Supp. at 310.

. Barbash, “Power and the Pattern of Union Government,” 9 Lab.L.J. 628, 633 (1958); see also, Anderson, “LandrumGriffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Tale L.J. 1460,. 1462 (1962); cf., Spitz, Democracy and the Challenge of Power (1958) pp. 82-84.

. During the trial in Local 28’s action to determine the terminability of the 1958 agreement the court declared:

“I am not saying that the arbitration clause is not a very good thing. It ,ob viously has been a splendid thing for the industry. It has prevented strikes and the whole system is a good system.

“I do not make any criticism of the Oouncil, * * * it is perfectly obvious over the years it has done a fine job * * *_»

In its opinion the court said:

“Certainly, it is highly desirable that the local unions of the IBEW and the chapters of NECA take advantage of the services of the Council; the evidence shows that it has served all parties well over the years.” 194 E.Supp. at 501-502.

In the opinion under review the District Judge concluded that the wage increases granted by the Council to the Local in 1958, 1959, and 1960 were:

“ * * * not unfair or unreasonable under all the circumstances, including the wage rates of comparable building trades in Baltimore, where unions are not as strong as in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Washington.” 203 F.Supp. at 299.

And most specifically the court stated: “I adhere to the view that the Council has served the parties well over the years. Wages have steadily increased, in line with other comparable building trades, and there have been remarkably few strikes.” 203 F.Supp. at 310.

. Findings that IBEW, NECA and Maryland Chapter officials cooperated in the founding of Local 24 by dissident members of Local 28, including supervisory personnel of two employers who had resigned their supervisory positions to take a more active part in union activities, were also a part of the res gestae that led the court to hold that the IP acted with “legal or constructive malice.” We are of the opinion that, in this industry where there is admittedly close rapport between employers and the union relatively free mobility between the employer and employee categories, the activities shown to have occurred during the formation of the new Local cannot be said to have breached a fiduciary obligation owed by the International to the existing Local and its members.

While not a breach of fiduciary obligation under the facts in this case, to the extent that there may be employer domination of the new Local, as comprehended under § 8(a) (2) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (2), the matter is for the Labor Board to rectify.

To the extent that members of Local 28 who hereafter join Local 24 may be denied equal rights within Local 24, in violation of § 101(a) (1) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (1), the plaintiffs are complaining of matters that may more properly be raised in new proceedings where concrete facts of alleged specific denials of equal right to particular individuals may be adduced. Cf., e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961).

. Although the general literature bearing directly on international union intervention in local negotiations is sparse, there are indications of a tendency toward increased international control in collective bargaining. See Barbash, Labor’s Grass Boots (1961) 149-150; Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy (1959) 287-288; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1462-1463 (1962) ; see also, Pierson, “Multi-Employer Bargaining,” in Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, Unions, Management and the Public (I960) 343-349; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management (1960) 927-930.

. The evidence on this point was conflicting. Although the District Judge intimated that the IP was so committed, he made no specific finding to this effect. See 203 F.Supp. at 298, 302 n. 27, 304.

. See also, Chamberlain, “Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contracts,” 48 Colum.L.Rev. 829 (1948) ; Kotin, “Labor Agreements in Collective Bargaining,” 6 N.Y.U.Ann.Conf.Lab. 1, 5-6 (1953) ; Summers, “Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass,” 2 Buffalo L.Rev. 1, 14-15 (1952) ; Goldberg, “Labor Arbitration— A Symposium: Introduction,” 37 N.Y.U. L.BRv. 359-361 (1962).

. See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 116, 174 F. 2d 988, 991 (1949) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge 751, IAM, 91 F.Supp. 596, 603 (W.D.Wash.1950), aff’d per curiam, 188 FD.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821, 72 S.Ct. 39, 96 L.Ed. 621 (1951) ; cf., Boston Printing Pressmen’s Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D.Mass.1956), aff’d. 241 F. 2d 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817, 78 S.Ct. 21, 2 L.Ed.2d 34 (1957) ; Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F.Supp. 737 (W.D.Ark.1961) ; In re Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., 199 F.Supp. 103 (D.P.B. 1961) ; but cf., Division 892 Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Electric By. and Motor Coach Employees of America v. M. K. & O. Transit Lines, 210 F.Supp. 351 (N.D.Okla.1962). (Holding, although a contract had been terminated arbitration could still be demanded in respect to the terms of the new contract).

. There the Court stated that “the basic policy of national labor legislation [is] to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare.” Id. at 105, 82 S.Ct. at 57S.

. This opinion has already demonstrated that other assailed elements of the “mixed motives,” found by the District Court, were neither in fact nor law improper. . Compare the instant case with, e. g., Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters, Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441, 41 L.C. par. 16,-755 (D.Minn.1961) ; Moore v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff’d without opinion, 265 App.Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff’d with minor modifications, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E. 2d 552, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).

. See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 191 F.Supp. 347, 351-352; 194 F.Supp. 664 (D.Del.1961), rev’d on other grounds, 306 F. 2d 152 (3d Cir.1962).

. We reject the suggestion of the defendant that since under the Constitution the Local agrees that its charter may be revoked without a hearing, the hearing given by the IP may be beyond challenge. At common law, and now under the LMRDA, the requirement of a fair hearing exists regardless of whether the Union Constitution provides that sanctions may be imposed without any hearing. See, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1410-1413 (1952) ; § 101(a) (5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (5).

. See, e. g., Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 200-206 (1960) ; Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv.L.Rev. 609, 616 (1959).

. See, Ibid.; Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 204-205 (1960) ; Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1082-1083 (1951) ; Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1425-1428 (1952).

. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1083 (1951) ; see Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25 Modern L.Rev. 273, 288-289 (1962) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851, 873-875 (1960) ; Wollett & Lamp-man, “The Law of Union Factionalism— The Case of the Sailors,” 4 Stan.L.Rev. 177. 213 (1952) : Note, 48 Va.L.Rev. 78, 90 (1962).

42a

It should be noted, however, that the initial factual inquiry was made, not by the IP, but by a referee found by the District Judge to be “fair and impartial.” 203 P.Supp. at 307.

. See Brooks, “Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline,” 22. Ohio St.L.Rev. 64 (1961) ; Oberer, “Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections,” 58 Mich.L.Rev. 55 (1959) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

. Professor Summers reports that Senator McClellan’s proposal to require that impartial arbitrators determine disciplinary matters was deleted from the final draft of the LMRDA. Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25 Modern L.Rev. 273, 289 (1962). Compare § 101(a) (6) (E) of the McClellan Amendment, 105 Daily Cong.Rec. 5810 (April 22, 1959), Legis.Hist. of the LMRDA, Vol. II, p. 1102, with § 101(a) (5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (5).

. See, e. g., Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25 Modern L.Rev. 273, 288-289 (1962) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

. “(The Court) Have you considered the fact that if you do go on strike or if you do refuse to go ahead with this policy which the International has set up and which all of the other local unions go along with and strike the International would very likely revoke your charter with whatever loss there is.

“It would seem to me that they have ■either got to end this whole agreement with these people or revoke your charter, one or the othei\

“You are running an awfully close risk, and if you people understand that you are running that risk if you go on strike and if you tex’minate the agreement without going through with this plan, what has certainly up to this point been clearly demonstrated unless there is evidence to the contrary that this is the plan and policy of the International Union and that it has worked out to the satisfaction of the Union as a whole as well as to the employers as a whole over the years.

“And you people yourselves have taken advantage of the arbitration provisions within the last three years. So that it is a matter which has been gone ahead with.

“Now, at the present time I am very much inclined to think that you have a right to terminate, but once you terminate, I think you then can’t expect to come to the Court and ask for protection against the International, if you terminate and strike.

“(Mr. O’Doherty) Yes.

“ (The Court) Then you have great risks and you ought to do it with your eyes open. I am not saying what the legal effect is, but it may be severe.”

. See Meltzer, “The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II,” 59 Colum.L.Rev. 269, 297 n. 287 (1959) ; Note, “Applying the ‘Contracts Between Labor Organizations’ Clause of Taft-Hartley Section 301: A Plea for Restraint,” 69 Yale L.J. 299 (1959).

. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 95 F.Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa.1950) ; Local 33, International Hod Carriers Union v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F.Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y.1960), aff’d on other grounds, 291 F. 2d 496 (2d Cir., 1961) ; cf., Snoots v. Vejlupek, 87 F.Supp. 503 (N.D.Ohio 1949) ; Kriss v. White, 87 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.1949).

Courts have also been concerned with possible conflicts between a broad interpretation of the “between any such labor organizations” clause and the Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts. See Local 33, International Hod Carriers Union v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F.Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff’d on other grounds, 291 F. 2d 496, 505 (2d Cir., 1961) (Friendly, J. concurring specially) ; International Union of Doll Workers v. Metal Polishers International Union, 180 F.Supp. 280 (S.D.Cal.1960). Seo also, Note, 59 Colum.L.Rev. 202 (1959). The problems of accommodating the several labor statutes, will be considered later. . Provisions regulating in detail certain, aspects of internal union affairs, by declaring some acts to be unfair labor practices (thereby remediable by the Labor Board), were deleted in the House-Senate-Conference. See House Rep. No. 510 on. H.R. 3020, p. 46, in 1 Legis.Hist. LMRA at 550; 93 Cong.Rec. 6859 (June 12, 1947), 2 Legis.Hist. LMRA at 1623 (Sen ator Taft, Supplementary Analysis of the Labor Bill as Passed, discussing § 8(b) (5)) ; Compare §§ 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 & 158, with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., §§ 7(b) & 8(c), in 1 Legis.Hist. LMRA at 49-50, 52-56; see also, 93 Cong.Rec. 6443 (June 5, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1540 (Senator Taft on § 8(b) (5)) ; 93 Cong.Rec. 6503 (June 6, 1947), 2 Legis.Hist. LMRA at 1579 (Senator Murray, summary of differences between conference agreement and bill passed by Senate, discussing § 8(b) (5)).

In addition, to assure that § 8(b) (1) (A) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (1) (A), did not interfere with union membership policy, the proviso was added that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” See 93 Cong.Rec. 4271-A273 (April 30, 1947), 2 Legis.Hist. LMRA at 1139-1143 (debate on proviso) ; cf., e. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4197 (April 29, 1947), 2 Legis.Hist. of LMRA at 1097 (Senator Taft discussing what is now § 8(a) (3)).

It should be noted that in 1959, with the passage of LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., Congress did undertake extensive and detailed statutory regulation of certain aspects of internal union affairs and organization.

. It has been suggested that a holding of jurisdiction under § 301(a) would tend to promote at least two congressional policies. (1) A major purpose of § 301(a) is to overcome state law jurisdictional difficulties and thereby make unions amenable to suits as entities and to subject their funds to judgments for violations of contracts. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511-513, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962). Section 301(a) jurisdiction in cases like Local 28’s would make this responsibility more effective. (2) In 1959, with the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., Congress undertook extensive and detailed statutory regulation of certain aspects of internal union affairs. It is suggested that even assuming the LMRDA and § 301(a) may not be construed in pari montería, it would serve congressional policy to construe § 301(a) broadly, thereby making a whole remedy available in a federal court when the same conduct inflicts injury, adjudicable under LMRDA, upon individual members and also injury, not adjudicable under LMRDA, upon local unions.

. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) ; Retail Clerks International Ass’n Locals 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 82 S.Ct. 541, 7 L.Ed.2d 503 (1962) ; Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962).

. See Local 33, International Hod Carriers Union v. Mason Tenders District Council, 291 F. 2d 496 (2d Cir., 1961) ; Local 2608, Lumber Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Millmen’s Local 1495, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 169 F.Supp. 765 (N.D.Cal.1958) ; see also, Burlesque Artists Ass’n v. Amer iean Guild of Variety Artists, 187 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.1958) ; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1485-1487 n. 150 (1962).

. See NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F. 2d 50 (6th Cir., 1941), aff’d, 318 U.S. 9, 63 S.Ct. 394, 87 L.Ed. 579 (1943) ; cf., NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 71 S.Ct. 758, 95 L.Ed. 969 (1951).

. International Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-619, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958) ; see also, Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland Federation of Musicians, 303 F. 2d 229, 230 (6th Cir., 1962) ; Rosen v. District Council No. 9, 198 F.Supp. 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y.1961).

. The relevant provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act include : Section 1, 29 U. S.C.A. § 101:

“No court of the United States * * * shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provision of this chapter ; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.”

Section 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104:

“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: [Emphasis added]

“ (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment ;

“(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization * * * ;

* * * # *

“(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and

“(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified * *

Section 7, 29 U.S.C.A. § 107, provides that an injunction will not lie in any case growing out of a “labor dispute” except after an adversary hearing where there is testimony in support of the allegations of the complaint to the effect—

“ (a) That unlawful and illegal acts have been threatened and will be carried out unless enjoined;

“(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant’s property will follow;

“(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

“(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

“(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.”

Section 8, 29 U.S.O.A. § 108, provides that no injunction shall issue unless complainant has made every reasonable attempt to settle the dispute — including negotiation, government-sponsored mediation or voluntary arbitration.

Section 13, 29 U.S.O.A. § 113, contains definitions:

“(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation ; or have a direct or indirect interest therein; * * * or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; * * * or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the ease involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ (as defined in this section) of ‘persons participating or interested’ therein (as defined in this section) .

* * * * *

“(c) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee.”

. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the-Act does not apply to all circumstances: in which, on its face, it might be thought to apply. We know that injunctions have-been upheld which were issued (1) to compel arbitration, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) ; (2) to enjoin a strike by a railway union over “minor disputes” cognizable by the Railroad Adjustment Board, see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana RR, 353 U.S. 30, 39-42, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957) ; (3) to compel an employer to bargain with a certified union, Virginian Ry. v. SystemFederation, 300 U.S. 515, 562-563, 57 S-Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937) ; and (4) to-compel a union to perform its statutoiy duty of fair representation, Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-240, 70 S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed. 22 (1949) ; Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 850 U.S. 892, 76 S.Ct. 152, 100 L.Ed. 785 (1955).

. In the recent ease of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 212, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 1338, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962), the Court distinguished the situation involving an injunction directed against a. strike, in violation of a no-strike clause, from Lincoln Mills on the grounds that in Lincoln Mills “ — a mandatory injunction to carry out an agreement to arbitrate — did not enjoin any one of the kinds •of conduct which the specific prohibitions •of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunctive powers of United States courts.”

. The District Court held that it was not required wholly to yield to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Specifically the court held that it had no jurisdiction in Local 28’s case “to decide whether the Maryland Chapter failed to bargain in good faith,” 203 F.Supp. at 293, or wheth er the IBEW “conspired with and encouraged the Maryland Chapter not to bargain fairly,” id. at 293, or whether “the International attempted to coerce the members of Local 28 in the exercise of the rights protected by sec. 7 * * Id. at 293 n. 11.

. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) ; see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962) ; Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n. 9, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 245 n. 5, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed. 2d 462 (1962) ; see also Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F. 2d 529, 533 (4th Cir., 1951).

. The recent Supreme Court decisions involved the “between an employer and a labor organization” clause; it is therefore necessary to review the policy considerations that justify applying the Smith rule to the “between any such labor organizations” clause of § 301(a).

First, it is clear that Congress did not mean to authorize the Labor Board to concern itself generally with matters of internal union discipline and structure. See n. 49, supra; see also, e. g., International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958).

Second, there can be no doubt that, just as the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements has been left to the courts, see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed. 2d 483 (1962), most 'matters directly concerning internal union activities, insofar as they are regulated at all, have been left to the courts. See Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, 286 F. 2d 165 (10th Cir., 1961) ; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, 205 F.Supp. 284, 291-292 (E.D.Pa.1962) ; Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1800, 183 F.Supp. 423, 425 — 426 (E.D.Louisiana 1960) ; see also, Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F.Supp. 608, 617 (E.D.Pa.)„ aff’d per curiam, 284 F. 2d 162 (3d Cir., 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833, 81 S.Ct. 747, 5 L.Ed.2d 744 (1961) (implied).

. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n. 9, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) ; cf., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d: 207 (1962).

In Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-198, 83 S.Ct. 267, 269, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), the Court stated that “[i]f * * * there are situations, in which serious problems will arise from both the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those-cases when they arise.”

. This, of course, is not strictly a jurisdictional challenge but rather an attack on the merits. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939- (1946). Jurisdiction over this cause is founded on § 102 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S. C.A. § 412, which provides that:

“Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district •court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.”

Section 609, 29 U.S.O.A. § 529, provides that:

“The provisions of section 412 of this title shall be applicable in enforcement of this section.”

. “No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (O) afforded a full and fair hearing.” (Emphasis added.)

. “It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exorcising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)

. Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were “otherwise disciplined”: Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists. 286 F. 2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed. 2d 388 (1961), reversing on other grounds, 189 F.Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y.1960) ; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 194 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1961) ; 205 F.Supp. 284, 289 (E.D.Pa.1962) ; Deluhery v. Marine Cooks Union, 199 F.Supp. 270, 273 (S. D.Cal.1961) ; Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750, 755-758 (S.D.N.Y.1960).

Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were not “otherwise disciplined” : Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, 308 F. 2d 52, 58-60 (5th Cir., 1962) ; Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F.Supp. 492 (D.N.J.1960).

. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 191 F.Supp. 347, 352-353, 194 F.Supp. 664, 668 (D.Del. 1961), reversed, 306 F. 2d 152, 156-157 (3d Cir., 1962) (only Kalodner, J. for reversing on this ground) ; Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers, 202 F.Supp. 348 (W.D.Pa.1962).

. See Moore v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 485, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, 216, aff’d without opinion, 265 App.Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff’d with modifications as to scope of injunction, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E. 2d 552, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943) ; see also Washington Local Lodge No. 104, etc. v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d 1, 68-71, 74-75, 203 P. 2d 1019, 1058-1059, 1061 (1949) ; Hatch v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Ill.App. 495 (1924) ; Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind.App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920).

. This is undoubtedly a factor for consideration in determining whether challenged action constitutes “other disci pline.” See, e. g., Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, 308 F. 2d 52, 58-60 (5th Cir., 1962).

. This is also a relevant factor. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, supra; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, supra; Gross v. Kennedy, supra; but cf., Allen v. Armored Gar Chauffeurs Local 820, supra.

. It would appear that, regarding this section, the District Court based its decision in part upon the conclusion that the hearing was unfair not only procedurally but also in that the IP had breached his fiduciary obligation and had imposed an unduly severe sanction — thus, the court has read substantive guarantees into the “fair hearing” requirement. See Union Trusteeships: A Report to the Congress, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, BLMR (1962) 131; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1482 (1962). Having held, on the merits, that the IP neither breached his fiduciary obligation nor imposed an unduly severe sanction, this court will reserve judgment on the mooted question of whether § 101(a) (5) protects substantive or merely procedural rights.

. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961) ; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, 205 F.Supp. 284, 291-292 (E.D.Pa.1962) ; Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1800, 183 F.Supp. 423 (E.D.Louisiana 1960).

. See Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, 205 F.Supp. 284, 290-292 (E. D.Pa.1962) ; Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1800, 183 F.Supp. 423 (E.D.Louisiana, 1960) ; cf., International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958) ; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, 286 F. 2d 165 (10th Cir., 1961) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962). And in our own circuit, cf., Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F. 2d 529, 533 (4th Cir., 1951).

. See Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Intern. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1800, supra; cf., Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, supra; International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra ; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, supra,

. Section 3(h) of the LMRDA defines a trusteeship as “any receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 402(h).

. Section 302, 29 U.S.C.A. § 462, limits the lawful reasons for which a trusteeship may be imposed. Section 304(c), 29 U.S. C.A. § 464(c), provides that a trusteeship will be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months only if “established by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws * *

. See Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F.Supp. 300, 304-306 (S.D.Cal.1960) ; Flaherty v. United Steelworkers, 46 L.R.R.M. 2483, 3006, 41 L.C., par. 16, 517 (S.D.Cal.1960) ; Cox v. Hutcheson, 204 F.Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.Ind.1962) ; Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F.Supp. 456, 471-472 (D.N.J.1900).

. Accord, Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F.Supp. 245, 246-247 (D.Conn.1962) ; see Palisades Lodge No. 173 v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 214 F.Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y.1960) (by implication) ; see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1498-1500 (1962). Note, 48 Va.L.Rev. 78, 96-97 (1962).

. At least two commentators appear to agree that revocation and reissuance of a charter should, at least under some circumstances, be held to constitute the imposition of a trusteeship. See Horowitz, “Possible Effects of LMRDA’s Provisions,” in Symposium on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (1961), edited by Slovenko, 458, 563; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962). The Department of Labor adopted the position:

“that a revocation of a charter, properly conducted and in accordance with a labor organization’s constitution and bylaws, does not create a trusteeship. * * The Department has also determined that nothing in the Act prevents the creation of a new local, even though it may be composed primarily of the same individuals, formerly belonging to the trusteed local that had its charter revoked.” Union Trusteeships: A Report to the Congress, U.S. Dept. of Labor, BLMR (1962) 33-34.

. In the earlier injunction proceeding-brought by Local 28, Judge Thomsen denied relief since the Local had not pursued' the ' available internal remedy before the IEC. Local 28 IBEW v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99, 107-108 (D.Md.1961).

. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1086'. (1951) ; accord, Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961) ; see also, Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv.L.Rev, 609, 614-615 (1959).

. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1086-92 (1951) ; Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Pact,” 70 Yale L.J., 175, 207-210 (1960) ; Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 1462, 1468-1482 (1947).

. “No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, * * * Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof * * *.”

. E. g., compare Detroy, supra, with Harris v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291, 205 F.Supp. 45 (E.D.Pa. 1962).

. See Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline : What the Courts Do in Pact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 208 (1960) ; see also Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Harv.L.Rev. 609, 614 (1959).

. Of possible interest in this connection are Cohn, “The International and the Local Union,” 11 N.Y.U.Ann.Conf.Labor 7 (1958) ; Summers, “Union Schism in Perspective : Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected Answers,” 45 Va.L.Rev. 261 (1959) ; Note, “Disposition of Union Assets on Disaffiliation,” 45 Va.L.Rev. 244 (1959) ; Annotation, 23 A.L.R.2d 1209 (1952).

. If this court should be in error in any of these conclusions, we are of the opinion that the order of the District Court still requires revision. While the revocation would be void, the International should, in that event, be given the opportunity to retry the Local before a properly constituted tribunal.

SOPER, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

The power of the District Court to entertain these suits is clearly demonstrated in the concluding portion of the court’s opinion, and with this conclusion I concur.

However, the ultimate conclusion of the court, reversing the judgment of the District Court, involves an endorsement and approval of the conduct of Freeman, the all-powerful president of the IBEW, in trying and punishing Local '28 and its members, and with this conclusion I am obliged to dissent, since the behavior of the IP was plainly at variance with established principles of due process and fair play. The opinion embraces the theory that “basic union policy and structure” require that the dominant power be lodged in the parent body and pursues this theme so steadily in the course of an elaborate discussion that in the end little head is given to the arbitrary manner in which the IP exercised his power. A brief résumé of the conduct of the IP, based upon undisputed evidence, demonstrates to my mind that the District Court was correct in finding that the local union and its members were denied their fundamental rights. The IP was a stern and resolute individual, determined to have his own way not only when he was executing the powers conferred upon him by the constitution of the IBEW but also in those areas in which the local union members were entitled to some freedom of choice. His attitude toward anything that tended to diminish his power is shown by a public statement in a speech in 1961 at the convention of an association of electrical contractors known as ÑECA. He said that he “hated” the Landrum-Griffin Act. The fact that Congress itself deemed it necessary to formulate a bill of rights for the protection of the individual workers found no favor in his eyes.

Accordingly, it is not surprising to learn that the Local had much provocation from the IP himself when it ventured to strike without his consent. The current labor dispute involved two major items — a demand of the woi’kers for an increase in wages of 35 cents an hour in place of an increase of 2 cents an hour offered by ÑECA, and a determined stand by the Local in opposition to the insertion of a “council clause” which would strip the Local of its power to terminate a contract at the end of the year and lodged the power of decision in the CXR.1 *In this dispute the IP promised the Local his support, but in fact he worked in harmony with NECA. He tried hard to persuade the Local to adopt the obnoxious clause and also to accept a raise of 10 cents an hour recommended by the IEC although he was aware that the Local had obtained contracts with a number of independent contractors entitling the workers to an increase in wages of 35 cents per hour. In order to break the strike the IP brought in workers from outside the State, and persuaded union men in other trades not to respect the Local’s picket line. The IP was angry with the union because it would not do his bidding and it is obvious that instead of supporting the Local in the dispute he used his weight in support of the employing contractors.

It was in this attitude and under these circumstances that the IP came to judgment. He had the right under the IBEW constitution to institute charges against the Local for striking without his consent and also the right to sit in judgment in the case. He exercised both rights. He appointed a referee to hear the charges preliminarily but reserved to himself the final decision. He had to decide whether he should condemn the Local for striking without his consent and without his orders and what punishment, if any, he should inflict. He was not obliged to hear the case himself since, under the constitution of the International, it could have been referred to the IEC, a body of international officers appointed to govern the union between meetings of the international convention.2 He knew that he had opposed the working employees and favored NECA in the negotiations that preceded the strike and that his own conduct was one of the matters that should be taken into consideration in deciding the case. Indeed, he was aware that he ought not to sit in the case, for he refused to submit to examination as a witness, saying that he could not be a witness because he had to make the ultimate decision in the case.

Nevertheless, he did sit; and again he gave evidence that he was not bound by any rules of fair play, for during the trial he did not hesitate to confer with the prosecuting attorney out of the presence of the attorney for the local union.

In view of this narrative, it is futile to suggest, as does the opinion of the court, that “the real basis for the argument that the IP was biased is that he was, in a sense, both prosecutor and judge.” The trier of the cause in an internal union dispute or in an administrative proceeding does not cease to be a judge because he is empowered also to act as proescutor. He may not ignore the established principles of due process in order to obtain his own ends.

It is plain that the IP was not qualified to pass judgment in the case and, particularly, to determine the kind of punishment to be inflicted for violation of the union rules. This is shown not only by what is set forth above but also by the extremely severe punishment which he inflicted upon the local union and its members by revoking the Local’s charter, as is shown in the opinion of the District Court. This was the only case in which the IP had refused his consent to a strike by a Local union when it desired to strike in order to maintain its position in a legitimate labor dispute. Not only did the IP withhold his consent to the strike in the instant case, but, when the strike took place against his will, he imposed the severest discipline within his power. Under all these circumstances it is improper to approve the actions of the IP especially in these days when the rights and constitutional safeguards •of a person accused of crime and of a person convicted of crime are so meticulously observed. One would suppose that the same protection should be afforded a lawabiding working man even if, in the •exercise of his rights of collective bargaining, he exceeds the bounds of propriety. For these reasons and those expressed in the opinion of Judge Thom.sen I dissent. See Calabrese v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, •et al., 211 F.Supp. 609 (D.N.J. December :21, 1962).

. The District Court held in an earlier suit brought by the Local against the Maryland Chapter of NECA, 194 F.Supp. 494, that the Local had the right to terminate the contract at the end of the year; no appeal was taken from the decision.

. The appeal was taken in this case to the IEO but, as the District Judge pointed out in bis opinion, the IEO did not try the case de novo but upon the record made up by the IP.