MARION RUNACRE MAGAZINER, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID MAGAZINER, APPELLEE
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Marion Runacre Magaziner appealed a trial court's denial of her motion to set aside a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that was entered three days after filing the petition, in violation of the 20-day statutory waiting period in Florida Statutes § 61.19. The appellate court held that while the trial court erred in failing to comply with the statutory requirement, the judgment was not void because the court had proper jurisdiction and both parties were given a full opportunity to be heard.
The judgment of dissolution is not void, even though the trial court failed to comply with the statutory 20-day waiting period. A judgment is not rendered void by errors or irregularities in the proceedings when the court has proper jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be heard, and there is no illegal deprivation of that opportunity.
[1] A final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered in violation of the statutory twenty-day waiting period is not void, but merely erroneous.
[2] Errors or irregularities in proceedings, short of an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard, do not render a judgment void if the court is legally organized an…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No final judgment of dissolution of marriage may be entered until at least 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing the original petition for dissolution of marriage, but the court, on a showing that injustice would result from this delay, may enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage at an earlier date.”
The statutory provision that the trial court violated by entering judgment three days after filing the petition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered three days after the petition for dissolution was filed, in violation of Florida Statutes § 61.19, w…
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HENDRY, Judge.
This consolidated appeal is from the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion for relief from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that was entered three days after filing of the petition for dissolution. The motion was filed fifteen months after the entry of the judgment of dissolution.
It is appellant’s contention that the judgment of dissolution was void and should be set aside because it was entered in violation of section 61.19, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides:
“No final judgment of dissolution of marriage may be entered until at least 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing the original petition for dissolution of marriage, but the court, on a showing that injustice would result from this delay, may enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage at an earlier date.”
It is conceded that the judgment of dissolution was entered before the twenty days had run and that there was no showing in the record that injustice would result from the statutory 20-day delay.
The court’s failure to follow this provision of section 61.19 does not, however, render the judgment void.
“It is settled law that where it appears that a court is legally organized and has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be heard as required by law, errors or irregularities, or even wrongdoing in the proceedings, short of an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void.”
State ex rel. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599, 15 So. 2d 324, 326 (1943); accord Quigley v. Cremin, 94 Fla. 104, 113 So. 892 (1927); see also Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 793, 128 So. 258, 263 (1930). There is no question that the court was “legally organized”, nor have the parties complained of not having been fully heard. Both the husband and wife appeared before the court, and testified that they had been residents of the State of Florida for more than six months prior to the filing of the petition for dissolution. The wife testified that she had freely and voluntarily entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated in the final judgment.
We conclude that the failure of the court to follow the twenty day waiting provision of section 61.19, Florida Statutes, was merely error in the exercise of properly obtained jurisdiction, which error did not render the judgment of dissolution void. Therefore the trial court did not err in entering the order appealed.
Affirmed.
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THE Padron LAW Grp. v. Valdenebro, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…d orders void under rules 1.540(b)(4) or 12.540(b)(4) merely because they were caused by trial court’s “mischaracteriz[ation]” that it lacked jurisdiction, when it “plainly had [it] to make [the] determinations [requested]”); Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (affirming denial of appellant’s motion for relief where trial court’s judgment, though procedurally erroneous, “was merely error in the exercise of properly obtained jurisdiction”).…
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Golub v. Golub (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)…tances of the case, the circuit court’s entry of a final judgment that dissolves the marriage but reserves jurisdiction to address all other matters is an act in excess of its jurisdiction. On this issue, we find the case of Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), instructive. That case addressed the effect of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered in violation of section 61.19, Florida Statutes (1979). Id. at 11. This statute provided: No final judgment of dissolution of mar…
Authorities Cited
- Sheldon v. Cora P. Powell, 99 Fla. 782 (Fla. 1930)
- Quigley v. Cremin, 94 Fla. 104 (Fla. 1927)
- State OF Fla. ex rel. Fulton BAG & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599 (Fla. 1943)