DAVID M. ANDERSON AND JO AN B. ANDERSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's striking of defendants' answer and counterclaim as discovery sanctions, holding that such severe sanctions require deliberate and contumacious disregard of court authority and should not be imposed merely for untimely compliance absent substantial prejudice.
The striking of pleadings as a sanction for discovery noncompliance is an extreme remedy that should be imposed only where a party acts in deliberate and contumacious disregard of court authority or gross indifference to court orders, and not for mere untimely compliance absent substantial prejudice.
[1] Striking of pleadings or entry of default judgment for discovery noncompliance is an extreme sanction requiring deliberate and contumacious disregard of court authority o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Anderson failed to comply with trial court orders compelling discovery in a dispute with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order striking appellants’ answer and counterclaim as sanctions for failing to comply with orders of the trial court compelling discovery.
The striking of pleadings or the entering of a default judgment for noncompliance with an order compelling discovery is the most severe of all sanctions and should be employed only in extreme circumstances such as where a party acts in deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority or gross indifference to an order of court. Watson v. Peskoe, 407 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Swindle v. Reid, 242 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Moreover, the visitation of such an ultimate sanction should not be imposed for failure to timely comply with the discovery order especially where failure to comply does not operate to prejudice the opposing party in any substantial manner. Santuoso v. McGrath & Associates, Inc., 385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
On review of the facts of this case, we believe that the sanctions imposed in this case are too severe and, therefore, constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. We, therefore, reverse the order striking appellants’ answer and counterclaim and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions that our decision does not operate to deprive the trial court of authority to proceed to impose on appellants some authorized lesser sanction which is just and proper under the circumstances.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Merrill Lynch v. Anderson, 501 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…repeatedly ordered the Andersons to comply with Merrill Lynch’s discovery demands. At one point the court even imposed sanctions on the Andersons which, on appeal, were found to be too severe. Anderson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 434 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The jury trial took four days and encompassed the testimony of ten witnesses, including that of David Anderson, who acted as attorney for himself and his wife. After the Andersons had rested on their counterclaim, and again at…
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McNAMARA v. Bradley Realty, Inc., 504 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…sanctions — the case had not yet been set for trial. See Wallraff v. T.G.I. Friday’s, Inc., 490 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1986); Santuso v. McGrath & Associates, Inc., 385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Anderson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 434 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and United Services Automobile Association v. Strasser, 492 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). See also Stoner v. Verkaden, 493 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (order imposing sanctions under Rule 1.380 must recite that party…
Authorities Cited
- Swindle v. Reid, 242 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Watson v. Peskoe, 407 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Santuoso v. McGRATH & Assocs., Inc., 385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)