STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL POMERANCE, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's suppression order in a cocaine trafficking case. The court reversed, holding that a vehicle was properly seized without a warrant under Florida's forfeiture statute based on probable cause, and the subsequent inventory search was lawful.
The appellate court held that the vehicle was properly seized without a warrant based on probable cause under the forfeiture statute, and the inventory search was therefore lawful. A warrant is not required by the forfeiture statute, and the mobility of automobiles and reasonable likelihood of concealment justify warrantless seizure upon probable cause.
[1] A warrantless seizure of an automobile is permissible under forfeiture statutes when probable cause exists and the vehicle's mobility creates a risk of it being hidden.
[2] An inventory search of a lawfully seized vehicle is a proper procedure.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides for the forfeiture of motor vehicles used to transport, conceal, or facilitate the sale of contraband, in violation of section 932.703, nowhere mentions obtaining a warrant; it simply states that an offending vehicle 'shall be seized.'”
Establishes that the forfeiture statute does not explicitly require a warrant before seizure
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaniel Pomerance was arrested at a restaurant in Lee County for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Officers seized his vehicle pursuant to Florida forfeit…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
The state appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Daniel Pomerance’s motion to suppress. We reverse.
Appellee was arrested at Sambo’s Restaurant in Lee County, Florida, for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The automobile driven by appellee was then seized by the officers pursuant to sections 932.702 and 932.703, Florida Statutes (1981). At the sheriff’s office the automobile was searched and inventoried. A brown paper bag was found in the trunk, and three and one-half ounces of cocaine wrapped in white freezer paper were found inside the bag.
Appellee filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. The trial court ruled that the vehicle in question was lawfully seized under the forfeiture statute, but suppressed the cocaine based on Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981).
Robbins has since been overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Furthermore, the search of the automobile here was an inventory search performed following seizure under the forfeiture statutes, not a search incident to an arrest, as in Robbins. Therefore, the propriety of the search and inventory of the vehicle in question is not controlled by either Robbins or Ross.
The issue before us, then, is whether the automobile was properly seized and impounded without a warrant at the time of appellee’s arrest. If so, the search of the trunk of the car was a proper inventory search. Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Waterhouse v. State, 256 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
We have found no case addressing this issue. However, section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides for the forfeiture of motor vehicles used to transport, conceal, or facilitate the sale of contraband, in violation of section 932.703, nowhere mentions obtaining a warrant; it simply states that an offending vehicle “shall be seized.” We know of no rationale for judicially engrafting onto the statute a requirement that a warrant be obtained. The courts have long distinguished between automobiles and houses in the context of a search. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Given the ready mobility of the automobile in issue here and the reasonable likelihood, under the circumstances here, that the car would be hidden while a warrant was being obtained, we conclude that probable cause was sufficient to support the seizure. Furthermore, the officers clearly had probable cause to justify the seizure.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. We therefore REVERSE the order granting the motion and REMAND the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RYDER and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Tyvessel Tyvorus White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…rgument that the police were required to obtain a warrant or court order before seizing the vehicle is without merit. Nothing in the Forfeiture Act requires the obtaining of a warrant or court order before seizing a vehicle. See, State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (The Forfeiture Act “nowhere mentions obtaining a warrant; it simply states that an offending vehicle ‘shall be seized.’ We know of no rationale for judicially engrafting onto the statute a requirement that a warrant be obtai…1 / 2
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Tyvessel Tyvorus White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1998)…385, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 424 (Fla.1977). In 1983, the Second District directly confronted the issue of whether a preseizure warrant needed to be obtained. The Second District held that it did not in State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), stating: We have found no case addressing this issue. However, section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides for the forfeiture of motor vehicles used to transport, conceal, or facilitate the sale of contraband,…
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Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (U.S. 1999)…Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited.” Fla. Stat. § 932.703(l)(a) (1997). Nothing in the Act requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to seizing a vehicle. See State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. App. 1983). Rather, the Act simply provides that “[plersonal property [*562] may be seized at the time of the violation or subsequent to the violation, if the person entitled to notice is notified at the time of the seizure . . . that the…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (U.S. 1925)
- Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1970)
- United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (U.S. 1982)
- Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1981)
- Felda Douglas Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Waterhouse v. State, 256 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)