CHESTER HIGGINS, APPELLANT,
v.
DR. WESLEY JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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In this medical malpractice action, the Florida appellate court reversed a trial judgment and remanded for a new trial because the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on concurring and intervening causes, which was necessary to properly assess the negligence of the parties when the defendant's alleged negligence operated in combination with a natural cause (cancer).
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on concurring and intervening causes. Such instructions are necessary for assessing the negligence of the parties, not merely for assessing damages, particularly when negligence is alleged to have combined with a natural cause contributing substantially to the injury.
[1] A trial court errs by refusing to instruct the jury on concurring and intervening causes when those issues are relevant to assessing the negligence of the parties.
[2] Jury instructions on concurrent and intervening causes are necessary for assessing the negligence of parties, not solely for assessing damages.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The charges on concurrent and intervening cause are necessary in assessing the negligence of the parties, not simply in assessing the damages.”
Establishes that jury instructions on concurrent and intervening causes are essential to determining liability and negligence, not merely to damage calculations.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant consulted a chiropractor (appellee) for low back pain and received chiropractic treatment for several weeks. Appellant's condition progressi…
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OTT, Chief Judge.
In the trial of this malpractice action, the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on concurring and intervening causes — Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 5.1(b) and (c). We therefore reverse for a new trial.
Appellant consulted appellee for low back pain. Appellee examined appellant, diagnosed a low back strain, and treated appellant chiropractically for several weeks. Appellant’s condition grew progressively worse and ultimately resulted in serious paralysis and loss of bladder and bowel functions. Appellant sued the appellee for negligent failure to observe proper standards of chiropractic medicine resulting in the failure to timely diagnose, discover, or treat a malignancy which originated in the prostate, involved the spinal column, and subsequently resulted in compression of the spinal cord.
The issues at trial were the negligence of the appellee and contributing (comparative) negligence of appellant. Quite clearly, the negligence of the appellee, if any, did not produce the cancer but was alleged to have combined with a natural cause contributing substantially to the end result. The contributing negligence of appellant was alleged to be his failure to heed appellee’s later suggestion that he should consult a medical doctor when appellant’s condition continued to progress.
The trial court denied appellant’s request at the charge conference for instruction of the jury on subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 5.1 and only gave 5.1(a).1 This left the jury with only the consideration of appellee’s negligence as a legal cause of appellant’s injury. The charges on concurrent and intervening cause are necessary in assessing the negligence of the parties, not simply in assessing the damages. See Little v. Miller, 311 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Appellant made a timely request for the instructions at the charge conference. After the trial court’s failure to include 5.1(b) and (e) in the charge to the jury, appellant noted his objection in the record after the jury retired. We think this adequately preserved the point for appeal. See Spurlock v. State, 420 So. 2d 875 (Fla.1982).
The final judgment on the jury’s verdict is VACATED and the case REMANDED for a new trial.
BOARDMAN and LEHAN, JJ., concur. . The following version of Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 5.1(a) was read to the jury:
Negligence is a legal cause of loss, injury or damage if it directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or contributes substantially to producing such loss, injury or damage so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the loss, injury or damage would not have occurred.
Appellant requested 5.1(b) and (c), as follows:
(b) In order to be regarded as a legal cause of loss, injury, or damage, negligence need not be the only cause. Negligence may be the legal cause of loss, injury or damage even though it operates in combination with the act of another, some natural cause, or some other cause if such other cause occurs at the same time as the negligence and if the negligence contributes substantially to producing such loss, injury or damages.
(c) Negligence may also be a legal cause of loss, injury or damage even though it operates in combination with some natural cause or some other cause occurring after the negligence occurs if such other cause was itself reasonably foreseeable and the negligence contributes substantially to producing such loss, injury or damage, or the resulting loss, injury or damage was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence and the negligence contributes substantially to producing it.
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Reyka v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 657 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…of the trial court to have given them. Indeed, had it not done so, it might have created reversible error. See Auster; Marinetti v. Grace, 608 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 620 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1993); Banks; Tilley; Higgins v. Johnson, 434 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Goodman v. Becker, 430 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . These health care providers include Halifax Hospital District d/b/a Halifax Medical Center, James Henson, M.D., Halifax Emerge…
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Jade Lakay Hart v. Louis Stern, M.D. & Wymore Ob/Gyn Specialists, P.A., 824 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…standard jury instruction 5.1(b) on concurrent causes is applicable when the plaintiff’s injury is caused by a doctor’s negligence, acting upon and combined with the plaintiff's preexisting physical condition.”) (citing Goodman; Higgins v. Johnson, 434 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Marrero), review denied, 523 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1988); see also Reyka, 657 So. 2d at 969 ("[T]he concurring cause instruction encompasses the medical malpractice situation where a health care provider is coping with an injury or con…
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Amparo Borges v. Jerome F. Jacobs, D.P.M. & Jerome F. Jacobs, D.P.M., P.A., 483 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…s [plaintiff’s] pre-existing physiological and anatomical status.... ” Goodman v. Becker, 430 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (footnote omitted). Accord Tilley v. Broward Hospital District, 458 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Higgins v. Johnson, 434 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Marrero v. Salkind, 433 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 418 (Fla.1984). And finally, no inference that the two post-treatment hospitalizations for surgery were unnecessary can be drawn from evidence that…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Spurlock v. State, 420 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1982)
- In the Interest of J. W. P. v. State, 311 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)