RAFAEL HUMBERTO PALACIOS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rafael Palacios was convicted of trafficking in marijuana after police opened his rental truck and found marijuana inside. The court reversed the conviction because Palacios did not knowingly, freely, and voluntarily consent to the search; his compliance was mere submission to apparent authority by an officer, and his status as a recent Cuban immigrant who spoke only Spanish was not adequately considered.
The court held that Palacios did not knowingly, freely, and voluntarily consent to the search. His action in opening the rear door upon request was mere submission to the apparent authority of Inspector Davis and fell short of the knowing, free, and voluntary consent necessary to comply with Fourth Amendment protections.
[1] A search conducted without consent or a warrant is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception.
[2] Mere submission to the apparent authority of a law enforcement officer does not constitute knowing, free, and voluntary consent to a search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nothing in the record discloses that the state met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Palacios consented knowingly, freely and voluntarily to the search.”
Establishes that the state bears the burden to prove valid consent by a preponderance of the evidence and that this burden was not met in this case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePalacios, a recent Cuban immigrant who speaks only Spanish, was driving a rental truck north on Interstate 75 when he failed to stop at an agricultura…
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ERVIN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, Rafael Humberto Palacios, appeals from a conviction for the offense of trafficking in marijuana, contending, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized subsequent to a non-eonsensual search not incident to arrest. We agree and reverse.
The record discloses that Palacios was driving a rental truck north on Interstate 75 in Hamilton County at 4:00 a.m. on December 1,1981, when he failed to stop at an agricultural inspection station. Inspector Davis, a uniformed officer on duty at the time, saw the truck bypass the station and accordingly pursued it in an official marked car with blue lights flashing. He stopped the truck some 2½ miles north of the station and then informed the driver, Palacios, first that he was required to stop at the station, and second that he needed to inspect the truck’s cargo section. Palacios, a recent Cuban immigrant who speaks only Spanish, said, “No English.” Davis again attempted to explain that he needed to inspect the rear of the truck and motioned to Palacios to open the rear door. Palacios complied with Davis’ gestures by opening the door. At that point, a second man, Ferrer, who had been following the truck in an automobile, told Inspector Davis that he could not open the boxes in the rear of the truck which, he contended, contained ceramic vases. Davis then informed Palacios and Ferrer to return to the station, where Palacios was again directed, by motions, to re-open the cargo section of the truck. By that time Sheriff’s Deputy Beck had approached the open door of the truck, smelled marijuana within it, and proceeded to open the boxes inside it, which were found to contain marijuana.
Palacios’ motion to suppress alleged that he did not knowingly, freely and voluntarily consent to a search of the truck and that the evidence thus seized was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. At the hearing on the motion, Palacios testified, through an interpreter, that he believed Inspector Davis had ordered him to open the truck’s door; that he did not know he could refuse to obey Davis’ order, because in Cuba officers generally have the right to conduct searches without consent, and that, had he known he could lawfully refuse, he would not have opened door to the truck. Ferrer also testified and confirmed the fact that Palacios does not speak or understand English. The trial court denied the motion, finding no coercion because, in its opinion, Inspector Davis was soft spoken, mild mannered and not authoritative. We reverse. Nothing in the record discloses that the state met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Palacios consented knowingly, freely and voluntarily to the search. See Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla.1980). In reversing, we adopt the reasoning in our recent decision of Rosell v. State, 433 So. 2d 1260, (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), which we find controls the facts in the present ease.
In this case, as in Rosell, we do not find that Palacios’ action, in opening the rear door of the truck upon request, was anything more than mere submission to the apparent authority of Inspector Davis and, as such, was far short of the knowing, free and voluntary consent necessary to comply with fourth amendment protections.
REVERSED.
THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…een no initial illegality, see, e.g., Younger v. State, 433 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 440 So. 2d 354 (Fla.1983); those which use the preponderance standard where there is an initial illegality or coercion, see, e.g., Palacios v. State, 434 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and those which do not expressly declare what standard is being [*1073] used, but, based on the facts set forth in the opinion, cite to the wrong line of cases, thus obliterating the distinction between Denehy and Norman. See, e…
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Elsleger v. State, 503 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)….1981), under ordinary circumstances where there is no antecedent police misconduct a consent to search need be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence. See also, State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); compare Palacios v. State, 434 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), with Wilson v. State, 470 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the present case the court did not find any antecedent police misconduct, erroneously assuming that clear and convincing proof is the usual standard with regard to cons…
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State v. Blan, 489 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)….1981), under ordinary circumstances where there is no antecedent police misconduct a consent to search need be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence. See also, State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); compare Palacios v. State, 434 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), with Wilson v. State, 470 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the present case the court did not find any antecedent police misconduct, errone [*866] ously assuming that clear and convincing proof is the usual standard with regard…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)
- Rosell v. State, 433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)