OSCEOLA COUNTY, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
ARTHUR D. CASTELLI, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Osceola County sought an injunction to force the Castellis to remove a fence blocking Wren Drive, a private roadway crossing their property. The court affirmed the dismissal of the county's claim, holding that the county failed to establish either statutory dedication or a prescriptive easement in the road.
The court held that the county did not acquire title or rights to the roadway. Section 95.361 did not apply because the road was constructed by a private developer rather than by the county. Additionally, the county failed to establish a prescriptive easement because it did not prove continuous and uninterrupted use for twenty years and failed to show that the public's use was adverse rather than permissive.
[1] A county cannot acquire title to a roadway under section 95.361, Florida Statutes, if the road was constructed by a private developer, not the county.
[2] To establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must prove by clear and positive proof that the use was continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or Division of Road Operations, jointly or severally, the road shall be deemed to be dedicated to the public to the extent in width that has been actually maintained for the prescribed period”
Establishes the statutory basis for acquiring title to roadways, which requires the road to have been constructed by a government entity, not a private developer
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWren Drive is a roadway passing through property owned by Arthur and Melinda Castelli. The road was originally constructed by a private developer, not…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prescriptive Easement cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Osceola County appeals from a final judgment in favor of Arthur and Melinda Castelli. The county had sought an injunction to require the Castellis to remove a fence which they had erected across Wren Drive, a roadway which passes through their property. We affirm.
Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that a county may acquire title to a roadway under certain circumstances:
(1) When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Division of Road Operations, has been maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years by the county, municipality, or Division of Road Operations, jointly or severally, the road shall be deemed to be dedicated to the public to the extent in width that has been actually maintained for the prescribed period, whether the road has been formally established as a public highway or not.... (emphasis added)
In this case, while there is evidence of county maintenance of Wren Drive for almost ten years, the evidence also establishes that the road was constructed by a private developer and not the county. Therefore, section 95.361 is inapplicable here.
The county’s claim that the public acquired a prescriptive easement in the road by maintaining and using it for more than twenty years is likewise unavailing. First, the county failed to show by clear and positive proof that the use was continuous and uninterrupted for the full twenty-ye period. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla.1958); Gibson v. Buice, 394 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Guerard v. Roper, 385 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Second, there is no evidence that the use was adverse under claim of right. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d at 64; Guerard v. Roper, 385 So. 2d at 720. If anything, the evidence at trial showed that the public was using the road with the express permission of the developer, a fact which prevents the creation of a prescriptive easement. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla.1974); Guerard v. Roper, 385 So. 2d at 720; Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mathers v. Wakulla Cnty., 219 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…2d 949, 953-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Pasco v. City of Oldsmar, 953 So. 2d 766, 769-70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Hancock v. Tipton, 732 So. 2d 369, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Lee v. Calhoun Cty., 532 So. 2d 43, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Osceola Cty. v. Castelli, 435 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Hodges v. City of Winter Park, 433 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Balbier v. City of Deerfield Beach, 408 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Campanella v. Shuford, 336 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The C…
Authorities Cited
- Lottie Sykes Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958)
- The City OF Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974)
- Maone B. Guerard v. Waldron Roper, 385 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Gibson v. Buice, 394 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)