IN RE ONE (1) 1979 CHEVROLET BLAZER BEARING FLORIDA TAG NO. WFF-202, VIN NO. CKL189202370. JOSE ANTONIO MARBAN, APPELLANT,
v.
METRO-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, APPELLEE
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The appellate court dismissed an appeal because the appellant filed a second notice of appeal after the trial court lost jurisdiction, rendering the subsequent order and appeal invalid. This case highlights the critical timing requirements for appellate jurisdiction.
No, the appellate court does not have jurisdiction. The trial court lost jurisdiction when the first notice of appeal was filed while a rehearing motion was pending, making the subsequent order denying rehearing a nullity. Therefore, the second appeal from that null order is also without jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction of a case upon the filing of a notice of appeal while a motion for rehearing is pending.
[2] A trial court order entered after it has lost jurisdiction is a nullity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon the filing of this notice of appeal on July 30, 1982, Marban’s rehearing motion was effectively abandoned, and the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case.”
Establishes the legal principle that filing a notice of appeal while a rehearing motion is pending abandons the motion and divests the trial court of jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court ordered the forfeiture of a vehicle used in drug trafficking. The owner filed a motion for rehearing and, while it was pending, filed …
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Concluding that we are without jurisdiction, we dismiss Marban’s appeal.
On July 8, 1982, the trial court entered a final order forfeiting the subject vehicle upon a finding that the vehicle had been used in a drug trafficking operation with the knowledge and consent of its owner, Marban. Marban timely moved for rehearing, but while that motion was pending in the trial court, filed a notice of appeal. Upon the filing of this notice of appeal on July 30, 1982, Marban’s rehearing motion was effectively abandoned, and the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case. Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1949); Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Scott-Whitaker Co. v. Joyce Properties, Inc., 155 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 159 So. 2d 651 (Fla.1963); Chambers v. Chambers, 143 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 114 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Codomo, 372 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla.1980). We, of course, had jurisdiction of the timely-taken appeal.
However, on November 5, 1982, we dismissed Marban’s appeal because of his failure to take any steps to prosecute it. Mar-ban was apparently undismayed, because by then he had filed a second notice of appeal directed to the trial court’s September 10, 1982, order denying his motion for rehearing. It is this second appeal that is now before us and over which we find ourselves without jurisdiction. As the reader has by now undoubtedly surmised, the trial court’s order denying rehearing was a nullity, and the appeal therefrom breathed no life into it. Under the circumstances set forth, the case below was finally disposed of on July 8, 1982, and our jurisdiction could attach only to an appeal from the order of forfeiture. When that appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution, Marban’s right to appellate review was lost.
Appeal dismissed.
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In re Forfeiture OF $104 v. Metro Dade Police Dep't, 589 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1991)…el. Owens v. Pearson, 156 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1963); State v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 134 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1961); Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1949); In re One 1979 Chevrolet Blazer Bearing Florida Tag No. WFF-202, VIN No. CKL 189202370, 436 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Id. at 727-28. As expressed in his notice of appeal, Gonzalez relied on Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla.1975). In Williams, we gave three non-inclusive examples of when a defendant may file a notice of appeal after pronou…
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In re Forfeiture OF $104 v. Metro Dade Police Dep't, 578 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…s v. Pearson, 156 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1963); State v. Florida State Turn [*728] pike Auth., 134 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1961); Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1949); In re One 1979 Chevrolet Blazer Bearing Florida Tag No. WFF-202, VIN No. CKL 189202370, 436 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Indeed, the supreme court has often stressed that the adoption of any other rule would “result in utter chaos in the appellate processes.” Faircloth, 187 So. 2d at 892, and “complete confusion in the disposition of litigation.” P…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949)
- Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Anne Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 114 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Codomo, 372 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Scott-Whitaker Co., Inc. v. Joyce Props., Inc., 155 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Chambers v. Chambers, 143 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Roney v. McCARTHY, 159 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1963)
- Jensen v. Hoofe, 159 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1963)