C. W. COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
W. H. PASSMORE, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1931-11-30
103 Fla. 744 Florida Supreme Court (1931) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 138 So. 48
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Cooper sought to cancel mechanics liens filed by Passmore on real estate, arguing they were unauthorized by statute. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court's enforcement of the liens, holding that mechanics liens arise from actual performance of labor, not from breach of contract to perform labor.


Holding

Passmore was not entitled to mechanics liens because he failed to prove that he rushed work to completion as rapidly and economically as possible, that he did work agreeable to Cooper, and that each house was completed and accepted by Cooper. Mechanics liens are acquired by performance of labor, not by breach of a contract to perform labor.


Key Quotes

“Mechanics liens are acquired under the statute by the performance of labor not by the breach of a contract to perform labor.”

States the fundamental legal principle distinguishing liens based on actual performance from those based on contractual breach

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Cooper and Passmore entered a contract whereby Passmore agreed to build houses for Cooper, with Cooper to pay Passmore $500 per house in addition to d…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
Whitfield, P.J.

Whitfield, P.J.

A bill of complaint by C. W. Cooper sought the cancellation of record of notices of mechanics liens filed by W. H. Passmore upon real estate of Cooper, the theory being that the liens were not authorized by the statute. By answer and cross bill Passmore asserted the validity of his liens and prayed for their enforcement.

The Court dismissed the original bill and decreed an enforcement of the mechanic’s liens. An appeal was taken by Cooper.

By a contract between the parties, Passmore agreed to build certain houses for Cooper who agreed to pay Pass-more “five hundred dollars on each house, this in addition to his daily wages, this amount is due and payable upon completion of each house, garage and garage apartment, and accepted by * Cooper.” “Passmore agreed to rush work to completion as rapidly and economically as possible and to do the work agreeable to * Cooper. ’ ’

Assuming that Passmore was entitled to liens for “five hundred dollars on each house in addition to his daily wages, ’ ’ the burden was upon Passmore to prove that he did ‘ ‘ rush work to completion as rapidly and economically as possible and” did “do the work agreeable to * *745Cooper;” and that each house was completed and accepted by Cooper. This is not shown by the probative force of the evidence. If the “completion of each house” and its acceptance by Cooper were prevented by Cooper in violation of the intendments of the contract, Passmore’s remedy is at law for a breach of contract.

Mechanics liens are acquired under the statute by the performance of labor not by the breach of a contract to perform labor.

Reversed.

Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.

Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Crum v. State, 172 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
    …from the evidence that the defendant commenced the physical altercation by grabbing the victim and shaking her and therefore, having been the instigator of the altercation, is not in a position to urge self defense. See: Gaff v. State, 103 Fla. 642, 138 So. 48; Mixon v. State, Fla. 1952, 59 So. 2d 38. In examining a record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict or the conclusion of the trier of fact, an appellate court need only find substantial, competent evidence to support t…
  • …, F.S.A. . Glazer v. Schwartz (1931) 276 Mass. 54, 176 N.E. 613; Mink et al. v. Heep et al., 223 App.Div. 220, 227 N.Y.S. 698; 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 95, p. 605. . 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 96, p. 606. . Cooper v. Passmore, 103 Fla. 744, 138 So. 48. . Poranski v. Millings, (Fla.1955) 82 So. 2d 675.…
  • …will be entitled, as it contends on its cross-appeal, to the final management payment of $2,500, a damage arising from the appellant’s breach of the contract. The appellee will not, however, be entitled to a lien for that amount, Cooper v. Passmore, 103 Fla. 744, 138 So. 48 (1931). We reject appellee’s contention on cross-appeal that it was entitled to the full amount of a claim assigned to it at a discount by Fandino & Sons, its subcontractor, since Weinbaum, by its contract with Twenty-Four Collection, wa…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw