RONALD VAPRIN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1983-08-09
No. 82-1367
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.
437 So. 2d 177 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Ronald Vaprin was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea after the court found he entered the plea based on a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences. The state had made an undisclosed agreement regarding sentencing leniency in exchange for Vaprin's testimony in other cases, but failed to inform the trial judge of this arrangement during the plea and sentencing process.


Holding

The defendant must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he entered it upon a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences due to the state's failure to disclose its sentencing agreement during the plea and sentencing process.


Headnotes

[1] A guilty plea may be withdrawn if it was entered upon a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences.

[2] A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea when counsel's ineffectiveness led to a misapprehension of sentencing consequences.

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Key Quotes

“the appellant entered his guilty plea upon a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences and therefore must be permitted to withdraw it”

States the court's holding that the plea must be withdrawn based on misunderstanding of sentencing consequences

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Facts & Procedural History

Vaprin agreed to plead guilty as part of an agreement to testify for the state in two unrelated cases. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Af…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

As a part of Vaprin’s agreement to testify for the state in two unrelated cases, he pled guilty to the present charges. After he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, he moved to vacate the conviction under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 on the asserted ground that the plea had not been knowingly entered supposedly because of the “ineffectiveness” of his own counsel in advising him that he would receive a more lenient sentence. See Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1971). The state attorney specifically agreed to the granting ot that motion. We think we are not merely speculating when we suggest that this agreement was (in a way) commendably in accordance with the state’s own previous, unrevealed undertaking to Vaprin with respect to the plea.1 We fully appreciate and agree with the attitude of the trial judge who, in denying the motion notwithstanding the agreement, expressed his strong disapproval of the fact that he had been misled by both sides, particularly the state, in their failure to apprise him of these facts during the plea and sentencing process.2 Nonetheless, under the circumstances thus stipulated below, it clearly appears that the appellant entered his guilty plea upon a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences and therefore must be permitted to withdraw it. Banks v. State, 136 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).

The order under review is therefore reversed with directions to grant the defendant’s 3.850 motion and for further appropriate proceedings.

Reversed.

. Plainly, the state had not outlined the agreement in open court for fear of “benefitting” those against whom Vaprin testified by disclosing the extent of the consideration he would receive for doing so. We express no opinion as to what rights flow to those defendants as a result of any such secretion.

. In contrast, we cannot be tolerant of the positions taken by the Attorney General’s of-flee before this court. On the one hand, it has most disingenuously sought to deny the existence of the state attorney’s concession and, on the other, most improperly, see Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (en banc), attempted to renege upon it. The state of Florida should not have made and will not be heard even to assert either contention.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Wade v. State, 488 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …ed to withdraw a guilty plea when such plea “was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making the plea.” Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983), and cases cited therein; Vaprin v. State, 437 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Where, as in this case, such misunderstanding or misapprehension is clearly demonstrated by the defendant upon motion made prior to sentencing, the trial court should permit the defendant to withdraw the plea in the interests of…
  • Fernandez v. State, 559 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
    …correctly conceded that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s [*465] motion to withdraw his plea of nolo conten-dere, based upon a misunderstanding of the sentencing consequences, Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1983); Vaprin v. State, 437 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to permit defendant to withdraw his plea. Reversed and remanded with directions.…
  • Nelson v. State, 812 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …court ultimately determine that counsel did not advise Appellant of this, then Appellant shall be afforded an opportunity to move to withdraw his plea. See Garcia, v. State, 736 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(Gross, J., concurring); Vaprin v. State, 437 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that where defendant entered guilty plea upon a justifiable misapprehension of its sentencing consequences, it was required that he be permitted to withdraw his plea). POLEN, C.J., FARMER and GROSS, JJ., concur.…

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