STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CLYDE MILLER, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's discharge of Miller on speedy trial grounds. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the speedy trial time period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not commence merely from Miranda warnings and interrogation when a defendant is already in custody on an unrelated charge; it only begins when the defendant is arrested or served with a notice to appear for that specific crime.
The speedy trial time period does not commence merely because a defendant in custody on an unrelated charge is given Miranda warnings and questioned about a separate offense. Under the 1980 amendment to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191, the time period commences only when a person is arrested as a result of the conduct giving rise to the specific crime charged or is served with a notice to appear for that crime.
[1] The speedy trial time period does not commence when a person already in custody on an unrelated charge is given Miranda warnings and interrogated about a new offense.
[2] Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(4), a person is taken into custody for speedy trial purposes when arrested as a result of the conduct giving rise to the…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the old rule, the time period commenced when a person was "taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged." As amended in 1980, the time period commences when a person is "taken into custody as defined under (a)(4)."”
Explains the change in the speedy trial rule and distinguishes the old standard from the new one
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiller was arrested on March 25, 1983 for an unrelated burglary. On March 31, 1983, a search of his vehicle revealed jewelry later identified as stole…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
The State appeals the order of the trial court granting Miller’s motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. Appellant argues that the speedy trial time period did not begin to run merely because appellee, who was already in custody due to an unrelated offense, was given Miranda warnings and questioned about the alleged crime. We agree, reverse and remand.
Miller was arrested during a burglary in process at the home of Mrs. Odham on March 25, 1983. A search of appellee’s vehicle on March 31, 1983, uncovered several articles of jewelry. Subsequent investigation revealed that some of the articles of jewelry found in appellee’s car were the property of Mr. and Mrs. Willoughby, who were the alleged victims of a burglary which occurred February 23, 1982.
On April 12,1982, while appellee was still in jail on the Odham charge, Investigator Revell had appellee brought to an interrogation facility at the Leon County Jail. After advising appellee of his constitutional rights and securing a written waiver of Miranda rights, Revell questioned appellee about the Willoughby burglary. On July 1, 1982, Investigator Revell signed a complaint against appellee, who was still in jail on the Odham burglary charge, for grand theft of the Willoughby property. An information charging grand theft in the Willoughby case was filed July 2, 1982.
On December 28, 1982, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for discharge based on the speedy trial rule. The court found that the speedy trial time on the Willoughby offense began to run on April 12,1982, the date appellee was given Miranda warnings and questioned about the Wil- loughby burglary. The trial court acknowledged that speedy trial time would not begin to run on April 12, 1982, under the holdings of State v. Breedlove, 400 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The trial court felt, however, that the decision it reached was mandated by the decisions of this court in Johnson v. State, 409 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1982); Wiggins v. State, 384 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); and State v. N.B., 360 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1980).
The cases of Johnson and Wiggins are not closely analogous to the case at bar. Both Johnson and Wiggins involved situations where the defendant was not already in custody on an unrelated charge at the time he was questioned about the relevant charge. Although the facts of State v. N.B. are somewhat analogous to the situation sub judice, that case was decided prior to the 1980 amendment to the speedy trial rule.
Under the old rule, the time period commenced when a person was “taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.” As amended in 1980, the time period commences when a person is “taken into custody as defined under (a)(4).” Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(4) states:
(a)(4). Custody. For purposes of this Rule, a person is taken into custody, (i) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged, or (ii) when the person is served with a notice to appear in lieu of physical arrest.
In the instant case, appellee was not arrested on April 12, 1982, but was merely given Miranda warnings and interrogated. This does not commence the speedy trial time period under the new rule. See Powers v. State, 422 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is REVERSED, and this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…son may be “in custody” for purposes of Miranda1 requirements, but not for purposes of the speedy trial rule. Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986); Christian; State v. Miller, 437 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State ex rel. Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1978). And, a seizure may trigger fourth amendment protection and yet not be a technical arrest. Griffin. In Melton v. State, 75…
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King v. State, 468 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…nying King’s motion for discharge based on Rule 3.191(a)(1), Fla.R.Crim.P. He first alleges that his “arrest” within Rule 3.191(a)(4) occurred when he was given his Miranda rights and interrogated. That definition has been rejected. State v. Miller, 437 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). He next contends that his placement in administrative confinement constituted an “arrest.” This court has consistently refused to adopt this argument. See Height v. State, 459 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Therefore, because K…
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State v. Terrick Taylor, 895 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ects his intent to question Taylor, not to arrest him. While Taylor was already in custody on other charges, Deputy Ferguson took no action to have Taylor detained on the charges he was investigating beyond the interview period. See State v. Miller, 437 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that speedy trial period did not begin to run when defendant who was in custody on unrelated case was given Miranda warnings and questioned about the alleged crime). Further, at no time did Deputy Ferguson communicate to…
Authorities Cited
- Powers v. State, 422 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Carmine John Giglio v. Honorable Stanton S. Kaplan, 392 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Gray v. State, 400 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Landahl v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- State v. N. B., 360 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Wiggins v. State, 384 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Hiram David Johnson v. State, 409 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)