JAMES WESLEY GODDARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Wesley Goddard was convicted under Florida Statute § 812.019(2) for initiating, planning, and trafficking in stolen property that he personally stole. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction, holding that the statute's plain language applies to a common thief who steals property and then traffics in it, though the court certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court due to its significant public importance.
Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, applies to a common thief who individually steals property and traffics in the stolen goods. Because one who actually commits a theft necessarily also initiates and plans it, the disjunctive language of the statute clearly encompasses such conduct.
[1] A statute's plain and unambiguous language is not subject to interpretation to ascertain legislative intent.
[2] The disjunctive "or" in a statute prohibits the doing of any of the acts joined by it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a well-settled rule that where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort to rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain legislative intent is unnecessary.”
Establishes the court's interpretive methodology—when statutory language is clear, no further interpretation of legislative intent is needed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Goddard personally stole goods and then trafficked in those same stolen goods. The evidence did not support an interpretation that the theft…
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PER CURIAM.
Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, imposes criminal sanctions upon “any person who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property and traffics in such stolen property.” Appellant was found guilty by jury of violating that statutory prohibition. The only issue raised on appeal which merits discussion is appellant’s contention that Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, was not intended to apply to him, a common thief who individually stole the goods in question1 and then trafficked in same.2 We disagree.
It is a well-settled rule that where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort to rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain legislative intent is unnecessary. The Legislature is held to have intended that which it plainly expressed.
We find the language of Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, plain and unambiguous. The word “or,” a disjunctive article, as used in the context of Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits the doing of either or any act so joined. Clearly, one who actually commits a theft also, at least, initiates and plans it, each act of which is proscribed by Section 812.019(2).
Accordingly, we conclude the Section 812.019(2), Florida Statutes, is intended to apply to the common thief who also traffics in the goods which he has stolen and, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction. However, because we recognize that the issue presented by appellant is one of great public importance, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question:
DID THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE INTEND TO PUNISH UNDER SECTION 812.019(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, THE COMMON THIEF WHO TRAFFICS IN THE GOODS WHICH HE HAS INDIVIDUALLY STOLEN, OR WAS THAT PROVISION INTENDED TO ONLY PUNISH ONE WHO ACTS AS A “RINGLEADER” IN THE ORGANIZING OF THEFTS AND TRAFFICS IN THE STOLEN GOODS.
BOOTH, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . We do not find that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to permit an interpretation that the thefts were committed by more than one person or that the thefts were committed by one acting under appellant’s direction.
. It is not disputed that appellant trafficked in the goods stolen.
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Goddard v. State, 458 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1984)…at this statute is [*235] intended to apply to the common thief who also traffics in the goods which he has stolen. Like the district court, I conclude that “one who actually commits a theft also, at least, initiates and plans it.” Goddard v. State, 438 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). McDONALD, J., concurs.…1 / 2