THE HORSE HAVEN AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
ROBERT WILLIT, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an award of temporary total disability benefits and psychiatric treatment costs, holding that the deputy commissioner failed to establish the required causal nexus between the claimant's industrial injury and his subsequent psychiatric condition based on reasonable medical probability rather than mere possibility.
The court held that post-traumatic psychiatric conditions are only compensable when there is a direct and immediate causal relationship to the industrial injury based on reasonable medical probability, not mere possibility. The deputy commissioner's order was reversed because it lacked specific findings establishing the required causal nexus and the record did not contain competent and substantial evidence meeting the reasonable medical probability standard.
[1] For post-traumatic neurosis to be compensable in workers' compensation, it must be the direct and immediate result of the industrial injury, not merely remotely connected…
[2] A workers' compensation award for a psychiatric condition requires competent and substantial evidence establishing a causal relationship between the compensable primary i…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It has long been the law in this state that for post-traumatic neurosis to be compensable, it must be the direct and immediate result of the industrial injury and not merely remotely connected with the injury.”
Establishes the foundational requirement for compensability of psychiatric injuries in workers' compensation cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Willit sustained a compensable back injury in an industrial accident. Following this injury, he developed a hysterical or conversion reaction. …
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JOANOS, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the Horse Haven and its carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (E/C) appeal an Order of the deputy commissioner that granted Robert Willit (claimant) temporary total disability benefits and all medical care and costs “as the nature of his injury might require, including psychiatric treatment.” The E/C contends that the deputy commissioner erred in its finding that claimant is entitled to compensation for a psychiatric condition arising after a compensable accident in the absence of clear evidence showing claimant’s psychiatric condition to be a direct and natural result of the compensable primary injury. We agree.
“It has long been the law in this state that for post-traumatic neurosis to be compensable, it must be the direct and immediate result of the industrial injury and not merely remotely connected with the injury.” Franklin Manor Apartments v. Jordan, 417 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956). The deputy commissioner’s order did not contain specific findings that established a causal relationship between claimant’s compensable back injury and the hysterical or conversion reaction that followed. Nor does the record contain competent and substantial evidence that would necessarily require either award. There is evidence to support a “possibility” that claimant’s hysterical reaction was causally related to his industrial injury, but this relationship must be based upon a “reasonable medical probability — not possibility.” Scotty’s, Inc. v. Jones, 393 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Nelson v. Hebrew Home for Aged, 276 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1973). For these reasons, we reverse and remand the order for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Scotty’s, Inc. v. Jones, supra, at 659. See also, University Inns v. Davis, 413 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
It would be well to note, however, in view of the probability of additional medical evidence being presented below, that the “reasonable medical probability” standard may be met notwithstanding the failure of a doctor to use the “magic words” — “reasonable medical certainty” in causally relating the claimant’s hysterical or conversion reaction to his physical injury. See, Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
In light of this determination, the award of attorney’s fees is also reversed and remanded for further consideration.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
LARRY G. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
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Closet Maid & Crawford & Co. v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…obability. But many of the opinions also referred to “reasonable medical certainty,” and used that phrase interchangeably with “reasonable medical probability.” See, e.g., Turner v. Harmon, 438 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Horse Haven v. Witlit, 438 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary 1273 (7th ed.1998), indicates that the phrases “reasonable medical probability” and “reasonable medical certainty” are merely…
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La. Pac. Corp. v. Harcus, 774 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…never offered an opinion regarding whether the claimant’s employment was responsible for his stenosis. While it may be true that no “magic words” are necessary to meet the “reasonable medical certainty” burden of proof, e.g., Horse Haven v. Willit, 438 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), prior to this case we had not reached the point where that standard might be disregarded entirely. Spinal stenosis is not necessarily caused by repeated heavy lifting over many years. See Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 37…
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Greater Miami Acad. & Crawford & Co. v. Blum, 466 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…past and future psychiatric care by Dr. Chona-Wylie. To be compensable, a post-traumatic mental disorder must be the direct and immediate result of the industrial injury. Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956); Horse Haven v. Willit, 438 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). On the evidence presented, it cannot logically and reasonably be said that Blum’s reactive depression is an immediate result of her lower back injury. We do not hold that a 9-month interval between the date of accident and mani…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Therber v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1956)
- Charity Ann Murvin v. State, 393 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Scotty's, Inc. v. Jones, 393 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Tranquilino Castro v. Florida Juice Division and Southern Fire Adjusters, 400 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Univ. Inns & Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Belva Joyce Davis, 413 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Franklin Manor Apts. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 417 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Therese Nelson v. Hebrew Home FOR Aged, 276 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1973)