J.I. CASE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
STEEL FABRICATORS, INC., APPELLEE
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J.I. Case Company appealed the trial court's order striking its defensive pleadings as a sanction for willfully violating a prior order prohibiting destructive testing of materials in a products liability case. The appellate court affirmed, holding that striking pleadings is an extreme sanction properly reserved for cases where there is substantial evidence of willful violation and prejudicial effect.
The trial court properly struck the appellant's defensive pleadings as a sanction where there is substantial competent evidence that the appellant willfully violated a prior order and such violation prejudiced the opposing party's ability to prosecute its claim. The appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the trial court's when there is evidence supporting the sanction imposed.
[1] Striking a party's defensive pleadings is an extreme sanction that should be reserved for the most severe cases.
[2] A trial court may strike defensive pleadings upon finding substantial competent evidence that a party willfully violated a prior order and that such violation prejudiced…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings that appellant willfully violated this prior order and that such violation prejudiced the appellee's ability to prosecute its claim against the appellant.”
Establishes the factual basis supporting the sanction of striking pleadings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court issued a prior order prohibiting destructive testing of material that was the subject of appellee's products liability claim against J…
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ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.
The trial court’s order striking the defensive pleadings of the appellant is hereby affirmed. A prior order prohibited any destructive testing of the material that was the subject matter of appellee’s products liability claim against the appellant. There is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings that appellant willfully violated this prior order and that such violation prejudiced the appellee’s ability to prosecute its claim against the appellant.
We agree with the appellant that a trial court should be very cautious in considering matters of this kind and should reserve for the extreme case a sanction as severe as the striking of pleadings. Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In most instances this will involve a consideration of not only the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct but also a consideration of the prejudi cial effect of the misconduct. It is clear that the trial court utilized such an analysis here. Given evidence to support the trial court’s determination, we are not free to substitute our opinion as to the propriety of the sanction imposed.
While affirming the trial court’s action here, we repeat our concern that the nature of the sanction imposed should be carefully tailored to the violation involved and its effects. In addition, wherever possible, a determination should be made as to whether the violation was occasioned by the conduct of the party or his attorney, and the sanctions should be imposed accordingly. While this does not mean that sanctions may not be imposed against a party because of his attorney’s misconduct, such sanctions should be avoided if the court’s purpose can be accomplished by limiting the sanctions to the person responsible for the violation.
HERSEY, J., concurs.
WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion.
WALDEN, Judge,
dissenting:
In my opinion the sanction imposed represented an abuse of discretion because it was too severe in light of the circumstances.
I would reverse.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Rosenberg v. Miller, 453 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…trial court entered an order striking and dismissing the answer and counterclaim. The record in this case does not present the extreme case required to justify a sanction as severe as striking the pleadings. J.I.Case Co. v. Steel Fabricators, Inc., 438 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Furthermore, because this case involves appellant’s failure to comply with a court order setting forth a specific time to file an answer rather than the existence of “redundant, immaterial or scandalous matter [in a] pleading_”,…
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Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…f sanctions. This court has cautioned trial courts that they “should be very cautious in considering matters of this kind and should reserve for the extreme case a sanction as severe as the striking of pleadings.” J.I. Case Co. v. Steel Fabricators, 438 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). “[U]sing the ultimate sanction of dismissal should always be viewed as a remedy of last resort.... ” New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). “Florida has a longstanding policy in favor…
Authorities Cited
- Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)