ARDIS F. HEIMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
CAPITAL BANK, CAESER O. CASILELLES, HEIMAN, KRIEGER, FREIDIN & SILBER, P.A., AND CONSOLIDATED OIL COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Mrs. Heiman sought homestead exemption for a condominium titled in her name to prevent forced sale after her husband's death. The court held that record title is not essential to homestead status and that a surviving spouse may claim homestead protections based on the deceased spouse's beneficial interest as head of family, even if legal title was held by the spouse.
Record title is not a prerequisite to homestead protection. A surviving spouse may obtain homestead exemption based on the deceased spouse's beneficial interest in the property as head of family, even though legal title was held in the surviving spouse's name. The case is remanded to determine whether the deceased husband retained sufficient beneficial interest to qualify the property as homestead.
[1] Record title is not a prerequisite to establishing homestead status.
[2] Homestead status may derive from a spouse's beneficial interest as head of the family in a marital home titled in the other spouse's name.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Record title is not a prerequisite to a finding that property is homestead. Homestead status may derive from the husband's beneficial interest as head of the family in a marital home titled in his wife's name”
Establishes the core holding that record title is not essential to homestead protection and that beneficial interest alone may suffice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEugene Heiman's surviving spouse, Mrs. Heiman, owned a condominium titled in her name alone. After her husband's death, a judgment creditor (Capital B…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Mrs. Heiman, surviving spouse of Eugene Heiman, sought to have her condominium declared exempt from forced sale under homestead provisions of the Florida Constitution, Article X, section 4. She maintained that her husband’s right to homestead protections as the head of the family, descended to her even though she took title to the condominium in her name alone. Finding that Mrs. Heiman had proved all other elements required to establish homestead, the trial court denied her petition to set aside the property as homestead, on the ground that record title was essential. We disagree and reverse.
Record title is not a prerequisite to a finding that property is homestead. Homestead status may derive from the husband’s beneficial interest as head of the family in a marital home titled in his wife’s name, Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir.1945); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917), so that upon his death the surviving wife may obtain the benefits in the form of exemption from forced sale. Mrs. Heiman is entitled to demonstrate that her husband retained a beneficial interest in the condominium sufficient to have the property designated homestead even though her name appeared on the deed. If the property qualified as homestead on the date of her husband’s death, Mrs. Heiman is entitled to the homestead exemption.
The bank urges us to dismiss the appeal. It argues that the appeal is moot or that Mrs. Heiman waived her homestead exemption when she paid the bank’s judgment from proceeds of the sale of the condominium. We reject the bank’s request. A sale forced by an impending execution of judgment cannot be deemed voluntary for the purpose of constituting a waiver. The action is not moot because the trial court may, upon appropriate application, order restitution following our reversal of its erroneous ruling. Mann v. Thompson, 118 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). An appeal is not necessarily moot merely because a party failed to obtain a stay and the judgment has been enforced. Lonergan v. Lippman, 406 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982).
For these reasons we deny appellee’s motion to dismiss and reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to determine whether Mrs. Heiman demonstrated that her husband retained a beneficial interest in the condominium. If so, she is entitled to homestead protections.
Reversed and remanded.
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COY v. Mango BAY Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…homestead exemption.” The court further explained, “If the homestead status attached prior to proceedings to subject the property to creditors’ lien, regardless of where the title is lodged, it is exempt.” Id. Similarly, in Heiman v. Capital Bank, 438 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the court held that “record title is not a prerequisite to a finding that property is homestead. Homestead status may be derived from the husband’s beneficial interest as head of the family in a marital home titled in his wi…
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Abe Baum v. Ardis Heiman, 528 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ot his homestead because record title was not in his name. The condominium was sold and Baum’s and Capital Bank’s judgments were satisfied. Heiman appealed the probate court ruling but named only Capital Bank as a party. In Heiman v. Capital Bank, 438 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), motion denied, 447 So. 2d 885 (Fla.1984), this court reversed holding that Heiman was entitled to demonstrate that her husband retained a beneficial interest in the unit sufficient to have it designated homestead even though only…
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Aronson v. Aronson, 81 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…or equitable, so long as the interest is a possessory interest. See Hill v. First Nat'l Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917) (tenancy in common); Smith v. Unkefer, 515 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (life estate); Heiman v. Capital Bank, 438 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (equitable interest); but see Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1969) (remainder interest does not qualify). . In 2010, section 732.401 was amended to allow the surviving spouse to elect an undivided one-half interes…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pasco v. Jamis T. Harley, 73 Fla. 819 (Fla. 1917)
- Tampa Bay Apt. Hotel Co. v. Monrose, 73 Fla. 894 (Fla. 1917)
- Mann v. Thompson, 118 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945)
- Lonergan v. Lippman, 406 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)