JERRY MARKS AND RICHARD HILLSTEAD, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1983-10-12
No. 82-42
BERANEK, J., concurs., ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
438 So. 2d 1006 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1983)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Fourth District affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence in a marijuana trafficking case, holding that customs and police officers had reasonable suspicion to board appellants' vessel based on suspicious circumstances including the boat's low position in water, nervousness about Coast Guard involvement, and lack of fuel despite anchoring offshore.


Holding

The officers had reasonable suspicion to board the vessel based on the articulated observations, and the boarding was justified regardless of whether the border search authority applied. The command to open the cabin door was reasonable because the officer needed to ensure no one armed was in the cabin.


Headnotes

[1] A vessel's proximity to shore and its location in the ocean can be considered in determining whether a boarding is justified under border search authority.

[2] A boarding of a vessel is justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if the boarding is not strictly a border search.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“a reasonable person would conclude that criminal activity is afoot under circumstances which include the following: (a) hailed in the ocean one and one-half miles off Port Everglades by another boat which is out of fuel and at anchor; (b) the operator asks the location of the nearest fuel source; (c) the hailee suggests Pier 66 but offers to call the Coast Guard, whereupon the hailor becomes very nervous and declines the Coast Guard call; (d) the boat with a 600-800 gallon fuel capacity is sitting low in the water; (e) there is a great deal of salt spray on the boat.”

Establishes the factors constituting reasonable suspicion to board the vessel

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Two customs officers and three deputized Hollywood police officers were patrolling in an unmarked vessel 1.5 miles offshore when appellants' Sport Fis…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DOWNEY, Judge.

DOWNEY, Judge.

At 7:30 on a June morning two customs officers, together with three deputized Hollywood police officers, were cruising in the Atlantic Ocean one and one-half miles from shore in an unmarked police department vessel. They observed appellants aboard a Sport Fisherman vessel at anchor motioning the officers to approach the anchored boat. As the officers drew near, appellant Hill-stead asked where the nearest fuel could be found and Officer Caperton responded that it was probably at Pier 66 in Port Everglades.

However, Caperton said he would call the Coast Guard. That suggestion appeared to make Hillstead very nervous and he requested that the Coast Guard not be called.

However, he did ask if he could pay Caperton to take him to get some fuel in two “jerry cans.” Caperton, becoming suspicious, took a closer look and realized this boat was very low in the water and had a great deal of salt spray on it, among other things. Thereupon, Caperton identified himself as a customs agent and prepared to board appellants’ boat. Prior thereto, he asked Hillstead to open the closed cabin door. When the door was opened Caperton could see burlap bags in the cabin, but could not identify anything as contraband. When officers boarded the boat they smelled marijuana.

Upon motion to suppress, Caperton and another officer articulated the facts that caused them to board the vessel. While they relied primarily upon their border search authority1 for the boarding, the articulated observations were sufficient to authorize a boarding because of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cf. United States v. D’Antignac, 628 F. 2d 428 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); Lavely v. State, 422 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

In our view a reasonable person would conclude that criminal activity is afoot under circumstances which include the following: (a) hailed in the ocean one and one-half miles off Port Everglades by another boat which is out of fuel and at anchor; (b) the operator asks the location of the nearest fuel source; (c) the hailee suggests Pier 66 but offers to call the Coast Guard, whereupon the hailor becomes very nervous and declines the Coast Guard call; (d) the boat with a 600-800 gallon fuel capacity is sitting low in the water; (e) there is a great deal of salt spray on the boat. With these observations, boarding was justified and we do not feel the command to open the cabin door had any effect on that right. Caper-ton testified boats of this size are frequently armed and he wanted to make sure no one armed was in the cabin. It was stipu lated at the hearing by the prosecutor that the observations made through the open door did not disclose contraband. Upon boarding, the officers smelled marijuana. The search following that observation disclosed 7,000 pounds of marijuana.

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the denial of appellants’ motion to suppress and the judgments and sentences appealed from.

BERANEK, J., concurs.

ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.

. We reject appellee’s contention that the facts of this case justified a border search.

Concurrence
ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

specially concurring:

I concur in an affirmance because I believe a border search was authorized under the circumstances described in the majority opinion. See United States v. Whitmere, 595 F. 2d 1303 (5th Cir.1979) and United States v. Freeman, 579 F. 2d 942 (5th Cir.1978).

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw