PETER MAAS, APPELLANT,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE

“5. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I have determined that it would be contrary to the public interest to depart from the Bureau of Prisons’ regulation prohibiting the publication of a manuscript written by a prisoner which deals with his life in crime. The policies underlying this regulation — that a person convicted of crime should not be allowed to exploit and glamorize his career in crime, and that personal wealth held and enjoyed by an inmate may cause dissension and additional disciplinary problems within the prison society— are too important to be abandoned absent substantial countervailing considerations.”

On May 4, 1966, appellant’s attorneys advised the Department that appellant would disseminate copies of the “Vala-chi Book Excerpts” on May 11, 1966, to prospective publishers of the manuscript. Thereupon, the present action was instituted by the United States to enjoin appellant from disseminating in any form copies of or excerpts from the Valachi manuscript and to require the return of all copies of and excerpts from the manuscript to the Department. A preliminary injunction against such dissemination was prayed for and granted by the District Court. The court issued the preliminary injunction and found that ap-pellee was threatened with immediate and irreparable harm for which it had no adequate remedy at law; that interim injunctive relief was necessary to maintain the status quo; and that injury to appellee and the public interest which would be suffered were the preliminary injunction denied far outweighed any possibleUnjury to appellant which might be occasioned by the granting of interim reljdf. The preliminary injunction ordered :

“That [appellant], his agents, assigns, successors, and anyone acting in concert with said persons be and hereby are restrained and enjoined from disseminating or publishing in any form edited or unedited copies of or excerpts from the manuscript prepared by Joseph Valachi while incarcerated in the District of Columbia Jail, Washington, D. C., including but not limited to the document entitled ‘Valachi Book Excerpts.’ ”

It is argued in this court, conceding arguendo that the Attorney General may have the power to prevent certain kinds of documents written by a federal prisoner from leaving a federal prison, that once the Attorney General permits the document to leave the federal prison, the First Amendment to the Constitution excludes all future control by the Attorney General over its publication. In addition to the First Amendment argument, it is urged that the Memorandum of Understanding lacks mutuality because there is no promise flowing from the United States to appellant; that, even if the memorandum is not barred by the First Amendment and is supported by a consideration, the exercise of the Attorney General’s right amounts to a forfeiture; and finally, that the Attorney General, at the time the Memorandum of Understanding was entered into, had no control over the manuscript and no right to condition its delivery to appellant because Valachi was not under the control of the Attorney General but under the control of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia under D.C.Code § 24-442.

It must be borne in mind here that this is not an appeal from a final judgment after a trial or from a summary judgment finally disposing of the case. It is here on the District Court’s grant of a prohibitory preliminary injunction aimed at preserving the status quo. Appellate courts quite generally view the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction as resting in the sound discretion of the trial court, and limit determination on appeal to whether there has been “abuse of trial court discretion,” “clear error,” “violation of the rules of equity,” or “improvident granting.” In our own jurisdiction, in at least two cases, we have addressed ourselves to those issues while upholding District Court denial of preliminary injunction. Thus, in Cox v. Democratic Central Committee, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 200 F. 2d 356 (1952), this court said:

“It is settled law that a Court of Appeals will not set aside the action of a District Court in either denying or granting an application for a preliminary injunction unless the action of the District Court was in clear error or in abuse of discretion.”

This analysis was repeated ten years later in Young v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 37, 299 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922, 82 S.Ct. 1565, 8 L.Ed.2d 504 (1962);

“Appellants recognized the general rule that a denial of a preliminary injunction will not be set aside on appeal unless the District Court’s action constitutes clear error or abuse of discretion, and that ordinarily this court will not consider the merits of the case further than necessary to determine whether that discretion was abused.” 4

Although both of' those cases were appeals from denial of a preliminary injunction, appellate courts, with near unanimity, use the same language in passing upon appeals from either the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.5

It is quite evident that in the case before us there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court; and further, as the District Court found, it appears that more harm might be sustained by refusing to grant the preliminary injunction than by granting it. If the preliminary injunction had not been granted, the relief sought by the Government would be mooted, for all practical purposes.6 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court and suggest that the trial of this case be expedited.

Affirmed.

BAZELON, Chief Judge, concurs in the result.

. Bureau of Prisons Manual Bulletin No. 471 (June 19, 1956).

. Bach was engaged as agent for the sale of the book and other rights growing out of publication.

. The request for copyright was later withdrawn.

. Cf. Armour & Co. v. Freeman, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 37, 39, 304 F. 2d 404, 406, cert. denied 370 U.S. 920, 82 S.Ct. 1559, 8 L.Ed.2d 500 (1962), where we reversed the District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture from immediately enforcing a new packing regulation amendment because “[o]n consideration of the papers before us, we think it was clearly error to deny [the] motion for a preliminary injunction.” [Citing Cox.] We reasoned that “[t]he * * * regulation which is under attack, is capricious and arbitrary on its face * * that “[irreparable injury * * * from the enforcement of the regulation is apparent without demonstration * * and that there was “nothing in the record before us to indicate the public interest would be adversely affected by the grant of a preliminary injunction.”

. Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, Inc., 264 F. 2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1959); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F. 2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1962); Schering Corp. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 320 F. 2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1963); Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp., 315 F. 2d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 1963); Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 347 F. 2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1965); Hornback v. Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, 346 F. 2d 161, 164 (6th Cir. 1965); Solex Laboratories, Inc. v. Plastic Contact Lens Co., 268 F. 2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 1959); Shearman v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 250 F. 2d 191, 195 (8th Cir. 1957); Dymo Industries, Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F. 2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Brown, 331 F. 2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1964).

. During the course of the argument in this court, appellant stated that he might be in contempt of court if he himself proceeded to write a biography of Valachi. On close questioning of Government counsel by the court on this point, the following colloquy took place:

“Court: Do you think that [appellant] would be subject to action for contempt if he * * * wrote a book himself? “Government: We certainly concede that [he] can write a book. And if there are any publishers listening, he can write a biography of Valachi. s}c # i-s

“Court: Do you have that authority to make that statement?

“Government: Yes, your honor, I have that authority.

“Court: The injunction doesn’t go as far as this man might fear. “Government: Well, the injunction just relates to this book. * * * It just relates to this manuscript, nothing beyond. * * * We wanted to reserve whatever rights we have under the agreement and the law, to have that covered by the permanent injunction. * a: *

“Court: Are you authorized to say that if [appellant] writes his own book without quotations [from Valachi] from his own memory, that you would have no cause for contempt?

“Government: Yes, I am so authorized. * *

Government counsel made it clear that on final disposition of the case they would seek to preserve all rights to which they felt they were entitled under the Memorandum of Agreement and the law.