JABO WOODSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the conviction for robbery with a firearm but vacated the sentence regarding the retention of jurisdiction. The court clarified that a trial court cannot retain jurisdiction over a life sentence indefinitely, as statutory limits apply.
No, a trial court cannot retain jurisdiction over a life sentence for an indefinite period. The statute in effect at the time limited retention of jurisdiction to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed.
[1] A trial court may not retain jurisdiction over a sentence for an indefinite period of time.
[2] Under Florida Statutes section 947.16(3) (1981), a trial court could only retain jurisdiction over the first third of the maximum sentence imposed.
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Establishes the court's disagreement with the trial court's action regarding sentence retention.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was found guilty of robbery with a firearm and sentenced to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum for firearm use. The trial court …
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PER CURIAM.
Jabo Woodson, defendant below, appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court following a jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery with a firearm.
The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years for the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In addition, the trial court found a number of aggravating circumstances which it felt warranted the retention of jurisdiction over appellant’s sentence.
Accordingly, the trial court entered an order stating that jurisdiction would be retained for an indefinite period of time. This the trial court may not do.
Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the statute in effect when appellant committed the offense for which he is convicted, allowed a trial court to retain jurisdiction only over the first third of the maxi mum sentence imposed. Whigham v. State, 404 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Nor may the trial court retain jurisdiction over the first third of the life sentence. While other courts within the state have not yet ruled on this issue directly, see, e.g., Harmon v. State, 438 So. 2d 369 (Fla.1983); Hopkins v. State, 418 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the Third District Court of Appeal has adopted the position that where a life sentence is imposed, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes is inapposite. Since a life span is immeasurable, no calculation of the length of time jurisdiction can be retained can be made. Rodriguez v. State, 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
But see Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
Appellant’s other point on appeal is without merit.
Affirmed as to appellant’s conviction. The mandatory minimum three year sentence for the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony is left undisturbed. The remaining portion of the sentence is vacated for entry of a sentence not inconsistent with this opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Kosek v. State, 448 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…ird of a life sentence is improper because the period of retention of jurisdiction cannot be calculated. The Third District has recently adopted the position that section 947.16(3) is inapplicable where a life sentence is imposed. Woodson v. State, 439 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). In Cordero-Pena, the court explained its reasoning as follows: We conclude that where a court imposes a life senten…
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Brown v. State, 460 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…imposed” pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), of a life sentence. We adopt the position of the Third and Fifth Districts that Section 947.16(3) is inoperable. Kosek v. State, 448 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Woodson v. State, 439 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Where a trial court imposes a life sentence, it is improper for it to retain jurisdiction over the first one-thi…
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Stettler v. State, 475 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…per. Mobley v. State, 473 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA, March 20, 1985); Brown v. State, 460 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Kosek v. State, [*1010] 448 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Willis v. State, 447 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Woodson v. State, 439 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). That portion of the sentence wherein the trial judge retained jurisdiction over one-third of the life sentence is…
Authorities Cited
- Harmon v. State, 438 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1983)
- Belarmino Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Cabrales G. Rodriguez v. State, 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Hopkins v. State, 418 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Whigham v. State, 404 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)