RUBY TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
TOLBERT ENTERPRISES, INC., AND AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Plaintiff Taylor appealed the grant of summary judgment in a negligence action arising from her slip-and-fall on a motel walkway. The court reversed, holding that even where a dangerous condition is open and obvious, summary judgment is improper when there is a disputed question of fact regarding whether the defendant breached its duty to maintain safe premises.
Summary judgment was improper. Although the dangerous condition was open and obvious, this does not eliminate the defendant's potential liability for negligently permitting a dangerous condition to exist on the premises. The question of whether the defendant breached its duty to maintain reasonably safe premises, and whether the plaintiff's comparative negligence should reduce or bar recovery, presents disputed questions of fact for jury determination.
[1] A landowner may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition on the premises, even if the condition is open and obvious.
[2] A plaintiff's knowledge of a dangerous condition does not automatically negate a defendant's potential liability for negligently permitting that condition to exist.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether, under these circumstances, the defendant had breached its legal obligation to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition was a disputed question of fact to be decided by the jury.”
Establishes that breach of duty to maintain safe premises is a factual question unsuitable for summary judgment resolution
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor, a guest at Tolbert's beachfront motel, slipped and fell on wooden steps leading to the beach where water and sand from a nearby guest shower h…
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ZEHMER, Judge.
On this appeal, plaintiff Taylor complains that the trial court erred in granting summary final judgment for the defendants, Tolbert Enterprises, Inc., and its insurer, Aetna Insurance Company. We agree and reverse.
In a simple one-count complaint, plaintiff alleged that while she was a guest in Tol-bert’s motel she slipped, fell, and suffered injuries as a result of Tolbert’s negligence in permitting water and sand to accumulate and create a slippery condition on the wooden steps and walkway across the dunes to the beach in front of Tolbert’s motel. A shower used by guests returning from the beach was located adjacent to the place where plaintiff fell, and water and sand draining from the shower created a condition described in plaintiff’s testimony as slippery. The evidence suggested that the condition had existed for some time before plaintiff fell, and plaintiff had observed it while using the walkway during several days before this incident. In her deposition testimony, plaintiff described how she approached the area, observed the water, proceeded to step up, and slipped, and then testified: .
Q. Did you see water and sand on the step that you fell on?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that before or after the fall?
A. When I started to step up, I glanced down and noticed that it was wet, and I was careful in stepping up.
Q. But you saw that it was wet and had sand on it before you stepped on the step, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree with me that the presence of water and sand was not an unusual thing on that walkway and you had walked it before?
A. I agree with your statement.
The court below granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that:
1. The evidence and depositions on file failed to indicate any negligence on behalf of the defendant, and any dangerous condition of the ramp and walkway allegedly within the knowledge of the defendant was also known to the plaintiff.
2. The accident occurred in broad daylight and it is obvious that the ramp and the step leading thereto were at all times subject to conditions occasioned by the presence of sand and water. The condition of the ramp was open and obvious and was certainly to be expected on a wooden ramp leading from a beachfront motel to the waterfront.
There was evidence before the court that the condition causing the accumulation of water and sand described by the plaintiff had existed for sufficient time to afford adequate notice to the defendant and that such condition rendered the steps slippery. Whether, under these circumstances, the defendant had breached its legal obligation to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition was a disputed question of fact to be decided by the jury. That plaintiff testified she had observed the condition and “was careful in stepping up” does not negate defendant’s potential liability for negligently permitting a dangerous condition to exist; it simply raises the issue of comparative negligence. Even though the alleged negligent condition was found by the trial court to be open and obvious, it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment for the defendant. Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Auburn Machine Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.1979); Zambito v. Southland Recreation Enterprises, Inc., 383 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Metropolitan Dade County v. Yelvington, 392 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHIVERS, J., concurs.
MILLS, J., dissents, with opinion.
MILLS, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm.
I would adopt the trial court’s opinion as stated in its Final Summary Judgment and quoted in part in the majority opinion.
The evidence presented to the trial court which is quoted in the majority opinion clearly shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Summary judgment was properly granted in this classic case for the rendering of a summary judgment. Certainly, an individual visiting the beach who is fully aware of a collection of sand and water on a walkway, was aware of it for several days, and was aware of it at the time she deliberately stepped in it, does not raise a factual issue for jury consideration.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Emmons v. Baptist Hosp. & Servicemaster Indus., Inc., 478 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…care required is ordinary and reasonable care.” 38 Fla Jur 2nd, Negligence, § 20. See also Cassel v. Price, supra, at 265 (quoting the above statement from Florida Jurisprudence). Plaintiff relies, in part, on Taylor v. Tolbert Enterprises, Inc., 439 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). There, this court stated: “Even though the alleged negligent condition was found by the trial court to be open and obvious, it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment for the defendant.” Id. at 992. The theory…
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Lynch v. Brown, 489 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…gerous condition does not negate a defendant’s potential liability for negligently permitting the dangerous condition to exist; it simply raises the issue of comparative negligence and precludes summary judgment. Taylor v. Tolbert Enterprises, Inc., 439 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). REVERSED AND REMANDED. NIMMONS, J., concurs in result with written opinion. BOOTH, C.J., dissents with written opinion. . Hunt v. Slippery Dip of Jacksonville, Inc., 453 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Cassel v. Price, 3…
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Gloris Crawford and Edward Crawford v. Miller, 542 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ht. . The dissent cites three cases for the proposition that a jury question is presented in a slip- and-fall case, notwithstanding that the condition was open and obvious. Those cases are inappo-site. The first case, Taylor v. Tolbert Enterprises, 439 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), involved a hotelier’s negligence in allowing an accumulation of slippery matter on the wooden steps and walkway leading to the public beach. The steps and walkway could not be traversed without stepping on the slippery matter. T…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pittman v. Volusia Cnty., 380 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979)
- Melena Bennett and Harry Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Yelvington, 392 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Zambito v. Southland Rec. Enters., Inc., 383 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)