RAY THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
LILIAN B. KORUPP, APPELLEE
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Ray Thompson sought restitution from his ex-wife Lilian Korupp for child support payments received from the biological father of her minor child, whom Thompson raised after their divorce. Thompson claimed quasi-contract recovery based on unjust enrichment, but the Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that child support payments are held in trust for the child's benefit, not the parent's.
The court affirmed judgment for Korupp, holding that child support payments are received in trust for the child's benefit, not the parent's own benefit, and therefore do not constitute unjust enrichment. Thompson was adequately compensated through use of the marital home and dependent-related benefits.
[1] Child support payments are for the benefit of the child, not the parent, and a recipient of support payments holds the monies in trust for the child.
[2] A party who has cared for and supported a child may not recover from the other parent on a quasi-contract theory for child support payments received by that other parent,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Child support payments are for the benefit of the child, not the parent, and a recipient of support payments receives the monies not in his or her own right, but in trust for the child as the cestui que trust.”
Establishes the legal principle that child support is held in trust for the child's benefit, defeating the unjust enrichment claim
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThompson and Korupp divorced in 1977. Korupp's minor child from a prior relationship remained in Thompson's custody. From age 14 to 18, Thompson cared…
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ZEHMER, Judge.
Ray Thompson and Lilian B. Korupp, married in 1972, were divorced in 1977. After the divorce, Ms. Korupp’s minor child remained in the custody of Mr. Thompson. The child had been born out of wedlock prior to Thompson and Korupp’s marriage, and the natural father of the child was Udo Grudzinski, a resident of Germany. From the time the child was fourteen years of age until he reached eighteen, Mr. Thompson and the child resided in the former marital home and Mr. Thompson cared for and supported the child. During this same time period Ms. Korupp, who no longer lived with Mr. Thompson, was receiving child support payments from Udo Grudzinski and accumulated nearly $15,000 in such payments. When the child reached eighteen years of age, Thompson filed a complaint against Korupp, on a quasi-contract theory with respect to the child support payments received by her, seeking an accounting and a judgment in the amount of $15,000 (representing the amount of money he spent in raising the minor child since the parties were divorced). The trial court ruled against Thompson and entered final judgment for Korupp. Thompson appeals, contending that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to recognize the existence of a quasi-contract on behalf of Thompson with respect to the support payments received by Korupp. We affirm.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Thompson was compensated by Korupp for care of her child by his exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the child reached eighteen years of age and by his claiming the child as a dependent for income tax and military benefit purposes. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Korupp had the right to partition the marital home one year after the divorce, but did not attempt to do so until Thompson filed this action.
Nor, as appellant argues, has appel-lee necessarily been unjustly enriched by the support payments not passed on to him. Child support payments are for the benefit of the child, not the parent, and a recipient of support payments receives the monies not in his or her own right, but in trust for the child as the cestui que trust. Crone- baugh v. Van Dyke, 415 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Korupp contends that she has saved nearly all of the child support payments received from the child’s natural father to be used for the benefit of the child’s future education. This is commendable and in keeping with the rule of law that support payments are for the benefit of the child, not the parent.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Thompson an accounting and recovery based on unjust enrichment. We specifically note, however, that our decision does not pass upon, and thus is without prejudice to, the child’s right to bring an action for an accounting, for imposition of a trust, or to otherwise establish a legitimate claim to his child support payments held by Korupp.
AFFIRMED.
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Dorsett v. Granvill Dorsett, 902 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…ents are for the benefit of the child, not the parent, and a recipient of support payments receives the monies not in his or her own right, but in trust for the child as the cestui que trust.” Sotoloff, 745 So. 2d at 962 (quoting Thompson v. Korupp, 440 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). Here, the Final Judgment requires the former husband to make child support payments directly to the mortgage holder on his mortgage for the marital home. It also provides that he must make child support payments directly t…
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Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Holland, 602 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…also a parent) holds the money in trust for the cestui que trust, who is the child, and has a fiduciary obligation to expend it only for the child’s benefit—the money does not belong to the next of friend, custodian or guardian, Thompson v. Korupp, 440 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), nor may the next of friend, custodian or guardian contract away the child’s right to support. Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Isaacs v. Deutsch, 80 So. 2d 657 (Fla,1955); (4) any non-volunteer stranger has a…
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McLANE v. Musick, 792 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…be impossible to establish whose funds paid for what and when. Clearly, they had a close family-like relationship, and not the kind of arm’s length relationship for which the law will imply a contract for compensation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Korupp, 440 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (former husband who cared for and supported wife’s child was not entitled to recover child support payments received by his wife from the child’s father on a theory of unjust enrichment where husband was compensated for care of t…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cronebaugh v. van Dyke, 415 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Baumann v. Agudelo (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
- Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)