COLLEEN WADSWORTH THOMPSON & ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
LOIS PRESTON FUNNY & JOHNNY FUNNY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this personal injury appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order granting a new trial, holding that jury instructions properly included statutory language excluding scarring or disfigurement from the definition of permanent injury under Florida's no-fault insurance threshold.
The court held that the language 'other than scarring or disfigurement' was properly included in the jury instructions because it appears in the applicable statute, was supported by the evidence, and was not misleading.
[1] A trial court errs in granting a new trial based on the inclusion of statutory language in jury instructions when that language is supported by evidence and not misleadin…
[2] Jury instructions that accurately reflect the language of a relevant statute, and are supported by the evidence presented, are generally proper.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The language 'other than scarring or disfigurement' is included in the applicable statute, is borne out by the evidence, and was not misleading.”
The court's core holding explaining why the jury instructions were proper and the new trial order was incorrect.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLois and Johnny Funny sued Colleen Thompson and her insurer Allstate for damages from an automobile collision. The Funnys alleged Lois sustained a per…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Permanent Injury cases and more on FLexlaw
THOMPSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a personal injury action. Appellants contend the order granting a new trial should be reversed because it was based on the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that certain jury instructions should not have been given. We reverse.
Appellees, Lois and Johnny Funny, filed a complaint against appellants, Colleen Thompson and her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, for damages they allegedly sustained as the result of a collision between an automobile driven by Lois Funny and an automobile driven by Colleen Thompson. The complaint alleged the action was not subject to the tort exemptions of § 627.737, Fla.Stat. in that Lois Funny “sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability.” At the charge conference appellants were permitted, over appellees’ objection, to add the language “other than scarring or disfigurement” to the language “a permanent injury based on reasonable medical probability,” which appeared in appellants’ written requested jury instructions. Accordingly, the jury instructions and verdict tracked the language of § 627.737(2)(b), Fla.Stat., which lists as one of the no-fault thresholds “[permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” The jury found that as a result of the instant accident Lois Funny did not receive a permanent injury, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.
The trial court granted appellees’ motion for new trial. The trial court reasoned that in light of Dr. Todd’s testimony, which indicated Lois Funny had scarring in her muscle tissue as a result of the accident, the jury could have easily been misled to appel-lees’ prejudice by the addition of the language “other than scarring or disfigurement.” The trial court concluded that although the language in question is contained in § 627.737(2)(b), it should not have been included in the instructions. We disagree. The language “other than scarring or disfigurement” is included in the applicable statute, is borne out by the evidence, and was not misleading. Accordingly, the addition of this language was proper and was not grounds for a new trial.
The order granting a new trial is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the appellants.
MILLS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jones v. Cornelian J. Smith, 547 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…must prove “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability.” The instruction here tracked that language; mention of subjective complaint was not required. See Eley v. Moris, 478 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Thompson v. Funny, 440 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Garcia v. Antunez, 362 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Reversal will not be granted where the subject of the proposed instruction is covered in other charges given by the court, or where failure to give the instruction is not sh…