MICHAEL MAHONEY, PETITIONER,
v.
SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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Mahoney challenged a Florida Workers' Compensation Law provision capping his recovery for loss of vision as unconstitutionally denying access to courts. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding workers' compensation remains a reasonable litigation alternative that provides full medical care and wage-loss benefits without tort litigation delay.
The statute does not violate constitutional guarantees of access to courts. Workers' compensation remains a reasonable litigation alternative because it provides fully paid medical care and wage-loss benefits without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation against employers or third parties, despite the monetary award appearing inadequate.
[1] A statute providing for workers' compensation benefits does not violate the constitutional right of access to courts, even if the benefits awarded appear inadequate, so l…
[2] Workers' compensation laws that provide for medical care and wage-loss benefits during recovery offer a reasonable litigation alternative to tort claims.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Workers' compensation, therefore, still stands as a reasonable litigation alternative.”
The Court's core holding that the workers' compensation system, despite its limited monetary awards, remains constitutional as an alternative to tort litigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMichael Mahoney, a part-time Sears employee attending junior college, suffered an 80% loss of vision in one eye when struck by a tire weight thrown by…
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PER CURIAM.
This case is before us to review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal which upheld, subsection 440.15(3)(a)1., Florida Statutes (Supp.1980),1 against a challenge that this portion of the Workers’ Compensation Law violates the access to the courts provision in article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 419 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
Michael Mahoney worked part-time at Sears while attending junior college. On January 8, 1981 a tire weight thrown by a fellow employee struck him in the eye. Ma-honey consequently suffered an eighty percent loss of vision in the injured eye. For this twenty-four percent permanent impairment of the body as a whole, Mahoney received $1,200 in impairment benefits. He contends that subsection 440.15(3)(a)l. unconstitutionally deprives him of access to the courts for redress of his injury. We disagree.
In Acton v. Ft. Lauderdale Hospital, 440 So. 2d 1282 (Fla.1983), we held that subsections 440.15(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1981), do not violate constitutional guarantees of access to the courts and equal protection. Mahoney might well have received more compensation for the loss of his eye prior to the legislative amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law in 1979.2 Mahoney, however, received fully paid medical care and wage-loss benefits during his recovery from his on-the-job accident without having to suffer the delay and uncertainty of seeking a recovery in tort from his employer or a third party. Workers’ compensation, therefore, still stands as a reasonable litigation alternative. The $1,200 award for loss of sight in one eye may appear inadequate and unfair,3 but it does not render the statute unconstitutional. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, McDonald and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
. § 440.15(3)(a)l. provides:
1. In case of permanent impairment due to amputation, loss of 80 percent or more of vision, after correction, or serious facial or head disfigurement resulting from an injury other than an injury entitling the injured worker to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to subsection (1), there shall be paid to the injured the following:
a. Fifty dollars for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a whole from 1 percent through 50 percent; and b. One hundred dollars for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a whole for that portion in excess of 50 percent.
. The loss of 80% of vision in one eye formerly resulted in a lump-sum payment equal to 60% of a worker’s average weekly wage multiplied by 175 weeks. § 440.15(3), Fla.Stat. (1977).
. We note that the same loss of vision in one eye today would result in an award of $9,500 in impairment benefits. § 440.15(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1982).
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Sasso v. RAM Prop. Mgmt. & Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984)…k redress in court. Such partial remedy does not constitute an abolition of rights without reasonable alternative as contemplated in Kluger v. White. See Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital, 440 So. 2d 1282 (Fla.1983); Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 So. 2d 1285 (Fla.1983). Sasso also urges us to find that section 440.15(3)(b)3.d. is unconstitutional because it denies wage-loss benefits based on the age of the injured worker. We defer to Judge Ervin’s detailed analysis in the opinion below of the standard…
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Rucker v. City OF Ocala & Crawford & Co., 684 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…cantly diminished Mahoney’s recovery, it has not totally eliminated the previously recognized cause of action and, as such, does not offend article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)), decision approved, 440 So. 2d 1285 (Fla.1983). VI Equal Protection Finally, Rucker contends that section 440.13(5)(e) is unconstitutional as a violation of his equal protection rights guaranteed by article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution.6 Appellant has failed to demonstr…
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Westphal v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)…ourt in Martinez explained that in order to be upheld as constitutional, the workers’ compensation law must continue to provide a “reasonable alternative to tort litigation.” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72; see also Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla.1983) (“Workers’ compensation, therefore, still stands as a reasonable litigation alternative.”). In Martinez, this Court noted that it “previously has rejected claims that workers’ compensation laws violate access to courts by failing t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp. & the Ins. Co. of N. Am., 440 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1983)
- Mahoney v. Sears, 419 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)