ROBERT A. HOWARD, MARY KAY HOWARD AND ERWIN FIESLER, APPELLANTS,
v.
EVELYN LANGLIEB GREER; EVELYN LANGLIEB GREER, P.A.; IDUS Q. WICKER, INDIVIDUALLY; IDUS Q. WICKER, JAMES A. SMITH, ERIC J. BLOMQVIST, JR., FRED C. DAVANT, JOHN F. MCMATH, G. VICTOR TUTAN, DENNIS O'HARA, AND JACKSON F. MCCOY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARTNERS IN THE LAW FIRM OF WICKER, SMITH, BLOMQVIST, DAVANT, MCMATH, TUTAN AND O'HARA; JON E. KRUPNICK; LAW OFFICES OF JON E. KRUPNICK, P.A.; GERALD WALSH; JAMES VINCENT DOLAN; WALSH, DOLAN & KRUPNICK, P.A.; GULF INSURANCE COMPANY; SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY; AND LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY; NORTHBROOK EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The Howards, judgment creditors of an insolvent real estate trust, sought to recover proceeds from a malpractice action brought by the trust's attorney. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the Howards had waived their right to the malpractice proceeds by accepting transfer of the trust's assets in settlement of their judgment.
The Howards waived their right to recover the malpractice proceeds. By accepting the transfer of trust assets in satisfaction of their judgment and expressly waiving the right to seek the proceeds of the pending malpractice lawsuit, they were estopped as a matter of law from repudiating the accord and satisfaction.
[1] A party who accepts the benefits of a settlement agreement is estopped from repudiating its terms, even if a formal written satisfaction was not executed.
[2] Acceptance of assets in satisfaction of a judgment may constitute an accord and satisfaction, precluding subsequent claims against those assets.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Having accepted transfer of all the assets of the trust in satisfaction of their judgment, the Howards may not claim that their failure to deliver the written satisfaction called for by the agreement invalidated its terms.”
Establishes that acceptance of benefits under the settlement operates as accord and satisfaction regardless of failure to execute formal written satisfaction.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Howards obtained a judgment against Anaconda Real Estate Investment Trust. Evelyn Greer, attorney for the trust beneficiaries, sued the former tru…
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BASKIN, Judge.
The Howards, judgment creditors of the Anaconda Real Estate Investment Trust, challenge the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of appellees and the denial of appellants’ motion for summary judgment. The effect of the trial court’s orders was an approval of the actions of Evelyn Greer, the attorney for the trust beneficiaries. Mrs. Greer successfully sued the former attorney for the trust for malpractice and distributed the sums obtained in the malpractice action to the trust shareholders. The Howards claim a prior right to recover the proceeds of the malpractice action as creditors under a judgment they obtained in an earlier lawsuit against the trust, Anaconda Real Estate Investment Trust v. Howard, 324 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.1976).
They assert that Mrs. Greer, who was court-appointed to administer the proceeds of the malpractice action for the insolvent trust, deprived them of their rights as creditors.
The Howards complain: (1) that Mrs. Greer incorporated into the malpractice settlement a provision requiring the settlement to be confidential; (2) that the confidential nature of the proceedings thwarted the filing of creditors’ claims against the newly-acquired trust funds; and (3) that they were entitled to satisfy their judgment from the settlement proceeds prior to any distribution to the trust shareholders.
We find no error in the trial court’s rulings; we affirm upon a holding that the Howards waived their right to recover. The Howards’ waiver stems from a negotiated accord and satisfaction. Having accepted transfer of all the assets of the trust in satisfaction of their judgment, the Howards may not claim that their failure to deliver the written satisfaction called for by the agreement invalidated its terms. When the Howards finally perfected their claim in a garnishment action in Broward County, the Broward court, Gilbert v. Krupnick, No. 77-1974 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct.1983), determined that the judgment they held was satisfied when the trust assets were transferred to them. We concur in the Broward court’s findings on this issue. The Howards ex pressly waived transfer to them of the then pending malpractice claim, on the advice of their counsel. Acceptance of the benefits of the settlement by the Howards estops them, as a matter of law, from repudiating the accord and satisfaction.
In McGehee v. Mata, 330 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) this court determined that:
If an offeror clearly attaches to his offer the condition that the offer, if taken at all must be received in satisfaction of the claim in dispute, and the other party received it, he takes that offer subject to the conditions attached to it, and the offer operates as an accord and satisfaction.
See also, Rudick v. Rudiek, 403 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hannah v. Ryder, 380 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pino v. Lopez, 361 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. dismissed, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1978); U.S. Rubber Products v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631, 200 So. 385 (1941).
In summary, the Howards accepted the trust assets in satisfaction of their judgment and expressly waived the right to seek the proceeds of the pending malpractice lawsuit. The summary judgment in favor of appellees is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Goslin v. Racal Data Commc'ns, Inc., 468 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…by cash [*393] ing the check which he knew represented the merged company’s tender of the amounts arguably due for the 1978 option he sued upon below, Goslin effected as a matter of law an accord and satisfication of that claim. See Howard v. Greer, 440 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 450 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1984); Rudick v. Rudick, 403 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).…
Authorities Cited
- United States Rubber Prods., Inc. v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631 (Fla. 1941)
- Pino v. Lopez, 361 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corp., 380 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- McGEHEE v. Mata, 330 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Rudick v. Rudick, 403 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Ricketson v. The Honorable Peter M. Demanio, 324 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Baker v. Grillo, 324 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)