DIANA N. MACIEJEWSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM M. HOLLAND, JR., P.A., WILLIAM M. HOLLAND, JR., AS PRESIDENT OF WILLIAM M. HOLLAND, JR., P.A., AND INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-12-07
No. 83-443
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
441 So. 2d 703 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Negative Treatment
Cited by 21 cases

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Synopsis

Diana Maciejewski appealed the dismissal of her complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the validity of a promissory note and mortgage she allegedly executed to her former attorney. The court reversed, holding that the complaint stated a valid cause of action for declaratory relief even though other remedies might be available.


Holding

The court held that the complaint states a valid cause of action for declaratory relief. The existence of alternative remedies does not preclude declaratory relief, and determining the validity of a note and mortgage is a proper subject for a declaratory decree action.


Headnotes

[1] A complaint states a cause of action for declaratory relief when it alleges doubts as to the validity of a promissory note and mortgage.

[2] In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all material allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the court may not…

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Key Quotes

“In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all material allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the court is not permitted to speculate as to whether the allegations will ultimately be proven.”

Establishes the standard of review for dismissal motions that the court applied to reverse the dismissal.

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Facts & Procedural History

Maciejewski was represented by William M. Holland, Jr. and his professional association in a dissolution of marriage action. After that action conclud…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHOONOVER, Judge.

SCHOONOVER, Judge.

The appellant, Diana N. Maciejewski, has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint. We find that the complaint states a cause of action for declaratory relief and accordingly reverse.

The controversy between the parties arose out of the appellees’ representation of appellant in a dissolution of marriage action. After the dissolution action was concluded, the appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of a promissory note and mortgage she had given to the appellees.

The complaint alleged that the appellee, William M. Holland, Jr., individually and on bqhalf of the appellee, William M. Holland, Jr., P.A., caused the appellant to execute the promissory note and mortgage in question. It further alleged that the appellant did not remember executing the instruments, copies of which were attached to the complaint. Moreover, because of certain conduct on the part of the appellees, or in the alternative, due to the appellant’s state of emotional distress at the time the instruments were executed, the appellant should not be bound by them.

After the appellees’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action was granted, and the appellant announced that she did not desire leave to amend, the action was dismissed with prejudice, and this appeal timely followed.

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all material allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the court is not permitted to speculate as to whether the allegations will ultimately .be proven. Arnold v. Week, 388 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In reviewing the appellant’s complaint in light of this rule, we find it states a cause of action for declaratory relief.

We recognize that the declaratory judgment act is not to be used as a tool to advise attorneys as to the proper path to pursue. Kelner v. Woody, 399 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, the existence of another remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief. § 86.111, Fla.Stat. (1981). Accordingly, the appellant cannot be precluded from proceeding in this action merely because she may have been able to file an action either for cancellation of the note and mortgage, or for breach of the contract between her and the appellees.

The appellant has alleged in her complaint doubts as to the validity of the note and mortgage, and this court has held that the determination of the validity of a note and mortgage is a proper matter to be considered in a declaratory decree action. Rice v. Fremow, 165 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); see also § 86.021, Fla.Stat. (1981).

We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith. ,

BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Barbado v. Green & Murphy, P.A., 758 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …ss complaint, based upon factual finding). Instead, on a motion to dismiss, all material allegations are accepted as true; speculation by the court as to whether the allegations will ultimately be proven is not permitted. See Maciejewski v. Holland, 441 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). At this juncture, it was error for the trial court to consider collateral matters and make a determination of whether appellant would ultimately be able to prove her case. We, therefore, reverse the final judgment, and rem…
  • Imogene Fern Cook v. The Sheriff OF Collier Cnty., 573 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …pson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Furthermore, all material allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the court is not permitted to speculate as to whether the allegations will ultimately be proven. Maciejewski v. Holland, 441 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We agree with the appellee’s contention that the sheriff is generally not under a common law or statutory duty to report the sign condition, repair it, or warn motorists of it, where, as in this case, he did not have the right t…
  • …to state a cause of action. In considering such a motion, all material allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the trial court is not permitted to speculate as to whether the allegations will ultimately be proven. Maciejewski v. Holland, 441 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Further, the court must confine itself strictly to the allegations within the complaint’s four corners; consideration of the defendant’s affirmative defenses or of the sufficiency of evidence which plaintiff will likely produce o…

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