JORGE DEMOYA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM R. WALSH, APPELLEE
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Calling a coworker a "raving maniac" and "raving idiot" during a professional disagreement constitutes non-actionable pure opinion based on disclosed facts, not slander.
Statements characterizing a coworker as a "raving maniac" and "raving idiot" during a heated professional disagreement constitute non-actionable pure opinion based on disclosed facts.
[1] Statements characterizing another person as a "raving maniac" and "raving idiot" during a heated professional disagreement constitute non-actionable pure opinion based on…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“may have been personally insulting, but did not constitute actionable slander”
Court's characterization of the appellee's statements about his coworker
Appellee made derogatory statements about his government coworker during a heated professional disagreement in the presence of other coworkers, callin…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Appellee’s characterization of his government co-worker as a “raving maniac” and “raving idiot”, during the course of a heated professional disagreement in the presence of a small group of other co-workers, may have been personally insulting, but did not constitute actionable slander. Compare Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gellert, 438 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (a statement that although ostensibly in the form of an opinion “implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion” is actionable) with other cases cited therein, e.g., Wetzel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 F. 2d 857 (9th Cir.1972) (calling plaintiff “nuts” and “crazy” in context of and in response to plaintiff’s demand that gas station pay for costs incurred when attendant at defendant’s gas station allegedly added wrong fluid to brake fluid considered to be non-actionable expression of pure opinion based on disclosed facts); Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 408 So. 2d 666, 667 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 329 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 29, 74 L.Ed.2d 44 (1982) (article characterizing accusations made by plaintiff as “almost paranoid” considered to be expression of pure opinion entitled to absolute constitutional protection).
The record supports the trial court’s determination that, as a matter of law, the statements sued on were pure opinion based on disclosed facts. See From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 56-57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla.1982).
Summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
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Citator
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HAY v. Indep. Newspapers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…lant, but toward the judicial system. Applying the principles hereinabove set forth, we hold the statement was a pure expression of opinion and accordingly protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See also Demoya v. Walsh, 441 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (characterization of coworker as “raving maniac” and “raving idiot” was pure opinion based on disclosed facts); Kotlikoff (accusations of mayor’s involvement in “huge coverup” and “conspiracy” were, in context, protected expressio…
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Scott v. Busch, 907 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…, Barrett, 742 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Lundquist v. Alewine, 397 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Restatement of Torts 2d § 570 (1977). . See Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp. 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). . See DeMoya v. Walsh, 441 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A. 2d 1086 (1982). . See Hoch v. Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, 742 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Harper, James and Bray, 2 The Law of Torts 2d, § 5.8 at 66-68; Restatement of Tort…
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John B. Sullivan, M.D. v. Jack W. Barrett, M.D., 510 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…and remand so that the trial court may enter a judgment for the defendant in accordance with this opinion. The statements in the letter were pure opinion and entitled to First Amendment protection. See Zambrano; Hay; From. See also Demoya v. Walsh, 441 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (defendant’s characterization of co-worker as “raving maniac” and “raving idiot” during course of heated professional disagreement in presence of small group of other co-workers constituted pure opinion based on disclosed facts).…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- E. AIR Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, 438 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 408 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Wetzel v. Gulf OIL Corp., 455 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1972)