HELEN SWANIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DOBBS HOUSE AND AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE CO., APPELLEES
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Appellant Swanigan sought reversal of a workers' compensation deputy commissioner's denial of modification for permanent total or partial disability benefits. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, using this case to illustrate the proper standard of appellate review and to criticize counsel for presenting arguments that fail to meet that standard.
The court affirmed the denial of modification. The court held that appellate review is limited to whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the order rendered—not whether competent, substantial evidence exists to support the claim disallowed. Where the record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting both the claim and the denial, the appellate court will not retry factual issues or substitute its judgment for the deputy commissioner's.
[1] Appellate courts review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the lower tribunal's order, not whether the record contains competent, subs…
[2] Appellate courts do not retry factual issues or substitute their judgment for that of the lower tribunal when factual issues are supported by competent, substantial evide…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the deputy; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy's order.”
Establishes the proper standard of appellate review in workers' compensation cases—reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting the order, not the claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSwanigan filed a claim for modification of workers' compensation benefits, seeking permanent total disability benefits or permanent partial disability…
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PER CURIAM.
Ordinarily, that single word would reflect our disposition of this appeal. Because we find this court reviewing more and more needless appeals presenting similar points for review, however, it seems appropriate to comment on a recurrent error by appellate attorneys stemming from an apparent misconception of the purpose and limited scope of appellate review.
We begin our discussion by quoting the appellant’s point on appeal:
The deputy commissioner erred in finding that the claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits or permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the 15% rating accepted by the employer/carrier as there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support a showing of change of condition as required by Florida law as a basis for a modification, (emphasis added).
Appellant then argues — rather ably, we note — that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support her claim for modification of worker’s compensation benefits. That being so, appellant asks us to reverse the deputy commissioner’s order denying modification. The point on appeal, however, as stated by appellant, is self-defeating under applicable standards of appellate review. We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the deputy; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy’s order. We can readily concede, as argued by appellant, that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support her claim for modification. Unfortunately, however, the record likewise contains competent, substantial evidence that supports the deputy’s findings and order denying her claim. Factually, this case could have been decided either way, depending on the testimony and evidence accepted and believed by the deputy. The issues presented and decided by him were essentially factual. We do not retry the claim at the appellate level and substitute our judgment for that of the deputy on factual issues supported by competent, substantial evidence, and appeals asking us to do so are frivolous. Catron Beverages, Inc. v. Maynard, 395 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). See also, Redding v. Cobia Boat Co., 389 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Fla.1980); Croft v. Pinkerton-Hayes Lumber Co., 386 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla.1980).
We suggest that a convenient and practical means for avoiding this common error is to state, at the outset of each point argued, the legal standard for appellate review relied upon for reversal, i.e., lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the order rendered, abuse of discretion, erroneous application of a rule of law, etc. The argument should then demonstrate not only the existence of the error complained of, but why that error requires reversal under the applicable standard of appellate review. By thus limiting the points on appeal to arguments within the proper scope of appellate review, counsel will avoid frivolous appeals and may well benefit from the more convincing form of argument directed specifically at why this appellate court can and should grant the relief requested.
• WENTWORTH, NIMMONS and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (60 total)
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Ullman v. City OF Tampa Parks Dep't & Alexsis, 625 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…adjudicator of fact ... ”). This court does not retry workers’ compensation claims at the appellate level, nor do we substitute our judgment for that of the JCC on factual issues supported by competent substantial evidence. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In this case, the JCC’s consideration of whether an accident, or a series of work-related incidents, occurred, as related by Mr. Ullman, depended not solely upon an evaluation of medical testimony, but upon a review of Mr. Ullma…
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McCANDLESS v. M.M. Parrish Constr. & Corporate Grp. Serv., Inc., 449 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…have been required to point out before, the issue before this court is whether there is any [*835] competent substantial evidence to support the deputy’s decision that the claimant is not entitled to any additional benefits, Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and there is more than ample competent substantial evidence to support the deputy’s finding in this regard. Although the only medical testimony is that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was a result of the accident, since th…
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Allman v. Meredith Corp. & Md. Cas. Co., 451 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…urt has said a number of times, the issue is not whether there is competent substantial evidence to support appellant’s position for reversal but whether there is competent substantial evidence to support the deputy’s order. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The deputy found that the claimant’s testimony regarding his activities and inability to engage in any gainful employment, including his specific denial of having performed any work activity for the last several years was so tot…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Croft v. Pinkerton-Hayes Lumber Co., 386 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1980)
- Redding v. Cobia Boat Co., 389 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1980)
- Catron Beverages, Inc. v. Maynard, 395 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)