IRIS GAUSE, APPELLANT,
v.
FIRST BANK OF MARIANNA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, counterplaintiff below, appeals a “judgment” granting appel-lee/counterdefendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a three-count counterclaim. The decretal portion of the trial court’s “judgment” reads:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that Counter-defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
This order is merely authorization for entry of a final judgment; it does not, in and of itself, constitute an appealable final judgment. Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Co., 356 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Additionally, it appears from a review of the record that appellee’s motion for summary judgment applies only to Count I of appellant’s three-count counterclaim. Because all three of the counts in the counterclaim are interrelated and arise out of the same transaction, a final judgment as to only one count is a nonappeala-ble interlocutory order. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1974); McClain Construction Corp. v. C.S. Roberts, 351 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
ERVIN, C.J., and BOOTH and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.
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Gause v. First Bank OF Marianna, 457 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ered that the “motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.” After the appeal of this order was dismissed by this court on the ground that the .order was not a final judgment but rather only authorization therefor, Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 442 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), a “corrective final order” was entered on 20 April 1984 which added this sentence to the first order: “[I]t is ordered ...: that [Gause] take nothing by this action and that [Bank] go hence without day.” This appeal followed. G…
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Seneca B. Anderson and Martha P. Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…l on the punitive damages issue. However, since the suit remains pending as to Hannon, the partial summary judgment entered in his favor on the count for punitive damages remains a nonap-pealable interlocutory order. Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 442 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). For that reason, we dismiss the portion of the appeal relating to the partial summary judgment in favor of Hannon on the punitive damages count. Turning now to the merits of this appeal, we see that the Andersons challenge firs…
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W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Luann Nixon, 489 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…gh VI of the counterclaim, the appeal, being in the nature of a piecemeal appeal cautioned against in Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1974), should not be presently entertained. See Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 442 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Gibbs v. Reliance Insurance Co., 399 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We therefore dismiss the appeal, without prejudice, as being premature. APPEAL DISMISSED. DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur.…
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- Mendez v. W. Flagler Fam. Ass'n, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974)
- Shupack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- McCLAIN Constr. Corp. v. Roberts, 351 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)