AARON THREAT, APPELLANT,
v.
J. CARLISLE ROGERS AND GLENN GENTRY, APPELLEES
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In a workers' compensation case, Aaron Threat appealed an order vacating a compensation award previously issued against his employers. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the deputy commissioner's authority to vacate the order within the 30-day period before finality, finding that the employers' failure to appear at the hearing was due to excusable neglect.
The deputy commissioner has authority to vacate or correct an order within the period before it becomes final when the failure to appear results from inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect. It is within the deputy's discretion to determine whether facts constitute excusable neglect, and the appellant did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
[1] A deputy commissioner has the authority to vacate a compensation order within the 30-day period before it becomes final, provided the vacation is based on grounds such as…
[2] A deputy commissioner's discretion to vacate a compensation order for excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence will be affirmed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the deputy has the authority, within the period before the order becomes final, to correct errors arising from inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect”
Establishes the core holding that deputy commissioners have limited authority to vacate orders before they become final
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAaron Threat was injured while pruning trees in a Florida grove. A compensation order dated January 13, 1983, awarded Threat temporary total disabilit…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us to review the order of the deputy commissioner vacating, within the 30-day period before it became final, a prior compensation order. We exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to review the order by certiorari, and affirm.
Claimant Aaron Threat injured his arm while pruning trees in a grove in Okahump-ka, Florida. An amended claim for benefits was filed, naming J. Carlisle Rogers and Glenn Gentry as employers. Because of an apparent miscommunication between counsel for Mr. Rogers and the deputy commissioner’s office, Mr. Rogers did not appear at the hearing held on the claim, subsequent to which the deputy issued his order, dated January 13, 1983, finding claimant entitled to TTD benefits, PTD benefits, and medical expenses, and awarding claimant’s attorney a fee under the “bad faith” provision of Section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes. Within the 30-day period before this order became final, Mr. Rogers’ attorney filed a motion to vacate the order, with supporting affidavits, asserting that Mr. Rogers’ failure to appear at the compensation hearing was the result of miscommunication and excusable neglect, and that Mr. Rogers had a meritorious defense to the claim for compensation, in that he does not own the grove property in question and never employed claimant.
On February 4, 1983, the deputy entered an order granting the motion to vacate and setting aside his prior order. Although the deputy commissioner has no authority to vacate an order which has become final, Farrell v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 361 So. 2d 408 (Fla.1978), we hold that the deputy has the authority, within the period before the order becomes final, to correct errors arising from inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect, as in the case at issue. See, Acosta Roofing Co. v. Gillyard, 402 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in which this court found such authority in Section 440.25(4)(a), Florida Statutes. See also, Morgan Yacht Corporation v. Edwards, 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), which found that Section 440.-33(1), Florida Statutes, authorized the deputy to rescind his approval of settlement stipulations upon a finding of fraud.
It is within the deputy’s discretion to determine whether the facts of a particular case constitute excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence, so as to support a motion to vacate a compensation order. Appellants have not shown an abuse of discretion by the deputy; his order granting appellee’s motion to vacate the prior compensation order is therefore affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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Drexel Props., Inc. v. Brown, 443 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…ul,” is certainly a debatable issue. But absent authority in statutes or rules, I would not create this wide portal of attack upon settled orders. It is quite another thing to excuse a party’s excusable neglect to attend a hearing, Threat v. Rogers, 443 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), or to correct inadvertencies of the deputy in failing to rule upon submitted issues, in ruling on issues not submitted, or in uncontroversial details not affecting the merits previously disputed and settled. Cf. Acosta Roofing C…1 / 2
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Yodelmis Vazquez v. Wendy's and Ace-Usa, 931 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…on order becomes final, it is within a JCC’s “discretion to determine whether the facts of a particular case constitute excusable ne- [*154] gleet, mistake or inadvertence, so as to support a motion to vacate a compensation order.” Threat v. Rogers, 443 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “ ‘[W]here inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles to which human nature is heir, then upon timely application accompanied by a reason…
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BEE GEE Shrimp, Inc. v. Petra Carreras, 516 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ccordingly, we reverse the deputy’s order denying the employer/carrier’s motion to vacate the order of March 10, 1987, and remand the cause for further proceedings. BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . See FIa.W.C.R.P. 4.100(b). . Threat v. Rogers, 443 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). . Compare Howard Johnson’s v. Pitchford, 496 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), wherein it was held that the deputy commissioner did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion to vacate on grounds of excusable neglect, since the…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Acosta Roofing Co. & Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gussie Gillyard, 402 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Edmond J. Farrell, III v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co. & Am. Mut. Liab. Co. & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 361 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1978)
- Morgan Yacht Corporation/Beatrice Foods & Gallagher Bassett Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)