JOSEPH G. ROUKOUS, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTATE OF RUBY J. KERNAN, DECEASED, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Roukous appealed the denial of his $38,272 claim against the Estate of Ruby J. Kernan for personal services rendered over seven years. The court affirmed, holding that the claim was barred by Florida's two-year statute of limitations for wages, and that Mrs. Kernan's written acknowledgment of the debt could not revive a claim that had never accrued.
The court held that Roukous's claim constituted a claim for wages barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(c), and that Mrs. Kernan's acknowledgment could not revive the claim because no debt existed until she signed the statement, as there had never been an employer-employee relationship during the period services were rendered.
[1] A claim for personal services rendered without an agreement for compensation is subject to the two-year statute of limitations for wages.
[2] An acknowledgment of a debt on a statement of services rendered cannot revive a claim that accrued after the services were performed and before any debt existed.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“this was a claim for wages which was barred by the two-year statute of limitations codified in Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1981)”
The court's central holding that Roukous's claim fell within the statute of limitations for wage claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrom 1970 to 1977, Roukous rendered various personal services to Mrs. Kernan (driving, home care, shopping, bill payment, handyman work) with no compe…
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MILLS, Judge.
Roukous appeals from a final judgment which denied his $38,272 claim against the Estate because it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. We affirm.
From 1970 to 1977, Roukous rendered a variety of personal services to the elderly Mrs. Kernan including acting as her driver, caring for her home, doing her shopping, seeing that her bills were paid, and acting as a general handyman. There was no agreement between Roukous and Mrs. Ker-nan that he would be compensated for these services.
In 1978, Mrs. Kernan received a visit from her daughter, Mrs. Frances Waugh. While there, Mrs. Waugh showed Mrs. Ker-nan’s will to Roukous. It contained a $35,-000 bequest to him, and it was his understanding that this bequest was to compensate him for all his years of service to Mrs. Kernan.
Mrs. Waugh allegedly told Roukous that Mrs. Kernan intended to make a new will and that he would not be a beneficiary under that will. She also allegedly told Roukous that he should make up a bill for his services and have it approved by Mrs. Kernan.
Roukous complied and presented a bill for $38,272 to Mrs. Kernan on 3 May 1978. She wrote “O.K. Ruby J. Kernan” at the bottom of the statement, but no payment was made on this debt.
Roukous filed a claim against the Estate which the trial court ultimately denied on authority of Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1970).
We agree with the trial court and hold that this was a claim for wages which was barred by the two-year statute of limitations codified in Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1981). Goehring, id.; Buenger v. Kennedy, 151 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Jones v. Lummus, 359 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
Although this decision conflicts with Schenkel v. Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, 141 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), Schenkel was indirectly overruled by the Supreme Court in Broward Builders Exchange, supra, when it disapproved the holding in Goehring v. Broward Builders Exchange, Inc., 222 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), and by implication adopted the holding in Buenger, supra.
Roukous argues that even if his claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Mrs. Kernan’s acknowledgment of the debt on 3 May 1978 acted to revive the claim. We do not agree. As the parties have agreed, this cause of action accrued when Mrs. Kernan signed the statement. Until that time, there was no debt because there was never an employer-employee relationship between Mrs. Kernan and Roukous during the period in which the services were rendered. Mrs. Kernan’s signature on the statement could not act to “revive” a previously nonexisting debt.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Broward Builders Exch., Inc. v. Lily Goehring, 231 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1970)
- Schenkel v. The Atl. Nat'l Bank OF Jacksonville, 141 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- Dinnen v. Lincoln Fin. Co., Inc., 151 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Jones v. Lynn F. Lummus ad Litem for the Estate of Floss M. Kramer, 359 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Lily Goehring v. Broward Builders Exch., Inc., 222 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)