P.N., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency adjudication for grand theft, holding that his inconsistent explanations for possessing a stolen moped created a factual issue that did not dissipate the statutory presumption of guilty knowledge.
A juvenile's inconsistent explanations for possessing recently stolen property create a jury question as to whether the statutory presumption of guilty knowledge has been rebutted, and the trial judge need not accept the juvenile's trial testimony that earlier misstatements resulted from fright rather than fabrication.
[1] Under Florida Statutes section 812.022(2), a juvenile's possession of recently stolen property raises a presumption of guilty knowledge, which is not dissipated by multip…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the multiplicity of alternative versions advanced by the juvenile created an issue for the trier of fact as to whether his possession of the moped had been satisfactorily explained so as to dissipate the statutory presumption”
Court's analysis of how inconsistent statements affect the presumption of guilty knowledge
P.N. was found in possession of a recently stolen moped. When stopped by police, he gave three different accounts: first that he borrowed it from a co…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The appellant was adjudicated delinquent based on a finding that he was guilty of grand theft. That determination was in turn founded upon the presumption of guilty knowledge which arose from the fact that he was in possession of a recently stolen moped.
Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981). When he was stopped by the police, P.N. told the officer first that he had borrowed the moped from a cousin, then a brother, and finally — as he testified at trial — from an otherwise unidentified friend named Victor Cruz.
We conclude that the multiplicity of alternative versions advanced by the juvenile created an issue for the trier of fact as to whether his possession of the moped had been satisfactorily explained so as to dissipate the statutory presumption. See State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1970). The case is controlled by State v. Fox, 404 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited, not R.A.L. v. State, 402 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) or A.R. v. State, 393 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Furthermore, since credibility is always, and particularly in this area, see State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853, 90 S.Ct. 112, 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969), for the fact-finder, the trial judge was not required, as P.N. argues, to accept his trial explanation of his earlier misstatements as the product of fright and confusion, rather than a search for a more acceptable, if equally untrue, excuse for his possession of the stolen property. See Andreasen v. State, 439 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Jackson v. State, 736 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…aught in a lie while giving an improbable story. Cf. J.J. v. State, 463 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Jackson’s trial version of his possession of the car did not conflict with his pretrial explanation. Cf. N.C., 478 So. 2d at 1144; P.N. v. State, 443 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). None of the “other proof’ mentioned in Graham is present in this case. The facts of this case are much closer to those cases where defendants’ unrefuted explanations of their possession of recently stolen property have been held…
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R.D.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…s the court obviously did, that the juvenile’s testimony was unworthy of belief and thus that the legislatively-imposed inference of guilt had not been overcome. See State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1970). I believe therefore that P.N. v. State, 443 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and State v. Fox, 404 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rather than R.A.L., R.M., and A.R., control. I would affirm.…
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Bertone v. State, 870 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…robable story. See J.J. v. State, 463 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Nor did Ber-tone’s trial version of his possession of the saws conflict with any pretrial explanation. Cf. N.C. v. State, 478 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); P.N. v. State, 443 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). This case resembles cases where defendants’ unrefuted explanations of their possession of recently stolen property have been held insufficient to support a theft conviction. See J.H. v. State, 868 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968)
- State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1970)
- Young v. Florida, 396 U.S. 853 (U.S. 1969)
- Caffey v. Missouri, 396 U.S. 853 (U.S. 1969)
- A. R. v. State, 393 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- R. A. L. v. State, 402 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Rodriguez v. Rattan, 402 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. FOX, 404 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Lou Ann Andreasen v. State, 439 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)