SEYMOUR GERBER, ROSE GERBER, HAROLD WINTER, AND HALSEY PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
THE KEYES COMPANY, APPELLEE; THE KEYES COMPANY, APPELLANT, V. SEYMOUR GERBER, ROSE GERBER, HAROLD WINTER, AND HALSEY PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., APPELLEES
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In this real estate broker dispute, the court affirmed summary judgment for Keyes Company against Halsey Publishing Company's breach of duty claim and affirmed a directed verdict for Halsey against Keyes's tortious interference counterclaim. The case addresses when a broker's fiduciary duties arise and cease in transactions involving competing offers and third-party brokers.
Keyes owed no duty to Halsey because the broker-client relationship had been terminated when Halsey submitted its offer through another broker and Keyes's exclusive listing had expired. Keyes did not tortiously interfere with its own business relationship with Arroyo because the contract with Arroyo was never breached and Keyes received its full commission.
[1] A real estate broker acting as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer owes a duty to deal fairly and honestly with both parties, which includes a duty n…
[2] A broker's duty to a prospective buyer is abrogated when the buyer terminates the broker-client relationship by submitting an offer through another broker and the broker'…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When acting as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer a broker is under a duty to deal fairly and honestly with both parties.”
Establishes the general fiduciary duty brokers owe, but also establishes that this duty applies to intermediaries acting for both parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKeyes Company held an exclusive listing to sell a building. Halsey Publishing initially submitted an offer through Keyes that was accepted but not com…
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NESBITT, Judge.
The Keyes Company (Keyes) had an exclusive listing to sell a building which the Halsey Publishing Company (Halsey) wanted to purchase. Halsey submitted an offer to the owner, Arroyo Investment Co., through Keyes. This offer was accepted, but the sale was not completed because of a foreclosure on the property. Arroyo bought back the building at the foreclosure sale and continued to list it exclusively with Keyes. Halsey submitted an offer to purchase through another real estate broker, Mr. Rose. This offer was rejected. At that time, Keyes’ exclusive listing had expired. The building was purchased by the Keyes Investment Co. A Keyes sales agent then contacted Halsey and Halsey took an assignment of the contract to buy the building. Mr. Rose contacted Keyes and threatened suit if he were not paid part of the brokerage commission because of the work he had done for Halsey. Keyes paid Mr. Rose $15,000.
Halsey asserted below that Keyes breached a duty owed to it by virtue of Keyes Investment Co.’s purchase of the property while Halsey had an offer outstanding.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Keyes. Halsey claims that Keyes acted improperly by bidding competitively against Halsey and by purchasing the building without informing Halsey. When acting as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer a broker is under a duty to deal fairly and honestly with both parties. United Homes, Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). This duty arises from the fact that the broker is acting for both parties. Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946). The general rule is that a broker cannot act for himself without full disclosure to the principals. Vining v. Smith, 343 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 518 (Fla.1978).
However, Halsey had abrogated its broker-client relationship with Keyes by submitting its last offer through another broker, Mr. Rose. See Melvin v. West, 107 So. 2d 156 (Fla.2d DCA 1958), cert. denied, 111 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1959) (nonexclusive listing contract terminated by seller’s execution of sales contract with buyer procured by another broker). Keyes’ exclusive listing on the building had expired. There was no longer a broker-client relationship of any kind between Halsey and Keyes.
Therefore, Keyes no longer had a duty toward Halsey. Cf. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927) (when broker undertakes to act for a purchaser and purchases for himself instead a constructive trust will be imposed in favor of the principal). A principal who is not a client must allege actively fraudulent conduct of a nature which is not present in this record to state a cause of action against a broker. See, e.g., Zichlin v. Dill, Ellis v. Flink, 301 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. discharged, 374 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1979). See also Gammage v. Turner, 206 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 870 (Fla.1968). Halsey has failed to state a cause of action against Keyes for breach of duty as a broker and the summary judgment is affirmed.
Keyes filed a counterclaim below, asserting that Halsey tortiously interfered with a business relationship. The damage asserted by Keyes was the amount of money Keyes paid to Mr. Rose. The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Halsey.
The elements of the tort of “interference with a business relationship” are: (1) the existence of a business relationship under which the plaintiff has legal rights; (2) an intentional and unjustified interference with that relationship by the defendant; and (3) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of that business relationship. Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 3099, 69 L.Ed.2d 965 (1981).
Keyes had a contract with the Arroyo Investment Co. to act as its broker in selling a building Arroyo owned. This con tract was never breached. Keyes received the full commission to which it was entitled under the contract. There is no cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship in the absence of a breach. Symon v.
J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 249 So. 2d 36 (Fla.1971).
Therefore, Keyes has failed to state a cause of action against Halsey.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments are both affirmed.
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Bergeron Env't & Recycling, LLC v. LGL Recycling, LLC, 398 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)…jury waiver, Bergeron was bound by the trial court’s findings. The trial court determined that Sun did not breach the JVA. No cause of action for tortious interference with a contract can exist in the absence of a breach. See Gerber v. Keyes Co., 443 So. 2d 199, 200–01 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that no cause of action for tortious interference existed where the contract was never breached); see also Decker-Ruhl Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 523 F. 2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1975) (observing that…
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Fraioli v. Bobby Byrd Real Est., Inc., 630 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…[*1133] also reject the notion that Singh’s conflicting interests in the underlying transaction diminished Byrd’s duty, as the listing agent offering the premises for sale, to deal with Fraioli in a fair and honest fashion. See Gerber v. Keyes Co., 443 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In short, Byrd’s exposure appears to be beyond dispute if, indeed, Singh engaged in misbehavior imposing detriment upon Fraioli. Hence, several unresolved questions can be distilled from this record: did Singh intentionally, or…
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Sonson v. Kern, 503 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Gerber v. Keyes Co., 443 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (18 total)
- Porte F. Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419 (Fla. 1927)
- Politis v. Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp., 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Balter v. Ethyl Corp., 452 U.S. 955 (U.S. 1981)
- Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96 (Fla. 1946)
- J. Rolfe Davis, Inc. v. Symon, 249 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1971)
- Hubbard v. MT. Sinai Hosp., 249 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1971)
- Gammage v. Gammage, 206 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- United Homes, Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- State ex rel. Taylor v. Milledge, 111 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1959)