JON T. TAYLOR AND PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
ARCHIE MARCUS GANAS, APPELLEE
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Taylor and Progressive appealed a trial court's order granting a new trial in a negligence action arising from a rear-end collision. The appellate court affirmed the new trial on compensatory damages but reversed the new trial on liability, comparative negligence, and punitive damages, finding the trial court failed to adequately explain its reasoning for ordering a new trial on those issues.
The court affirmed the new trial on compensatory damages but reversed the new trial on liability, comparative negligence, and punitive damages. The trial court must reinstate the verdict on the latter three issues and enter judgment accordingly, with only the compensatory damages issue to be retried.
[1] A new trial may be granted on compensatory damages when the jury's award is so inadequate that it suggests a misunderstanding of instructions.
[2] A trial court's order granting a new trial must state reasons with sufficient clarity to facilitate appellate review.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Court ... having concluded that the jury could not legally have answered question 1 in the affirmative and question 2 in the affirmative and set forth the percentages of negligence as to question 4 and then arrive at the amount of $361.00 as the total amount of compensatory damages”
Establishes the trial court's reasoning that the jury's verdict was logically inconsistent and therefore must have resulted from misunderstanding compensatory damage instructions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA rear-end collision occurred on the Mathews Bridge in Jacksonville when Taylor's automobile struck Ganas' disabled or slow-moving automobile from beh…
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MILLS, Judge.
Taylor and Progressive appeal the trial court’s order granting Ganas a new trial in a negligence action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This is a personal injury case arising out of a rear-end collision which occurred on the Mathews Bridge in Jacksonville. There was evidence that Ganas’ automobile was disabled and was stopped or was traveling well below the minimum speed limit when struck by Taylor’s automobile from the rear. There was additional evidence that Ganas did not use his brake lights, turn signals or flashers so as to warn following traffic that he was stopped or moving very slowly. There was conflicting evidence as to whether Taylor was drunk. The jury found that Taylor was 25% negligent and that Ganas was 75% negligent. (Answer to questions 1, 3, and 4 of verdict.)
The medical and chiropractic evidence was conflicting as to whether Ganas sustained permanent injuries. The jury found that Ganas sustained a permanent injury. (Answer to question 2 of verdict.)
The evidence was conflicting as to whether Ganas lost wages and as to the amount of his chiropractic expenses, but Ganas and his chiropractor both testified that the amount of the chiropractic bills which remained unpaid was $361. There was un-controverted evidence that Ganas had continuing pain.
The jury found that Ganas’ total damages were $361. It found that Taylor’s acts and actions did not warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
The trial court granted Ganas a new trial on liability and on compensatory and punitive damages because it concluded that the jury did not understand its instructions on compensatory damages. The trial court’s order granting the new trial provided:
[T]he Court ... having concluded that the jury could not legally have answered question 1 in the affirmative and question 2 in the affirmative and set forth the percentages of negligence as to question 4 and then arrive at the amount of $361.00 as the total amount of compensatory damages in view of the fact that that amount was the unpaid balance of his past medical bills. Therefore, there is no other conclusion to draw except that the jury did not understand the instructions of the Court concerning the verdict. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The verdict entered on the 20th day of January, 1983, in this cause as to liability and damages is hereby set aside.
The order recited that because the jury found comparative negligence and permanent injury but also found Ganas’ damages to be equal to the precise amount of his unpaid medical bills, the jury must have misunderstood the instructions and a new trial would be granted. We agree and affirm the granting of a new trial, but only on the issue of compensatory damages.
The trial judge’s order does not explain why a new trial was granted on liability and punitive damages. Because the order fails to state the reasons for granting a new trial on these issues with sufficient clarity to facilitate intelligent appellate review, it must be reversed as to these issues. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla.1978).
Although “magic words” are not required, the reasons given for granting a new trial must be such as would support a finding that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence or that the jury had been influenced by outside considerations. Wackenhut, supra. Here, the only thing that plainly appears from the order granting a new trial is that the judge felt the compensatory damage award was inadequate. Therefore, there is no reason why the issues of liability, comparative negligence, and punitive damages should be retried. Although a trial judge has broad discretion to grant or deny new trial, a judge may not substitute his view of the evidence for that of the jury. A new trial is not to be granted unless no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict rendered. Florida First National Bank of Jacksonville v. Dent, 404 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1969).
We affirm the granting of a new trial on the sole issue of compensatory damages and remand for that purpose. We reverse the granting of a new trial on the issues of liability, comparative negligence, and punitive damages and instruct the trial court to reinstate the verdict on these issues and enter judgment at the appropriate time.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
THOMPSON, Judge,
dissenting in part, and concurring in part.
I would award a new trial on both the issues of liability and damages. See 1661 Corporation v. Snyder, 267 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Lawson v. Swirn, 258 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1972). I agree to the reinstatement of the verdict on the issue of punitive damages.
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Ursula H. Smith v. Telophase Nat'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 471 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…is court, said “since the court ordered a remittitur, we perceive it concluded only that the damages awarded were excessive, and not that Reynolds failed to establish the landlord’s liability.” While a remittitur was not involved in Taylor v. Ganas, 443 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the same principle was involved when the court held that the trial court, absent a finding that the evidence was insufficient to support liability, erred in ordering a new trial on the issue of liability and damages when the onl…
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Massey v. Netschke, 504 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…ther. Plaintiff’s motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal was timely filed. Plaintiff’s argue that the verdicts were grossly inadequate as a matter of law. We agree and reverse. Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1969); Taylor v. Ganas, 443 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Shelly v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 445 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Howard, 458 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Defendants argue that a new trial should not be granted sin…
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Dena Wilson v. THE Krystal Co., 844 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…as appropriately given. We likewise conclude that there was no error in denying Ms. Wilson’s motion for a new trial. A motion for new trial should not be granted “unless no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict rendered.” Taylor v. Ganas, 443 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). A trial court is given broad discretionary latitude to grant or deny a motion for new trial because of its direct and superior vantage point of the trial proceedings. Pathway Financial v. Miami Intern. Realty Co., 588 So. 2…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978)
- Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1969)
- The 1661 Corp. v. Snyder, 267 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Fla. First Nat'l Bank OF Jacksonville v. Dent, 404 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- In re Est. of Irving S. Richter, 258 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Izar Lawson and Reto Lawson v. Swirn, 258 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- John W. Thomson & SON, Inc. v. Jeziorski, 263 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1972)
- Maria Papp et vir v. Guillermina Rivero Morales, 263 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1972)