ALAN GREENSTEIN AND CINDY GREENSTEIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
GREENBROOK, LTD., JACK A. WINSTON, IRA GRABOW, FLORIDA HOUSING CAPITAL CORPORATION AND HOUSING CAPITAL CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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The court held that res judicata bars splitting a cause of action against the original defendants, but a claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship is stated against new defendants.
Plaintiffs previously sued for specific performance of a home purchase contract and lost. They then filed a new action for damages against the origina…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The Greensteins’ suit for specific performance against the seller, Greenbrook, Ltd., and the alleged titleholder, Florida Housing Capital Corporation, of the home they contracted to purchase ended in a judgment for the defendants which was affirmed in Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 413 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The plaintiffs then instituted the present action seeking damages sustained in that transaction based upon theories of breach of contract as against Greenbrook, and interference with the Greenstein-Greenbrook contractual relationship as against Florida Housing and three additional defendants, Jack Weinstein, Ira Grabow and Housing Capital Corporation. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the Green-steins again appeal.
We affirm the dismissal of the defendants Greenbrook and Florida Housing upon the application of that aspect of the doctrine of res judicata which forbids “splitting” a cause of action. When the plaintiffs initially sued those defendants, it was incumbent upon them then to raise all available claims or demands for relief arising out of the alleged breach. Their failure to do so precludes subjecting those defendants to another successive action based on the same conduct. Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So. 2d 432 (1942); Beck v. Pennsylvania National Mut. Casualty Co., 279 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); 1 Fla.Jur.2d Actions §§ 56, 59 (1977).
This ground, however, obviously has no application to the three defendants, Weinstein, Grabow, and Housing Capital Corporation, who were not joined in the first case. Since we find that the complaint states a cause of action against them for tortious interference with a contractual or business relation, e.g., Nitzberg v. Zalesky, 370 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the dismissal of the complaint against them is reversed for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…bviously not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to dispose of the second one. (It would likewise not bar the second case under that aspect of the res judicata doctrine which forbids splitting a cause of action. See Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 443 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).) The same rule is correctly deemed to apply when, as in Rob-Cor, two distinct causes of action are contained in the same complaint. In the present case, we will not attempt to resolve the apparently insoluble conundrum of whethe…
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Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. COX, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…ctrine of res judicata” which “makes it incumbent upon [plaintiffs] to raise all available claims” in one action and which “precludes subjecting ... defendants to another successive action based on this same conduct.” Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 443 So. 2d 296 (Fla.3d DCA 1983) (purchaser’s failure to raise breach of contract claim in first action precluded second action for breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual relationship based on same contract). The rule “is founded on the soun…
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Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…dentities analysis. No supreme court case has altered Sheam’s definition of a cause of action. The first case that appears to have merged a transactional res judicata test into a splitting cause of action analysis is Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 443 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). There the court held that a plaintiff had improperly split claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract, even though the tort and contract counts involved different causes of action. This court similarl…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793 (Fla. 1942)
- Nitzberg v. Zalesky, 370 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Greenstein v. Greenbrook, Ltd., 413 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Lightsey v. State, 413 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Zebedee McNICHOLS v. State, 279 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Beck v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 279 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)