VICENTA PINA, APPELLANT,
v.
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-01-03
No. 83-520
Before HENDRY, BARKDULL and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
443 So. 2d 395 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Vicenta Pina appeals a judgment denying insurance coverage under her General Insurance Company policy after she omitted her son Oscar as a driver from her insurance application, in violation of Florida Statutes § 627.409(1). The court affirmed the denial of coverage, finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying coverage, concluding that no reversible error had been demonstrated. The appellant's arguments regarding ambiguity in the application, evidentiary support for the judgment, and denial of jury trial were all rejected.


Headnotes

[1] An insurance policy may be voided if the applicant omits a driver from the insurance application who had driven the insured vehicle with consent prior to the application…

[2] Ambiguities in an insurance application must be resolved against the insurer.

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Key Quotes

“Coverage was denied on the basis that appellant had violated section 627.409(1), Florida Statutes (1979), by omitting from the application for insurance the name of her son, Oscar Pina, as a driver in insured's household who had driven the insured's vehicle with her consent prior to the date of the application.”

Establishes the factual and legal basis for the denial of coverage.

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Facts & Procedural History

Vicenta Pina obtained an insurance policy from General Insurance Company. Her son, Oscar Pina, had driven the insured vehicle with her consent prior t…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of a final judgment entered by the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida determining that appellee, General Insurance Company, afforded no coverage under the policy of insurance, issued to appellant Vicenta Pina. Coverage was denied on the basis that appellant had violated section 627.409(1), Florida Statutes (1979), by omitting from the application for insurance the name of her son, Oscar Pina, as a driver in insured’s household who had driven the insured’s vehicle with her consent prior to the date of the application.

It is appellant’s contention that she is entitled to reversal on the grounds that (1) the insurance application was ambiguous and therefore, as a matter of law, the ambiguity had to be resolved against the insurer without any testimony as to the party’s understanding of the ambiguity, (2) the judgment of the trial court is without evidentiary support and the record contains no evidence as to the appellant’s understanding of the ambiguous phrase in the appellee’s insurance application, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellant a jury trial on the issues.

We have carefully considered the points on appeal in the light of the record, briefs and argument of counsel and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. See: McTeague v. Treibits, 388 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Rochow, 384 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); General Insurance Co. of America v. Sentry Indemnity Co., 384 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed, 389 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.1980); Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Nespereira, 366 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Zero Food Storage, Inc. v. Henderson’s Sea Food, Inc., 121 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); section 627.409(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982).

Therefore the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Abrams v. Gen. Ins. Co., Inc., 508 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …son was in violation of a known requirement that she do so and that coverage was thus precluded under section 627.409, Florida Statutes (1983). See Martinez v. General Insurance Co., 483 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Pina v. General Insurance Co., 443 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Affirmed. . The deposition precludes acceptance of the appellant’s fail-back claim that her motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the denial of a motion for summary judgment…
  • Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pachivas, 458 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …reen, 80 So. 2d 321 (Fla.1955), and, of course, misrepresentation in an application for automobile insurance may constitute grounds for rescission. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. Shifflet, 201 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1967); Pina v. General Insurance Co., 443 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); § 627.409(1), Fla.Stat. (1981). Thus, it was error for the trial judge to strike the counterclaim. Further, the allegations in the amended complaint are insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain an award of punitive damages.1…

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