SOUTHEASTERN FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
DANIEL LEHRMAN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The court held that an insurance policy exclusion for motorized vehicles not pertaining to premises service and not licensed for road use applied to a customized show motorcycle.
The insured's customized show motorcycle was stolen, and the insured sought coverage under their insurance policy. The policy contained an exclusion f…
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ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment assessing damages against the appellant insurance company for a loss by theft of the appellee insured. We believe the trial court erred in construing an insurance policy to include coverage for the appellee’s customized show motorcycle where the policy specifically excluded from coverage “motorized vehicles, except such vehicles pertaining to the service of the premises and not licensed for road use.” It is undisputed that appellee’s motorcycle is a “motorized vehicle” and that such vehicle was not one “pertaining to the service of the premises” upon which appellee resided. Under such circumstances the motorcycle was excluded ¡from coverage.
Courts should resort to complex rules of construction to determine coverage or the applicability of exclusions only when the language used in the policy is ambiguous or otherwise susceptible of more than one meaning. Absent such factors courts should apply the plain meaning of words and phrases used in a policy of insurance. Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 382 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). While we will not hesitate to construe provisions against an insurance company responsible for drafting the contract, we must be equally ihindful to construe words and phrases according to their plain meanings. This is especially important in light of our repeated admonitions to insurance companies to write policies in clear and understandable terms.
In accordance with the above we reverse and remand with directions that judgment be entered in favor of the appellant. In view of our holding we need not decide the issue raised on cross appeal.
DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Wash. Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Sydelle Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 2013)…nt to its plain language. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc., 889 So. 2d 779, 785 (Fla.2004). If, and only if, a contract is ambiguous should the court [*955] construe it in order to determine the parties’ intent. See Se. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lehrman, 443 So. 2d 408, 408-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“Courts should resort to complex rules of construction to determine coverage or the applicability of exclusions only when the language used in the policy is ambiguous or otherwise susceptible of more than one meaning.”).…
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Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Branco, 148 So. 3d 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…ns. Corp. v. Casar, 104 So. 3d 384, 385-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Absent ambiguity, the plain meaning of an insurance policy controls. E.g., Arias v. Affirmative Ins. Co., 944 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Se. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lehrman, 443 So. 2d 408, 408-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)). Courts should resort to rules of interpretation only when the policy language is ambiguous or otherwise susceptible to multiple meanings. E.g., Phillips, 134 So. 3d at 507 (citing Arias, 944 So. 2d at 1197). When the d…
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Miller v. Kase, 789 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ule of grammatical construction. However, resort to rules of construction is permissible only where the contractual language is ambiguous. Herring v. First S. Ins. Co., 522 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Lehman, 443 So. 2d 408, 408-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). See also Royal Am. Realty, 215 So. 2d at 338. (In the absence of clear and unambiguous language, the court must engage in judicial interpretation. To that end, the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the par…
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