HOMESTEAD PROPERTIES, A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANT,
v.
CARLOS SANCHOO AND BIBI SANCHOO, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-01-10
No. 83-941
Before HENDRY, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
443 So. 2d 442 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Homestead Properties appealed a trial court order awarding the Sanchoos the return of their $10,000 deposit on a residential purchase contract. The appellate court reversed, holding that the mortgage rider's plain language made the buyers qualified for financing despite their failure to sell other properties, and thus they defaulted by canceling the contract.


Holding

The court held that the Sanchoos were deemed qualified for mortgage purposes under the plain language of the mortgage rider, notwithstanding their failure to sell other properties. They defaulted on the contract by canceling it, and their deposit was properly forfeited.


Headnotes

[1] A mortgage rider's plain and unambiguous terms dictate whether a buyer is deemed qualified for financing, irrespective of external conditions.

[2] A buyer's failure to sell other properties does not excuse performance under a purchase contract when the mortgage rider explicitly states the buyer will be deemed qualif…

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Key Quotes

“I will be deemed qualified for purposes of this Rider regardless of conditions attached to the approval relating to matters outside the purchase and sale transaction, matters of title or execution of documents.”

Establishes that the buyers were qualified despite external financial conditions such as failing to sell other properties.

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Facts & Procedural History

The Sanchoos entered into a contract to purchase a residence from Homestead Properties, depositing $1,000 initially and $9,000 subsequently. They appl…

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Opinion of the Court
NESBITT, Judge.

NESBITT, Judge.

The Sanchoos entered into a contract to purchase a residence from Homestead Properties. Upon execution of the contract, the purchasers deposited $1,000 and subsequently deposited $9,000. They applied for financing and several months later were notified that they had qualified. Ultimately, the Sanchoos informed Homestead that the contract was cancelled because they had failed to sell two other properties which they owned and depended upon for cash to close. The instant action was filed in circuit court seeking the return of the buyers’ $10,000. From an order awarding the Sanchoos their deposit money, the seller appeals.

In essence, the purchasers argue that the notification from the bank was a qualification conditional on their sale of the two other properties. Having failed to sell these properties, the buyers theorize they were not qualified for a mortgage and thus, the return of their deposit was required.

We disagree based on the plain and unambiguous terms of the mortgage rider which provides in pertinent part:

I understand that you are not arranging for my mortgage, nor requiring me to use your recommended lender. This Rider will, however, be deemed void if I elect not to use your recommended lender or if I fail to perform my obligations under this Rider on time and I will then be required to close as if the agreement were for all cash. I further understand that you are not participating in the decision as to whether or not I will qualify for a mortgage. Obtaining the mortgage is entirely my responsibility.

I will be deemed qualified for purposes of this Rider regardless of conditions attached to the approval relating to matters outside the purchase and sale transaction, matters of title or execution of documents. Any change in my financial condition prior to closing or any other change which results in refusal of the lender to close the loan shall render this Rider void and I will be required to close for all cash.

Clearly, under these clauses, the purchasers were qualified despite their failure to sell other properties. In the alternative, the Sanchoos agreed that if all means and methods of financing were unavailable, they would close for all cash. Thus, under either provision, the buyers defaulted on the contract and their deposit has been forfeited. Because the trial court incorrectly rewrote the contract to provide otherwise, we reverse.

Reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the sellers.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Nat'l Health Labs., Inc. v. Bailmar, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …elopment Corp., 305 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 586 (Fla.1975), and Sun Bank of Miami v. Lester, 404 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) seem among the closest to the present situation. See also, Homestead Properties v. Sanchoo, 443 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) for a recent application of the general rule. Nor do we agree with the appellee and the trial court that Philpot compels, or even indicates a different result. That case indeed involved a clause, which was contained verbatim in t…
  • Mahler v. Allied Marine, 513 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …113 (Fla.1965), and the particular ingredient of the rule that the failure to comply with a contractual time requirement precludes the successful invocation of a right which is contingent upon its being followed. See Homestead Properties v. Sanchoo, 443 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Saul J. Morgan Enters, v. 57th Ave. Dev. Corp., 305 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 586 (Fla.1975); see also National Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Bailmar, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for…
  • DAN Galasso Waste Serv., Inc. v. Hemery, 528 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …urnett v. Brito, 478 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Bowman v. Kingsland Dev., Inc., 432 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Ocala Warehouse Inv., Ltd. v. Bison Co., 416 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). . Homestead Properties v. Sanchoo, 443 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); National Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Bailmar, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984). . Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Serv. Corp., 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1973); Keys Lobster, I…

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