OLIVER EARL YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Oliver Young appealed the dismissal of his inverse condemnation claim against Palm Beach County for noise damage to his residential property from aircraft operations at Palm Beach International Airport. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that Young adequately alleged a cause of action for inverse condemnation and that the county must respond to the complaint.
The court held that Young's amended complaint adequately stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation sufficient to require the county to respond. The complaint satisfied pleading requirements: the statutory compliance requirement of Section 768.28(6) did not apply because inverse condemnation does not sound in tort; the allegation that flight frequency increased over fourteen years adequately alleged that conditions are reasonably expected to continue; and the description of air or navigational easements taken was sufficient to inform the county of the relief sought.
[1] An inverse condemnation claim for airport noise may arise when noise and other disruptive factors become so onerous as to constitute a taking of neighboring property.
[2] An inverse condemnation claim seeking equitable relief for a taking of property rights is not a tort claim to which statutory notice requirements for tort claims apply.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The cause of action alleged here does not sound in tort, a sine qua non for application of Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1981) [...] Rather, appellant seeks the equitable remedy of requiring the government to condemn the property taken and pay compensation therefor.”
Establishes that inverse condemnation is not a tort claim and therefore the statutory immunity provision does not apply
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung owned residential property approximately 2,000 yards from the eastern end of the East-West runway of Palm Beach International Airport for over f…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment dismissing his amended complaint seeking inverse condemnation against Palm Beach County. The complaint alleged a taking of residential property due to noise from overflying aircraft as they enter and depart Palm Beach International Airport.
The amended complaint averred that for over fourteen years appellant has owned certain real property approximately 2000 yards from the eastern end of the East-West runway of Palm Beach International Airport, which is owned and operated by Palm Beach County. Regular and almost continuous flights to and from the airport over and near appellant’s property, often minutes apart, make it impossible during such flights for appellant or members of his family to converse, to speak over the telephone, or to listen to television. It was further alleged that the frequency of these flights has steadily increased over the past fourteen years; the noise emitted by said aircraft has severely diminished, deprived, and substantially interfered with the beneficial use and enjoyment of said property and has diminished the market value thereof.
Finally, appellant alleged that appellee should be required to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay appellant for air or avigational easements or other property rights taken.
The trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint because appellant failed to allege 1) compliance with Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1981), 2) that the conditions complained of are reasonably expected to continue, and 3) inadequate identification of the air or avigational easements or other property rights that were taken.
There now exists a variety of cases involving inverse condemnation of property neighboring airports.1 They describe the cause of action that arises when noise and other disruptive factors become so onerous as to constitute a taking of neighboring property. The cause of action alleged here does not sound in tort, a sine qua non for application of Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1981). See State Road Department v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941); City of Jacksonville, supra; see also Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P. 2d 540 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 989, 85 S.Ct. 701, 13 L.Ed.2d 610 (1965). Rather, appellant seeks the equitable remedy of requiring the government to condemn the property taken and pay compensation therefor.
Appellee contends that appellant failed to allege that the conditions complained of are reasonably expected to continue. Assuming there is such an actual pleading requirement, we regard the allegation that the frequency of the offending flights has steadily increased over the past fourteen years as adequately meeting that requirement. Regarding the trial court’s finding that the air or navigational easements taken were not adequately described, we think appellant’s statement was sufficient to acquaint appellee with the relief sought and allow intelligent formulation of a responsive pleading. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971); City of Jacksonville, supra.
In view of the foregoing we conclude that the amended complaint adequately states a cause of action for inverse condemnation sufficient to require appellee to respond thereto. Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions.
DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., and GOLDMAN, MURRAY (Associate Judge), concur. . E.g., Aaron v. United States, 160 Ct.Cl. 295, 311 F. 2d 798 (1963); Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), cert. denied 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla.1965).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Schick v. Fla. Dep't OF Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…mplaint clearly alleged the flooding rendered the properties useless for all residential purposes, and concluded therefore that the allegations were sufficient to demonstrate a taking. A similar result obtained in Young v. Palm [*1320] Beach County, 443 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In Young the court held that the amended complaint which alleged a steady increase in airplane flights over a 14-year period, with the attendant noise which substantially interfered with the beneficial use and enjoyment of appel…
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ST. Lucie Cnty. & St. Lucie Cnty. Port & Airport Auth. v. Town OF ST. Lucie Vill., 603 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…pear to some persons to be erroneous. 245 So. 2d at 103. This sentiment is especially true as to future governmental action. Florida recognizes common law causes of action for damages which stem from airport operations. Young v. Palm Beach County, 443 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA1984); Foster v. City of Gainesville, 579 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA1991) (substantial diminution in property value due to airport runway extension supported cause of action for damages); Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 512…
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City of Fort Lauderdale v. Hinton, 276 So. 3d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State Rd. Dep't of Fla. v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745 (Fla. 1941)
- Charles W. Alden and wife v. W. Coast Title Co. & Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971)
- Coffee Cnty. v. City of Tullahoma, 379 U.S. 989 (U.S. 1965)
- Guiberson Corp. v. Webber, 379 U.S. 989 (U.S. 1965)
- Lorenz v. Jiminez, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965)
- Cannon v. State ex rel. Jensen, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965)
- Alva A. Aaron v. The United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
- Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth. v. Corando Benitez, Jr., 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- F. E. C. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967)