BUFORD SPRINGFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Buford Springfield's probation was revoked after he was found to have committed robbery in violation of his probation conditions. On appeal, Springfield challenged both the sufficiency of evidence for the robbery finding and the constitutionality of a statute allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction over his sentences. The court affirmed the revocation, finding the evidence sufficient and rejecting his constitutional arguments on procedural grounds.
The evidence was sufficient to support the robbery finding under the relaxed legal standards applicable to probation revocation proceedings. Although the statute as applied to Springfield may be unconstitutional ex post facto legislation, Springfield's failure to raise this issue before the trial court bars appellate consideration of it.
[1] Evidence sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court is adequate to support a finding of violation in a probation revocation proceeding.
[2] A statute providing for retention of jurisdiction over a portion of a sentence is not facially unconstitutional as an ex post facto law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the context of the relaxed legal standards applicable to probation revocation proceedings, we find that the conscience of the court was satisfied and that the trial court committed no reversible error.”
Establishes the deferential standard of review in probation revocation cases and affirms the trial court's credibility determination
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpringfield was on probation with a condition requiring him to live at liberty without violating any law. The state presented a witness who testified …
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DANAHY, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order revoking appellant’s probation. Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he had committed a robbery, a violation of condition 5 requiring that he live and remain at liberty without violating any law. That argument is unpersuasive. The state furnished a witness who said that appellant did participate in the robbery, while appellant denied it. The court chose to believe the state’s witness. In the context of the relaxed legal standards applicable to probation revocation proceedings, we find that the conscience of the court was satisfied and that the trial court committed no reversible error. Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1982); Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1974); Ivey v. State, 308 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first half of the concurrent sentences imposed upon revocation of his probation. He contends that the amendment to section 947.-16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), under which the trial judge retained jurisdiction over his sentences, is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, both on its face and as applied to him. Appellant’s contention that the statute is facially unconstitutional has been previously addressed and rejected. Borden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1176 (Fla.1981); Sellers v. State, 421 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Arnett v. State, 397 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), cert. denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla.1981).
His further contention that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to himself is correct. Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982); State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981).
However, we cannot address that argument because the record before us affirmatively shows that he did not raise this issue before the trial judge.
Thus, he finds himself in a different position than, for example, the appellants in Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982), and Reid v. State, 440 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), who did initially and properly bring the error to the attention of the trial court for its timely consideration and correction. Ex post facto application of the retention statute is not fundamental error and objection must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for review by direct appeal.1 Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.1982); Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982); Fredricks v. State, 440 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
AFFIRMED.
OTT, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . Our holding is without prejudice to appellant seeking relief in the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Slaughter v. State, 493 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…amental error and a contemporaneous objection must be made at the trial level to preserve the issue for appellate review. See Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982); Fredricks v. State, 440 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Springfield v. State, 443 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Appellants have cited State v. Stacey, 482 So. 2d 1350 (Fla.1985), in support of their argument that their failure to object does not waive this issue because such failure was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. How…
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Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…y appellant’s motion for rehearing because the ex post facto issue was first raised in the motion. Ex post facto issues are generally not fundamental error, therefore must be raised at trial to be properly preserved for appeal. Springfield v. State, 443 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Our denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing is without prejudice to appellant seeking relief in the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. GRIMES, A.C.J., and RYDER and SANDERLIN, JJ., co…
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State v. Wiita, 744 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…ed before the trial court. See Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.1982); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 722 So. 2d 192 (Fla.), and cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Springfield v. State, 443 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). A trial court’s decision regarding the withdrawal of a plea will generally not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See Hunt v. State, 613 So. 2d 893, 896 (Fla.1992). Where a defendant challenges a…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982)
- Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1982)
- State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1981)
- Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1982)
- Raleigh Borden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1981)
- N.U., Inc. v. T & R Seafood, Inc., 428 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Arnett v. State, 397 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Ivey v. State, 308 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)