LARRY D. CLARKE, APPELLANT,
v.
CHERYL A. CLARKE, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the husband appealed the trial court's equitable distribution of marital property, challenging both the award of his home interest to the wife as lump-sum alimony and the inclusion of his pension plan in the equitable distribution calculation. The Second District affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either decision.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in either regard. Lump-sum alimony awards need not be limited to circumstances where the recipient demonstrates need if equitable distribution is accomplished under circumstances showing justification and financial ability of the other spouse. The pension plan, as a vested asset built up during the marriage, properly constitutes property subject to equitable distribution, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering its estimated future value for distribution purposes.
[1] A trial court has discretion to award a spouse's interest in the marital home to the other spouse as lump-sum alimony to achieve equitable distribution of marital propert…
[2] Lump-sum alimony awards are not restricted to circumstances where the recipient spouse demonstrates need if equitable distribution is accomplished with justification and…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court has discretion to award the husband's share of the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony to accomplish an equitable distribution of the marital property.”
Establishes that lump-sum alimony can be used as a tool for equitable distribution of marital property when the trial court has discretion to do so.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband and wife were dissolving their marriage. The trial court awarded the marital home entirely to the wife, treating the husband's one-half in…
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LEHAN, Judge.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, the husband argues that the trial court erred in its attempt to equitably distribute the parties’ property. The husband contends that the court should not have given the husband’s one-half interest in the marital home to the wife as lump-sum alimony and that the trial court should not have considered the husband’s pension plan to be among assets of the husband for the purpose of determining equitable distribution. The trial court took into account the evidence of the plan’s estimated future value and reduced that by fifty percent. We disagree with the husband’s contentions and affirm the final order of dissolution.
The husband’s first contention is that the lump sum award of the husband’s interest in the home was not justified on the basis of needs of the wife. However, Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), does not restrict lump sum alimony awards to circumstances in which the recipient’s need therefor exists if equitable distribution is accomplished under circumstances showing justification and financial ability of the other spouse.
The trial court has discretion to award the husband’s share of the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony to accomplish an equitable distribution of the marital property. Canakaris at 1201. It appears that the court divided the parties’ assets roughly equally by, among other things, giving the marital home entirely to the wife and considering the husband’s pension plan to be a part of the husband’s property. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion.
The husband’s second contention is that his vested pension plan should not have been considered by the trial court in making the equitable distribution.
We disagree. See Aylward v. Aylward, 420 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We recognize that this case apparently differs from those cases in that here the parties agree that the husband can receive no money from the pension plan until he attains age sixty-five, approximately twenty-one years in the future.
However, in viewing the value of the pension plan as security for the future for a husband who has good income-producing ability and other assets in reserve, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Under that view, the pension plan, the right to the great bulk of which was built up during the nineteen-year marriage, is similar in nature to other assets held for the future. We also note that the husband’s rights to the pension plan in this case are vested, in contrast to Aylward.
The only evidence of the pension plan’s value presented in the lower court was the wife’s testimony giving its present value as one half of its estimated future value. As the trial court implies, the weight of that testimony was not great because the wife was not shown to be qualified as an expert in the subject. But, under the standards of appellate review established by Canakaris and its directive that the trial court should be guided by “all relevant circumstances,” 382 So. 2d at 1201, we cannot find in this dissolution case that the wife’s testimony was entitled to no weight. We cannot say that reasonable men could not differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s actions. The husband presented no evidence of the plan’s value; his basic contention appears to be that the pension plan should have no value for equitable distribution purposes.
AFFIRMED.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)…epresents no revolutionary departure from Florida law. In fact, the decision under review is the first to expressly refuse to consider pension benefits as marital property in fashioning a scheme of equitable distribution. See e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 443 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Cowan v. Cowan, 389 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), review denied, 397 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1981). Although admittedly ce…
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Carroll v. Carroll, 471 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…her economic status lump sum alimony award to insure equitable distribution of marital assets is within trial court’s discretion). The trial court properly awarded the wife as lump sum alimony the marital home and furnishings, see Clarke v. Clarke, 443 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Besley v. Besley, 437 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla.1984); Fell v. Fell, 421 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Locke v. Locke, 413 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the car and a substantial cash awar…
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Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 456 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…wn or the other party’s attorney’s fees. See Conner v. Conner, supra. Our decision with respect to the treatment to be given the husband’s retirement plan is in apparent conflict with decisions from other courts in this state. See Clarke v. Clarke, 443 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (that court stating that it did not find an abuse in the trial court’s discretion in considering the husband’s pension plan to be a part of the husband’s property); see also Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Hurtado v. Rose-Jean Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- State v. Scotti, 420 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)