CARLOS HERNANDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
VIVIAN R. HERNANDEZ, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the trial court awarded the wife $250,000 as special equity compensation for her financial contributions to the husband's medical education, payable from his future earnings once he obtained a medical license. The appellate court reversed, holding that educational degrees and their speculative future earning capacity cannot be treated as distributable property, but remanded for consideration of alternative equitable remedies such as reimbursement for direct educational expenses.
The court held that an educational degree is not property subject to distribution as lump sum alimony or special equity because its value measured by future earning capacity is too speculative to calculate. The court also held that awards made by the trial court that were not sought in the wife's pleadings are improper.
[1] An educational degree, measured by future earning capacity, is too speculative to be considered property subject to distribution as lump sum alimony or special equity in…
[2] A general prayer for "any other benefits... …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an educational degree is not property subject to distribution as lump sum alimony in a dissolution of marriage proceeding because its value, which must be measured by future earning capacity, is too speculative to calculate”
Establishes the primary holding that educational degrees cannot be treated as distributable property due to valuation uncertainty
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties married in 1974 and had one minor child. The husband attended a foreign medical school with financial support from the wife, his parents, …
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FERGUSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution. The parties were married in 1974 and have one minor child. During the marriage, the husband attended a foreign medical school aided by the financial support of the wife, his parents, and tuition loans. The husband filed his petition for dissolution of marriage in 1982, shortly after his graduation. Since that time, he has been unsuccessful in four attempts to pass the medical examination required for .a license to practice in the United States. At the time of entry of the judgment dissolving the marriage he was employed as an assistant in a medical clinic earning a net $160 per week — less than that earned by the wife in her position as a legal secretary.
Recognizing the husband’s present inability to pay permanent or rehabilitative alimony, yet seeking to compensate the wife for her financial contributions to the husband’s education, the trial court assessed the present value of the husband’s medical training at “in excess of One Million Dollars,” and ordered him to pay the wife twenty-five percent of his net income as a special equity or an equitable distribution. The payments were to be made monthly, to commence only when the husband began to practice medicine until $250,-000 was paid. That provision of the final judgment presents the main issue in this appeal.
In Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), we held that an educational degree is not property subject to distribution as lump sum alimony in a dissolution of marriage proceeding because its value, which must be measured by future earning capacity, is too speculative to calculate. This reasoning applies equally to a special equity, which is a vested interest in property brought into or acquired during the marriage because of contribution of services or funds over and above normal marital duties. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla.1980). Therefore, we reverse the award granting the wife $250,000 as a special equity or an equitable distribution in “the fruits of the husband’s medical career.” 1
We also reverse the judgment insofar as it makes awards which were not sought by the pleadings. See Leonard v. Leonard, 414 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 424 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1983). The final judgment makes the following awards which find no support in the allegations of the wife’s counter-petition and which were not prayed for: (1) life insurance on the life of husband naming the minor child as beneficiary; and (2) private school and college education for the minor child. The general prayer in the wife’s answer/counter-petition for “any other benefits ... which [the court] deems meet and proper” is insufficient to support the award.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
. This does not preclude the trial judge, on remand, from fashioning some other equitable remedy which does justice between the parties, see Canakaris at 1202, and which does not leave one spouse "short-changed", see id. at 1204. Such an award may include, but is not limited to, reimbursement to the wife for sums advanced by her for the husband’s tuition and other expenses of medical school, reimbursement for her interest in the joint assets sold by the parties in order that the husband could attend school, and relief from liability for tuition loans by the bank to the husband which were co-signed by her.
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Freeman v. Freeman, 447 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ault is entered admits only the well-pleaded facts and acquiesces only in the relief specifically prayed for. Williams v. Williams, 227 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969). The award of relief not sought by the pleadings is error. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983). The jurisdiction of the court can be exercised only within the scope of the pleadings. Fine v. Fine, 400 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Stephen’s out-of-court agreement did not excuse Glenda’s failure to plead facts justifyin…
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French v. French, 452 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…count, to be selected by the wife.... and consistent with IRS regulations.” The husband argues that the IRS provision in the judgment should be stricken because the wife did not request establishment of an IRA account, citing Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and because federal law limits an IRA contribution to $2,000 per working person and makes no provision for establishing an IRA for an unemployed person. He argues that he would be subject to a cumulative penalty tax on the contri…
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Jahnke v. Jahnke, 804 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ng to financial issues became void when the court set it aside. We agree with the former husband that a court cannot award relief that was not requested in the pleadings. See Hines v. Hines, 494 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); McDonald v. McDonald, 732 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). However, the former wife’s rule 1.540 motion was not a “pleading.” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110. The only relevant pleading is the former wife’s counterpetition for dissoluti…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Costas v. Miranda, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Leonard v. Dortha A. Leonard, 414 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)