WILLIAM GREGORY GAWRONSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of being an accessory after the fact.
[1] Circumstantial evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction if it is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
[2] To prove the offense of accessory after the fact, the state must establish that the defendant acted with knowledge of the principal's crime and with the intent to assist…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant's car was used in an attempted robbery, and he was later found driving it with the perpetrator. The defendant claimed he had loaned the …
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DANAHY, Judge.
The appellant was convicted and sentenced for burglary, grand theft, and accessory after the fact to attempted robbery. While the circumstantial evidence adduced was sufficient to sustain the convictions for burglary and theft, we find that it was not inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt of the accessory offense. Therefore, we affirm the convictions and sentences for burglary and grand theft, but reverse the conviction for accessory after the fact.
The facts pertinent to our reversal on the accessory charge are as follows. During the early evening of October 3, 1981, an attempted robbery of Long John Silver’s restaurant in Lakeland was reported to police. A man, later identified as Wesley Twelves, entered the restaurant and walked up and down the aisle several times between the exit and the area of the cash register. Twelves stared at the register for a time and then suddenly rushed toward the cashier, Theresa Williams, who was attending the register. She threw her weight against the cash drawer, locking it. Twelves then struck her, knocking her to the floor. After he unsuccessfully. attempted to pry open the cash register drawer, he ran out the door. A customer, Raymond Muoio, heard the cashier scream and saw her fall to the floor. He immediately ran into the parking lot after Twelves to identify his car and get his license number. Twelves jumped into the passenger side of a yellow Audi with a driver who had the motor running. Mr. Muoio could not identify the driver. The car sped off. Later, Lakeland police officers engaged the same car in a high speed chase which ended when the car crashed into a police car. Twelves and Gawronski, who was the driver and owner of the car, were arrested.
At trial, Gawronski testified that he was neither at the restaurant nor driving his car at that time. Instead, he testified that he had loaned his car to Twelves earlier in the evening and that he had waited at a friend’s house for Twelves to return. When Twelves returned, he did not say where he had gone or what he had done. Gawronski then drove his car a short distance when an unmarked police car chased him causing him to be innocently frightened, whereupon his car crashed into a marked police car. He and Twelves were then arrested.
To prove the offense of accessory after the fact against Gawronski, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, he maintained, assisted, or gave Twelves aid, knowing that Twelves had committed the attempted robbery, with the intent that Twelves avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment. § 777.03, Fla.Stat. (1981); Schramm v. State, 374 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Because the evidence of defendant’s guilt was circumstantial, his conviction could not be sustained unless the evidence was both consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Thomas v. State, 374 So. 2d 508 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980); McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla.1977); Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1956); Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla.1954); Chaudoin v. State, 362 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). It is not enough that the facts create a strong probability of, and are consistent with, guilt. Rather, for a conviction to stand, those facts must also eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We find that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case was not sufficient to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The car at the restaurant was Gaw-ronski’s. The state’s theory at trial was that Gawronski was the driver at that time and that he aided Twelves’ escape knowing that Twelves had committed the attempted robbery. When the car was stopped later, Gawronski was the driver. That fact does not place Gawronski at the restaurant. No one saw him at the restaurant or in the car there. No evidence adduced by the state showed Gawronski’s story of the loan of his car to Twelves to be false. The presence of his car at the scene would demonstrate that Gawronski might have been there; but that was neither sufficient to establish his knowledge of Twelves’ crime nor proof that he aided or assisted Twelves with the intent that Twelves avoid detec tion, arrest, trial or punishment while he was possessed of that knowledge. Holley v. State, 406 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Therefore, we reverse his conviction for accessory after the fact because of insufficient evidence and direct that he be discharged for that offense. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). His other convictions and sentences for grand theft and burglary are affirmed.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Dunn v. State, 454 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…n repeatedly stated that “it is not enough that the facts create a strong probability of, and are consistent with, guilt. Rather, for a conviction to stand, those facts must also eliminate all reasonable hypothesis of innocence” (Gawronski v. State, 444 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)); that merely because the evidence “establishes some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis [guilt] rather than another [innocence]” such evidence “cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be” (Harrison v.…
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Bowen v. State, 791 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…underlying crime will often require relying solely on circumstantial evidence. In that event, the circumstantial evidence must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Gawronski v. State, 444 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Holley v. State, 406 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 3. Maintenance, Assistance, or Aid. The State must prove that Ms. Bowen provided some maintenance, assistance, or aid to Carr after he committed each crime. Although the commo…1 / 3
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Maquiera v. State, 494 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…ing that he had committed a felony or been accessory thereto before the fact, with intent that he shall avoid or escape detection, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be deemed an accessory after the fact_(emphasis supplied). See Gawronski v. State, 444 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (to prove offense of accessory after the fact to attempted robbery, state must prove that defendant maintained, assisted, or gave aid to principal, knowing that principal had committed attempted robbery with intent that principal…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978)
- Nadean O. McARTHUR v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977)
- Hoyt Dan Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956)
- Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954)
- Clark Dean Chaudoin v. State, 362 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Thomas v. State, 374 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1979)
- Missouri v. Wandix, 445 U.S. 972 (U.S. 1980)
- Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972 (U.S. 1980)
- Rodrigo Quintana v. Quintana, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)