CANRON CORPORATION, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, D/B/A TAMPER, APPELLANT,
v.
THELMA HOLT, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN E. HOLT, DECEASED, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THELMA HOLT, SURVIVING SPOUSE, MELVIN E. HOLT, II, A MINOR, AND ALEJANDRO BROWN, A MINOR, SURVIVING SONS, APPELLEES
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The appellate court reviewed a postdissolution action where the husband appealed the denial of his attorney's fees and the wife cross-appealed the dismissal of her partition complaint for the marital home.
The court reversed the dismissal of the wife's partition complaint, finding that the settlement agreement did not grant the husband an indefinite right to possess the property and that the wife could seek partition.
[1] A foreign corporation is considered to be "doing business" in Florida for jurisdictional purposes when it regularly solicits business in Florida through direct mail or by…
[2] A foreign corporation's regular solicitation of business in Florida, coupled with the presence of an employee residing in Florida to service equipment sold to Florida cus…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing dissolution, the wife filed a complaint for partition of the marital home, which the husband occupied exclusively until its sale per a settl…
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[*530] PER CURIAM.
This appeal is brought by the defendant in a products liability action from an order of the trial court determining that it had personal jurisdiction over defendant. We affirm.
At the hearing held on the motion for summary judgment the evidence showed that Canron Corporation (Canron) is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. It is not registered to conduct business in Florida and has no telephones, offices, property, or bank accounts in Florida. However, it regularly solicits business in Florida through direct mail and by sending its sales persons to visit Florida customers. It has an employee who resides in St. Augustine, Florida, whose function is to service equipment sold to its Florida customers. An affidavit filed by co-defendants/amicus curiae, Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., avers that since 1968 Canron has been dealing with Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., and its predecessors in Jacksonville for the purpose of soliciting sales of various railroad-related machinery manufactured by Can-ron. During that time, Seaboard purchased production tampers, ballast regulators, and undercutters, as well as the trac-gopher involved in the accident out of which this suit arises. The affidavit also listed a number of Canron employees with whqm the affiant had dealt over the course of the years and revealed that Canron customarily sends a representative to Florida to train purchasers in the use of equipment that it has sold. Over the years Canron has conducted a number of training sessions in Florida unrelated to any delivery of its products.
While the fatal accident occurred in Georgia, the purchase order for the trac-gopher came from the Jacksonville offices of Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., and the machine was shipped to Seaboard’s Tampa facility, at F.O.B. Canron’s South Carolina plant.
Canron takes the position that the evidence below was insufficient to show that it is “doing business” in Florida under section 48.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and if it was “doing business” in Florida the evidence was insufficient to show that appellee’s cause of action “arose from” such activity.
As to Canron’s first contention, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Canron was “doing business” in Florida within the meaning of the statute; Cf. Sanchez v. Laribee Machine Company, Inc., 409 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981).
The evidence demonstrates that among Canron’s business activities in the State of Florida was the sale and delivery of the trac-gopher involved in the instant case. There was, therefore, sufficient “connexity” between Canron’s business activities in Florida and the cause of action. See, Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher Druckgusswaremfabrik, 442 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); Shoei Safety Helment Corp. v. Conlee, 409 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), dismissed, 421 So. 2d 518 (Fla.1982); Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. J.R. Charman, 635 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…for jurisdiction over one who regularly solicits business in Florida. The case law indicates that solicitation is one factor the courts consider in deciding whether a company is conducting business in the state. For example, in Canron Corp. v. Holt, 444 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court held the defendant was “doing business” under section 48.193(l)(a) where it had regularly solicited business in Florida through direct mail and by sending its sales persons to visit Florida customers, had a service rep…
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Am. Motors Corp. & Jeep Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…manufactured nor sold in Florida. Prior to the 1984 amendments, both sections 48.181 and 48.-193 required that there be a “connexity” between the cause of action and the defendant corporation’s activities in Florida. See, e.g., Canron Corp. v. Holt, 444 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher Druckgusswaremfabrik, 442 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (rehearing granted in part and denied in part); Firestone Steel Products Co. of Canada v. Snell, 423 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); General T…
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AETNA Life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 488 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…r servicing activities carried out within the state at the time of the personal injury or property damage.6 Appellant also asserts in its motion for rehearing that this court has misapprehended and improperly relied upon Canron Corporation v. Holt, 444 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), in remanding to the trial court for a determination of the location at which the allegedly nonconforming goods were in fact delivered. It is appellant who has misapprehended this court’s holding, as well as its reason for citing…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harlan C. "Bud" Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher Druck-Gusswaremfabrik, 442 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Shoei Safety Helmet Corp. & Shoei Kako Co., Ltd. v. Conlee, 409 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Dagoberto Sanchez and Christina Sanchez v. Laribee Mach. Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)