MARVIN JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marvin Johnson was convicted of depositing a worthless check with intent to defraud in violation of Florida law. The appellate court affirmed, holding that depositing a worthless check constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to defraud under statutory presumptions.
Depositing a worthless check constitutes 'delivery' under Florida's worthless check statute and establishes prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. The statutory presumption of intent to defraud from the refusal of payment due to lack of funds remains unrefuted when the defendant deposits a worthless check and engages in conduct consistent with fraudulent intent.
[1] The act of depositing a worthless check, payment of which is refused by the drawee due to insufficient funds, constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.
[2] The term "delivery" in the context of worthless check statutes encompasses the act of depositing a check into an account.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In any prosecution or action under this chapter, the making ... or delivery of a check ... payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud”
Establishes the statutory presumption that creates prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent when a check is refused for lack of funds
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 11, 1982, Johnson deposited a $2,500 counter check signed by 'Robert Watts' into Gwendolyn Fagg's account. The teller instructed Johnson to i…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction after jury trial of depositing a worthless check with intent to defraud in violation of section 832.05(3), Florida Statutes, which provides:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, by act or common scheme, to cash or deposit any item, as defined in section 674.-104(l)(g), in any bank or depository with intent to defraud.
We affirm.
Evidence was presented at trial to show that on March 11, 1982, appellant deposited a $2,500 counter check signed by a “Robert Watts” and drawn on the Citizens State Bank of Marianna into the account of' Gwendolyn Fagg at Citizens Bank and Trust in Quincy. The teller at the Quincy bank testified that when appellant made the deposit she told him to tell Mrs. Fagg that since the check was for a large amount of money, she would have to place it under a ten day hold. Ignoring that instruction, appellant immediately informed Mrs. Fagg of the deposit without mentioning the hold placed on it, and asked her to write a check on her account for $2,500 and to take that check to First State National Bank in Bainbridge to satisfy appellant’s obligation for $2,500 to another person. Within a few days, the banks had determined that the “Robert Watts” account on which the original $2,500 check was drawn was nonexistent.
Appellant argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case should have been granted because the state failed to prove that appellant knew the check was worthless and that he had the intent to defraud Mrs. Fagg or the Quincy Bank. Statutory presumptions override appellant’s position. Section 832.07(l)(a) provides, in part:
In any prosecution or action under this chapter, the making ... or delivery of a check ... payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud ....
Contrary to appellant’s contention, we hold that the phrase “to cash or deposit” as used in section 832.05(3)(a) is encompassed within the meaning of the term “delivery” in section 832.07. There fore, appellant’s undisputed act of depositing the worthless check in Mrs. Fagg’s account amounted to a delivery of that check and thus constituted prima facie evidence of his intent to defraud. That presumption remained unrefuted and was corroborated by the evidence of appellant’s action of disregarding the bank teller’s instructions as to the hold placed on the original check. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
LARRY G. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
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Wells v. State, 807 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…486, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The provision for the demand letter is contained in subsection 832.07(1), Florida Statutes, which creates a presumption of intent to defraud. Cornell v. Jerome, 573 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Johnson v. State, 444 So. 2d 563, 564-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). If the statutory demand letter is properly sent and the maker of the check fails to pay within the time limit, then the State has the benefit of the evidence-of-intent provision of the statute. We know of no authority,…
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Stephens v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…ection 812.022(2), relating to evidence of theft or dealing in stolen property); see also J.M. v. State, 884 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (applying burglary presumption based on a defendant’s stealthy entry under section 810.07); Johnson v. State, 444 So. 2d 563, 564–65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (applying fraud presumption enumerated in section 832.07). In line with these cases, we conclude the appropriate inquiry here is whether Stephens provided an unrefuted explanation as to where the offense was committed. If…