THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SEYMOUR PLASNER, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-01-24
No. 83-1588
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL and HUBBART, JJ.
444 So. 2d 1077 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984)

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Synopsis

Florida appealed the dismissal of an arson information charging Seymour Plasner, arguing the trial court erred in finding prosecutorial delay from August 1981 (fire) to December 1982 (arrest) warranted dismissal. The court held that a defendant seeking dismissal for prosecutorial delay bears the burden of proving prejudice, which Plasner failed to do.


Holding

A defendant seeking dismissal based on prosecutorial delay bears the burden of showing prejudice. Plasner failed to meet this burden. The removal of debris by non-state actors does not limit the state's statutory time to file charges absent proof of prejudice. Expert testimony suggesting alternative causes for the fire does not constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant dismissal.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant seeking dismissal of charges due to prosecutorial delay bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

[2] The state is not limited to a four-month period to file charges for arson, but rather has the statutory time to bring a charge unless the delay prejudices the defendant.

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Key Quotes

“In order to secure a dismissal of an indictment or information because of a prosecutorial delay in the filing of the charges, a defendant has the burden of showing prejudice.”

Establishes the legal standard that a defendant must prove prejudice to obtain dismissal for prosecutorial delay.

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Facts & Procedural History

A fire occurred in August 1981. Debris from the fire was removed from the premises three to four months later by persons not under state control. Plas…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an information because of prosecutorial delay from the date of a fire in August, 1981 until an arrest for arson in December, 1982. In order to secure a dismissal of an indictment or information because of a prosecutorial delay in the filing of the charges, a defendant has the burden of showing prejudice. Barber v. State, 438 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); See also State v. Parent, 408 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

In the instant arson case it is clear that the defendant never met this burden. The defendant contended that because the debris from the fire was removed from the premises some three to four months after the fire; by persons not under control of the state, he was thereby prevented from examining the debris to determine if it might disclose a defense to the arson charge. Under this reasoning the state would not have the statutory time to file a charge, but would be limited to a period of approximately four months in the instant case. A person does not have a right to be arrested. The state has the statutory time to bring a charge unless the delay prejudices a defendant. See Barber v. State, supra and State v. Parent, supra. The. evidence tendered by the defendant does not show prejudice, but to the contrary, demonstrates some doubt, as to whether or not the fire was started by arson. His experts revealed by their testimony, from examination of the evidence that was preserved, that there was a possibility of the fire starting from causes other than arson.

Therefore, for the reasons above stated the order of dismissal is reversed and the matter is returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded with directions.


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