U-HAUL COMPANY, AN OHIO CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND GLASGOW AND DAVIS COMPANY, APPELLEES
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U-Haul Company appealed an order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. The court held that a trailer constitutes a motor vehicle under Florida law for purposes of service of process, and affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
A trailer is a motor vehicle within the contemplation of Florida Statutes Section 48.171 for purposes of service of process on nonresident owners. The court distinguished prior cases addressing whether a trailer is a dangerous instrumentality, holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle applies for licensing and service of process purposes.
[1] A trailer is considered a motor vehicle for the purposes of Section 48.171, Florida Statutes, governing service on nonresident motor vehicle owners.
[2] Statutory definitions of "motor vehicle" and "trailer" are controlling in determining the applicability of statutes related to vehicle operation and service of process.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trailer is a motor vehicle within contemplation of Section 48.-171, Florida Statutes (1981)”
States the core holding that trailers are included within the statutory definition of motor vehicle for service of process purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceU-Haul Company, an Ohio corporation, was served with process in connection with a lawsuit involving Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Glasgow and D…
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WALDEN, Judge.
U-Haul Company appeals from an order denying its motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. We affirm.
First, U-Haul says that a trailer is not a “motor vehicle” with the consequence that Section 48.171, Florida Statutes (1981), entitled, Service on Nonresident Motor Vehicle Owners, etc., is not applicable. We disagree and hold that a trailer is a motor vehicle within contemplation of Section 48.-171, Florida Statutes (1981). We support this with the definition found in Chapter 320, Florida Statutes (1979), Motor Vehicle Licenses, as follows:
320.01 Definitions, general. — In construing these statutes, when applied to motor vehicles, and when the context permits, the word, phrase, or term:
(1) “Motor vehicle” includes:
(a) Automobiles, motorcycles, motor trucks, trailers, semitrailers, tractor trailer combinations, and all other vehicles operated over the public streets and highways of this state and used as a means of transporting persons or property over the public streets and highways and propelled by power other than muscular power, but does not include traction engines, road rollers, such vehicles as run only upon a track, bicycles, or “mopeds,” as defined in subsection 316.-003(2). (emphasis added)
(b) A recreational vehicle-type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle....
Further, this statute defines trailer:
(6) “Trailer” includes all four-wheel vehicles coupled to, or drawn by a motor vehicle.
U-Haul relies upon Powell v. Henry, 224 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), and Garcia v. Mid-Florida Hauling, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), for the proposition that a trailer is not a motor vehicle. We distinguish and disregard them because there the question was whether or not a trailer is a dangerous instrumentality, a totally different issue. It is our position that a trailer is a motor vehicle per statute for certain purposes such as licensing or service of process. However, a trailer may not be a motor vehicle within the context of whether or not it is a dangerous instrumentality so as to impose vicarious liability.
U-Haul’s remaining point is without merit.
Affirmed.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and BERANEK, J., concur.
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Edwards v. ABC Transp. Co., 616 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…the First and the Third District Courts of Appeal, the court in Pullman held that the trailer portion of a tractor-trailer rig is not a dangerous instrumentality for purposes of imposing vicarious liability. See U-Haul Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (trailer is a motor vehicle for purposes of licensing or service of process but is not a [*145] motor vehicle under dangerous instrumentality doctrine); Garcia v. Mid-Florida Hauling, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (tr…
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Pullman, Inc. v. Johnson, 543 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…of a tractor-trailer rig is not a dangerous instrumentality for the purpose of applying the vicarious liability policy enunciated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). See U-Haul Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Garcia v. Mid-Florida Hauling, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Foster v. Lee, 226 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Powell v. Henry, 224 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. dismissed, 231 So. 2d 518 (Fla.1970). See also…
Authorities Cited
- Garcia v. Mid-Florida Hauling, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Powell v. Henry, 224 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Cleveland Myers, Jr. v. State, 224 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)