MAYRA URBIETA, APPELLANT,
v.
GUILLERMO URBIETA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This appeal concerns attorneys' fees awarded to discharged counsel in a dissolution of marriage case. The appellate court reversed a trial court's award of $1,000 to the former attorneys, finding it inadequate and an abuse of discretion, and remanded for proper enforcement of the charging lien and reconsideration of reasonable fees.
The court reversed the fee award as an abuse of discretion, finding it not in keeping with the time expended and importance of legal services rendered. The court held that where an attorney is discharged, the trial court must determine the reasonable value of services rendered, limited by the maximum contract fee, and must properly adjudicate any charging lien.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when an award of attorneys' fees is so inadequate as to be unsupported by the evidence.
[2] When an attorney is discharged by a client, the court must determine the reasonable value of services rendered, limited by the maximum contract fee.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where an attorney has been discharged by a client the court is required to determine the reasonable value of the services rendered, limited by the maximum contract fee.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining fees owed to discharged counsel in Florida.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStabinski & Funt, P.A. was hired by the wife to represent her in a dissolution of marriage action at $100 per hour. After the firm spent considerable …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Reasonable Value Of Services cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from orders awarding attorneys’ fees of $1,000.00 to appellant’s former attorneys and denying rehearing on the fee award in an action for dissolution of marriage.
The law firm of Stabinski & Funt, P.A. was employed by the wife to represent her in an action for dissolution of marriage' instituted by the husband, and entered into an agreement which provided that the wife would pay its fees of $100.00 per hour, together with costs and other expenses. After her attorneys had spent many hours in advancing her cause, the wife discharged the Stabinski law firm and hired another attorney. The trial court permitted the substitution and gave the discharged lawyers a charging lien for all fees and costs. Subsequently, the husband and the wife entered into a settlement agreement whereby the husband obligated himself to pay the wife’s attorneys’ fees and other benefits. The substituted attorney filed a motion to tax costs and assess his fees.
Upon hearing, the Stabinski law firm presented expert testimony stating that $5,800.00 was a reasonable fee. However, the court ordered the husband to pay them only $1,000.00 and the substituted attorney, $3,000.00. The Stabinski law firm filed a motion for rehearing requesting the trial court to consider the employment agreement and the firm’s charging lien. Rehearing was denied, but the firm was given leave to file a petition for determination of its fee owed by the wife pursuant to their agreement and the lien. The court denied the petition in view of its prior award of fees to the firm from the husband, and thereafter denied a motion for rehearing.
The wife’s former attorneys urge reversal on the ground that the award of attorneys’ fees of $1,000.00 on this record was so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We agree and reverse.
Where an attorney has been discharged by a client the court is required to determine the reasonable value of the services rendered, limited by the maximum contract fee. See Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla.1982); see also Behar v. Root, 393 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. Fisher, 390 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
It is clear in this case that the fee allowed the wife’s former attorneys is not in keeping with the time expended and the importance of the legal services rendered and furthermore, that the evidence, testimonial and documentary, does not support the trial court’s rulings as to the award of legal fees to which said attorneys are entitled. March v. March, 395 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. Fisher, supra; Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The court additionally erred in failing to adjudicate the charging lien of the Stabinski law firm. See Baucom v. Baucom, 397 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), modified sub nom Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.1983) (wife’s attorneys not entitled to pursue husband for their fees, despite perfected' charging lien, where wife agreed to settlement which made her liable for fees); de la Cruz v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
Therefore the orders appealed are reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enforce the charging lien of the Stabinski law firm and to grant a rehearing on the petition of said attorneys and award them a fee in an amount based upon a further consideration of the record and the controlling principles of law.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brodie, 602 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…mployment agreement; he is entitled to recover, [*1362] under quantum meruit, only for the value of services he performed prior to his discharge. See Trend Coin v. Fuller, Feingold & Mallah, 538 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla.3d DCA 1989); Urbieta v. Urbieta, 446 So. 2d 230 (Fla.3d DCA 1984). We are not persuaded by Brodie’s argument that FDIC waived its “quantum meruit defense” by failing to assert it as required by 1.110(d). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b) provides that an affirmative defense under Rule 1.1…
-
Spano v. Bruce, 62 So. 3d 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…re, a review of the attorney’s fee award in the mother’s favor appears inadequate, and the attorney’s fee order lacks the requisite findings to justify the award. An inadequate award of attorney’s fees is subject to reversal. See Urbieta v. Urbieta, 446 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2009), provides for Title IV-D cases and non-IVD family law cases. In Title IV-D cases, section 61.16 states that attorney’s…
-
Urbieta v. Urbieta, 469 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982)
- Sinclair v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983)
- Bart M. Behar v. Root, 393 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Documation, Inc. v. Pence, 390 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Micaela de la Cruz v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- March v. March, 395 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Baucom v. Baucom, 397 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)