JAMES ALLAN ROESCH A/K/A MICHAEL PHILLIPS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenges his sentence claiming the trial court failed to properly credit him for jail time served as a condition of probation and time served on probation violation charges. The court reverses and remands, holding that Florida law requires credit for all jail time served as a probation condition plus time on probation violation warrants, without duplication.
A defendant is entitled to credit for any jail time served as a condition of probation and all time served on warrants charging probation violation, though without duplication of credit against other sentences. The trial court's calculation of 164 days credit was insufficient and the case must be remanded for proper recalculation with specific dates documented.
[1] A court must give a defendant credit for jail time served as a condition of probation.
[2] A defendant is entitled to credit for all time served on warrants charging violation of probation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida law requires that a court must give a defendant credit for any jail time served as a condition of probation.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that jail time served as a probation condition must be credited.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant pled guilty to grand theft and was placed on probation for eighteen months with a special condition to reside in county jail for 171 days. H…
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying in part appellant’s rule 3.850 motion to correct his sentence.
In his motion appellant alleges that after he pled guilty to a charge of grand theft, the court placed him on probation for eighteen months with the special condition that he reside in the county jail for 171 days.1 He further alleges that he was arrested on January 6, 1982, on probation violation charges and was incarcerated until January 30, 1982, at which time the trial court entered an order extending his probation for eighteen months.
On April 12, 1982, appellant was arrested on new criminal charges and his probation was temporarily revoked. Appellant was held in jail until July 28, 1982, when his probation was permanently revoked and he was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment with credit for 144 days jail time.
Pursuant to a previous rule 3.850 motion, the court “corrected” appellant’s sentence to reflect credit for 147 days of jail time.
Appellant now contends that the trial court erred by not giving him credit for time served in county jail as a condition of probation and by failing to calculate his total time of incarceration during his probation period. Appellant alleges that he was entitled to 301 days of jail credit. The trial court in its order on the instant motion gave the appellant an additional seventeen days credit, stating that from the record it appeared appellant was entitled to a total of 164 days credit.
Florida law requires that a court must give a defendant credit for any jail time served as a condition of probation. State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1976); Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Hence, if appellant’s allegations are true, he is entitled to credit for at least 171 days spent in jail (time served) as a condition of his probation. Appellant is also entitled to all time served on warrants charging violation of probation, Calhoun v. State, 403 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), though he is not entitled to duplication of any credit he may have been given against other sentences. Miller v. State, 297 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
Since we cannot tell how the sentencing court arrived at its conclusion to allow only 164 days of credit time, we reverse and remand for further consideration of this issue. In determining the proper credit time, the trial court should specify the exact dates of appellant’s incarceration in order to provide an adequate record should further review be requested.
RYDER and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . Since appellant avers that he had already been incarcerated 171 days at the time he was sentenced, it appears that the trial court was sen-fencing appellant to time served as a condition of his probation.
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Chaplin v. State, 473 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…re cognizable on direct appeal. We think that the sentencing computation error alleged in this case can be analogized to those cases which have permitted post-conviction relief for errors in the computation of credit for jail time. Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Lamar v. State, supra; Jablonskis v. State, 422 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Although this type of sentencing error may be raised by way of direct appeal, the courts have nevertheless allowed it to be remedied in post-convicti…
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Crosby v. State, 487 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…t time served incarcerated while awaiting judgment and sentence on the violation proceedings. See see. 921.161, Fla. Stat. (1983); State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1976); Kirkman v. Wainwright, 465 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Dickerson v. State, 427 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Hernandez v. State, 396 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Accordingly, we reverse the sentences as construed and remand with…
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Lavrich v. State, 633 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…or the underlying offense. Davis v. State, 543 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989). Therefore, we remand to the lower court to assess how long Lavrich was in custody for the violation of community control or the underlying offenses. See Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984) (where reviewing court [*1179] could not tell how the sentencing court arrived at its conclusion to allow 164 days credit for time served, it reversed and remanded for further consideration of the issue); and Hernandez v. State,…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)
- Winston v. State, 297 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Miller v. State, 297 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Calhoun v. State, 403 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)